Changing Statehood: The spatial transformation of the Finnish state by Leppänen, Laura
Changing statehood:
The spatial transformation









SARJA - SER. AII  OSA - TOM. 260




From the Department of  Geography and Geology
Faculty of  Mathematics and Natural Sciences




Department of  Geography
University of  Oulu
Oulu, Finland
Professor Harri Andersson
Department of  Geography and Geology
University of  Turku
Turku, Finland
Professor Pentti Yli-Jokipii
Department of  Geography and Geology
University of  Turku
Turku, Finland
Reviewed by
Professor Andrew E. G. Jonas
Department of  Geography








Department of  Regional Studies





Painosalama Oy, Turku, Finland 2011
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
In recent years, interdisciplinary research uniting sociological and geographical knowl-
edge, political sciences and historical perspectives have emerged in order to study the
changing statehood under contemporary capitalism (Brenner 2004a: 1; Moisio & Vasanen
2008: 20). In the background of  this research theme is the understanding of  the state
not as a self-enclosed geographical container of  socio-economic and politico-cultural
relations (cf. Agnew 1994: 91–92; Brenner 1999a: 40) but rather as a manifestation of
global politico-economic, ideological and power structures in a certain historical situ-
ation (Moisio 2008: 7). That is to say that the state as a political, economic, social and
cultural construct is seen as subject to constant transformation over the course of  time
(cf. Moisio 2009a).
The transformation of  statehood occurs as a response to internal and external po-
litico-economic pressures towards the state. This suggests that statehood is adjusted
to the ongoing politico-economic challenges. Currently, the emergence of  neoliberal
thinking and economic globalization has challenged the prevalent ways of  thinking
with regard to statehood. The ongoing politico-economic global transformation has
constructed new forms of  statehood, often characterised as competition states, work-
fare states, internationalized states, post-Keynesian states or post-Fordist states (see
Cerny 1990, 1997; Peck 2001; Jessop 2002a; Brenner 2004a: 1). These new forms of
statehood have challenged, replaced or partly superseded the previous forms of  state-
hood often characterised as a Keynesian welfare national state or welfare state (cf. Peck
2001; Jessop 2002a; Brenner 2004a). However, the transformation of  statehood is a
highly contextual phenomenon, which becomes visible in the different temporal and
contentual adoption of  the emerged new forms of  statehood. A particularly typical
feature for the conceptualisations of  reworked statehood is the understanding of  scalar
restructuration of  state power between a national state, subnational units and suprana-
tional actors, in other words a scale sensitive approach to state theory which has been
adapted in recent years.
Among the interdisciplinary studies of  changing statehood, scholars have particu-
larly examined the socio-political struggle of  state power and its consequences on state-
hood and state spatiality (see e.g. Brenner 1998; 1999b; 2003b; 2004a). When exam-
ining state space as a central dimension of  political activity, the central governmental
problem at a given time becomes crucial in understanding the changing statehood. The
general idea is that the state governance can itself  be conceived as a problematising and
problem-solving activity closely connected with the territorial practices of  the state. In
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this context, as the political problem of  the state has been altered, the methods for an-
swering the central governmental problem at a given time have also been modi  ed or
changed. This has simultaneously reworked the state spatiality. The interaction between
state apparatus and state space provides an informative research focus to the study on
changing statehood.
When studying the state space as a central dimension of  political activity, those
measures, like regional policy, which affect state spatial transformation and state ter-
ritorial structure, becomes relevant. However, the study of  regional politics in the
Finnish context has often ignored the values in the background of  regional political
decision-making; this is to say that the basic task of  regional policy and ways of  ration-
alising regional policy has rarely been touched upon (Remahl 2008: 15). The research
interest which has emerged regarding state transformation, in which the interest is on
state space and state apparatus but also on rationalisations on central political prob-
lems, state’s success and surviving against global competition, approaches the study of
state spatiality in a new way (e.g. Moisio 2008, Moisio & Leppänen 2007). It provides a
way to examine the changing statehood, regional policy and state spatiality by combin-
ing state theoretical, regional theoretical and socio-political perspectives in the study of
regional development and regional politics, an approach that will enrich the production
of  information in the research  eld; it also give opportunities to raise the value of
the subject matter in socio-political discussions (Remahl 2008: 15). The study of  state
transformation opens a new approach to the study of  regional politics; the political
changes and their in  uence on changing statehood are discussed not adhering the mere
sectoral or formal understanding of  regional policy but rather discussing all the policy
measures contributing to state spatiality. In a similar vein, the basic research concerning
regional political processes has not received as much attention; the majority of  Finnish
research on regional politics is applied, and it quite often strengthens the prevailing po-
litical practices (Remahl 2008: 15). In order to examine changing statehood in Finland,
I have adopted a critical political-geographical approach; an interdisciplinary viewpoint
combining the geographical knowledge and political sciences in studying both the his-
torical development of  changing statehood and in examining the future development
of  statehood – this is an approach which has not been applied very often in the Finn-
ish research on regional policy and regional development.
Finland as a Nordic welfare state provides an interesting context for my study of
changing statehood. Finland can be considered as representing a social democratic re-
gime of  welfare states (see Esping-Andersen 1990) in which social and regional equal-
ity have been adopted as core values and an objective in the spatial development. In
Finland, the Keynesian-oriented objectives of  social and regional equality have for a
long time been manifested as the spatial form of  statehood of  a balanced spatially de-
centralised welfare state (Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 26). However, the Finnish state, pre-
viously seen as a geographically remote and culturally relatively isolated state, has thus
been challenged by the recent politico-economic global development trends, usually
labelled as globalization. When compared particularly to the Central European states,
Finland was relatively slow in opening itself  up to the world economy and adopting
neoliberal principles (cf. Brenner 2004a). However, the doctrines of  neoliberalism have
been particularly in  uential in the Finnish context since the deep economic depression
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of  the 1990s. The sparsely populated and export-oriented state with no major natural
resources such as oil or gas has been “forced” to reconsider its state politics and state
strategies in the face of  new politico-economic challenges. The reconsideration of  state
politics and state strategies in Finland became particularly apparent after the perceived
regulatory failure of  Keynesian welfare policies and its consequences: the declining
pro  tability of  traditional mass-production industries and the  nancing and legitimacy
crisis which culminated in the economic recession of  the 1990s. After the assumed
regulatory failure of  Keynesian welfare policies, the basic values of  the Finnish Nordic
welfare state, those of  regional and social equality, have been exposed to re-evaluation.
As the political problem of  the Finnish state has been altered from maintaining sov-
ereignty and other security-political related issues towards surviving in global economic
competition and constructing economic growth, the methods for answering the central
governmental problem at a given time have also altered and reworked state spatiality.
Competing state strategies and state spatial strategies have emerged aiming to enhance
the competitiveness and “survival” of  Finland in various global politico-economic
scales, arenas or networks. The path-dependent character of  the changing statehood
and the transformation of  state spatiality cause, however, inertia in the dynamics of
changing statehood and the transformation of  state spatiality in Finland. The Finnish
peculiarity seems to be that the politics of  “one nation” and particularly the principles
of  social and regional equality have hindered the most radical reforms to change the
spatial structures of  the state.
1.2. Research questions
This study deals with the interaction between the state apparatus and state space, par-
ticularly the changing statehood in Finland. My aim is to examine the politico-econom-
ic processes which potentially challenge the historically constructed spatial con  gura-
tions of  the Finnish state. In order to study the current political-economic processes
of  statehood, particularly the changing meanings given to state space, engaging with
the interdisciplinary  eld of  state theory provides an insightful perspective. I have par-
ticularly utilised Neil Brenner’s (2004a: 89–94) conceptualisation of  the state spatial
form, state spatial projects and state spatial strategies which refer to the capacity of
state institutions to in  uence and “mould” the geographies of  accumulation. In this
context, Neil Brenner’s (2004a: 4) conceptualisation of  statehood is promising. He has
attempted to minimise references to “the” state as a singular noun because of  its prob-
lematic nature: it refers to a state as a single national geographical scale subordinated to
a national political centre. Instead, Brenner prefers the term statehood, because it does
not
“ontologically prejudge the con  guration of  state scalar organi-
zation, the level of  state centralization, or the degree of  institu-
tional isomorphism among state agencies. While we shall see that
political strategies to establish a centralized, nationalized hierarchy
of  state power have indeed played a key role throughout much of
the twentieth century, they are today being widely superseded as
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a more polycentric, multiscalar, and non-isomorphic con  guration
of  statehood is created” (Brenner 2004a: 4).
In addition to the conceptualisation of  statehood and its change, one of  the central
concepts in my study is the spatial transformation of  statehood by which I refer to the
spatial consequences of  the changing statehood, particularly the spatial restructuring
of  the state and the re-conceptualisation of  the state space. The changing statehood
becomes visible in state space for example as the territorial structure of  the state, in
locating and relocating state actitivies and in different valuations of  state space at dif-
ferent times.
A slightly different perspective, as well as criticism of  the theoretical framing of
“new state spaces”, is provided in the exploitations of  the theoretical constructions on
the emergent “city-regionalism”, “new regionalism”, “new city-regionalism” or “com-
petitive city-regionalism” (e.g. Scott 1996; MacLeod 2001; Jones & MacLeod 2004;
Ward & Jonas 2004; Harrison 2006; Harrison 2007; MacLeavy & Harrison 2010). As
far as this study is concerned, the most valuable offering of  the literature on city-re-
gionalism is the examination of  the reterritorialisation of  the state and territorial con-
structions of  new state spaces; how territorial forms are constructed and reconstructed
politically through actually existing everyday acts and struggles, the changing role of
state and state politics concerning distribution in various localities, spaces and scales
across the city-regions (e.g. Jonas & Ward 2007: 170). Jonas and Ward (2007: 172) have
noted that city-regions, as political and social constructions, are an integral part of  the
state rescaling process and state reterritorialisation but at the same time, however, they
warn about looking at city-regions as an autonomous force of  global economic and
political change, as a distinct “actor-scale”. They continue by claiming that city-regions
are produced through material politics and struggles on diverse scales and have empha-
sised the presently understated role of  class interests, political alliance formation, and
actually existing struggles and strategies developed around e.g. investments, collective
consumption and electoral arrangements when examining the role of  city-regions in
contemporary capitalism (see Jonas & Ward 2007: 172; Ward & Jonas 2004: 2119). The
trend towards “competitive city-regionalism” is understood as representing an ongo-
ing, dynamic but at the same time con  icting politics of  and in space rather than a
smooth switch to a new post-national era of  capitalist territory (Ward & Jonas 2004:
2134). At the same time, John Harrison (2006: 21) has presented a critique of  the new
regionalism, claiming that, at least to some extent, it has neglected the role of  the state
in the resurgence of  regions in the reconstituted capitalist space economy. He identi  es
the need for understanding the function of  city-regions within the context of  national
social formations and the role of  the nation-state in shaping subnational territorial
spaces (Harrison 2007: 324). The new regionalism provides some insightful observa-
tions, particularly on the reterritorialisation of  the state and the role of  actually existing
material political practises. However, combining the state theoretical and geographical
views, particularly when examining changing statehood, still requires more wide-rang-
ing considerations of  the state when considering this study.
The empirical part of  my study is concerned with two political spaces. Firstly, I
focus on the temporal dimension of  changing statehood and the transformation of
the Finnish state spatiality. I undertake a profound investigation into policy-making
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with historical and present perspectives in order to conceptualise the temporal aspects
of  changing statehood. My focus is on the changing relationship between space and
power in the context of  state, with particular attention to the interaction between state
apparatus and state space and the spatial consequences of  political choices intended to
respond to the political problems at a given time. However, my primary focus is not
on the consequences of  changing statehood, but rather to examine the production of
this transformation which consists mainly of  political activity, political discourse and
rhetoric in a particular historical and geographical context. I am, however, interested in
the spatial aspects of  changing statehood. Secondly, my purpose is to focus on regional
political space and regional actors in order to examine the ways in which the elite of
regional actors reason and understand the changing statehood, and its spatial aspects in
the Finnish context in particular. Furthermore, I scrutinise the regional actors’ meth-
ods to “locate” the region of  Southwest Finland in the multi-level politico-economic
operational environment. I am also interested in their ways of  managing and develop-
ing their spaces of  engagement (see Cox 1998), the politico-economic spaces where
the regional actors operate in order to secure their local interests.
I set three research questions which are dealt separately in the following empirical
sections:
• What are the key dimensions of  the changing state strategies from the mid-
1960s up to the present time? How these key dimensions are manifested in state
spatiality?
• How are political struggles in state spatial strategies manifested in regional ac-
tors’ ways of  perceiving “the Helsinki metropolitan region” and the recent
emergence of  metropolis politics?
• What are the key strategies that regional actors in Southwest Finland have ap-
plied in order to respond to the present challenges in their operational environ-
ment?
I have divided the empirical part of  the study into three chapters. In these empirical
chapters, I have analysed each research question separately. In the  rst empirical chap-
ter I examine political rhetoric, and particularly how the political state strategies from
1965 up to the present day are manifested. I have chosen the mid-1960s as the  rst
year of  investigation due to the beginning of  “of  cial” regional policy legislation in
Finland taking place in 1966. In this chapter, I have referred state strategies as political
strategies, “initiatives to mobilise state institutions in order to promote particular forms
of  socioeconomic intervention” (Brenner 2004a: 88). I aim at providing a context sen-
sitive theorisation regarding the gradual transformation of  Finnish Keynesian welfare
state policies towards the more competition-oriented state strategies and state spatiality.
I scrutinise the changing state strategies of  Finland from the mid-1960s up to the
present time targeted to respond to the contemporary political problems. I have based
the analysis in the  rst empirical chapter on the conceptualisation of  the “central gov-
ernmental problem” or the “state paradigm” of  state administration being constituted
in the discursive structures of  regional politics. When considering the regional devel-
opment in Finland, it has become common to distinguish the “large” and “small” re-
gional policy from each other in regional policy measures and funding. The Ministry of
the Interior (2004: 8) de  nes the “small” regional policy as referring to those measures
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targeted directly on regional development, which mainly signi  es the public funding
aiming to improve living conditions and the business environment of  a speci  c region.
On the other hand, the “large” regional policy refers to the  nance and development
measures which are directed to different regions also without speci  ed regional policy
objectives. It covers all those measures of  the state which are not directly targeted to
a speci  c region but which nonetheless have strong regional in  uences, for example
taking care of  the basic services in regions or income transfers. Although the develop-
ment of  transport infrastructure and technology for example are advised by nationwide
objectives, these policy branches are also central for regional development. Therefore
in general, it should be noted that the “large” regional policy is central for regional de-
velopment. (Ministry of  the Interior 2004; Ministry of  Employment and the Economy
2011.) Tea Remahl (2008: 46) has noted that nowadays it is common to display the
regional political measures by emphasising its fragmented segments like rural policy, ur-
ban policy or innovation policy at the same time bypassing the term “regional policy”
or using it only when concerning the spatial aspects of  the policy segments. She argues
that the transformation of  the term “regional policy” has occurred due to the trans-
formation of  regional policy contents from supporting the less developed regions in
state space towards enhancing the competitiveness of  the whole state by exploiting the
endogenous strengths of  various regions (Remahl 2008: 46). In some cases, the term
“regional policy” has even acquired negative nuances; it is seen as a rather controversial
issue in politicking. When studying the changing statehood in general, it is not nec-
essary to particularly distinguish the “large” or “small” regional policy measures but
rather to examine the measures affecting the statehood in its entirety. Consequently, I
treat state governance itself  as a problem-solving “activity” closely connected to the
territorial practices of  the state.
At the core of  the  rst empirical chapter are the changing characteristics of  inward-
looking (the national scale) and outward-looking (beyond the national scale) state strat-
egies in Finland and the attempts of  state apparatus to create either territorial cohesion
or territorial differentiation in Finland. In the  rst empirical chapter, I have based the
analysis which concerns years 1965–2011 on rich empirical material, mainly state budg-
ets. In the  rst empirical chapter, I demonstrate that a paradigmatic shift in the ways
of  understanding the Finnish state’s central governmental problem from “the regimes
of  national survival” to “the international competition regimes” evidently causes pres-
sures for state spatiality. I have widened the discussion from state strategies to include
the emerged spatial forms of  statehood that the state strategies and state spatial strate-
gies have produced over the course of  time. My purpose is particularly to study the
changing meanings given to state space as the governments have sought to respond to
the central political problem of  the state in speci  c historical contexts. I also discuss
the presented future visions, structures and state spatial forms. The chapter draws a
conclusion that a change from the regimes of  national survival to international compe-
tition regimes increasingly in  uences the interaction between the Finnish state and its
territory.
In the second empirical chapter I examine how regional actors perceive and un-
derstand the changing statehood. In the Finnish public policy debate, there is a con-
sensus on the need to rework the Finnish society to better respond to the emerging
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socio-political challenges. The reworking of  society has led to a spatial restructuring of
state and to a re-conceptualisation of  the state space, i.e. the spatial manifestation of
state power, as the government seeks to respond to various political challenges by en-
hancing the competitiveness and pursuing survival in various politico-economic spaces,
scales or networks. Thus, in view of  this ongoing transformation and the somewhat
unclear trends away from spatial decentralisation and towards spatial centralisation of
the statehood, I have found it crucial to explore how regional actors perceive and rea-
son the recent regional development. I have approached the second research question
by empirically studying how the political struggles of  state spatial strategies emerge in
regional actors’ ways of  perceiving measures to develop city-regionalism, in this par-
ticular case, the Helsinki metropolitan region and the recent emergence of  metropolis
politics in Finland. I argue that a consensus still exists on the legitimacy of  the welfare
state. Since the changing statehood is manifested as a series of  political struggles over
state spatial strategies in a discursive space, I have used the Q methodology which
combines both qualitative and quantitative aspects in order to evaluate the strategies
involved in the Finnish situation. Consequently, I have discussed the Q methodology
in its entirety in the empirical chapter 5. My reason for using this is the strong meth-
odological orientation of  the research process in the Q methodology; my purpose is to
construct a better understanding of  the Q methodological procedure, from the gather-
ing of  data to the interpretation of  results.
The present understanding of  state scalar organisations, not merely as sites for po-
litical strategies but also as mechanisms or outcomes of  those political strategies, em-
phasises the understanding of  state scalar structures as being historically malleable,
reworked through the political strategies that they enable (Brenner 2009: 126). Theories
of  state rescaling often imply that the power of  the nation-state has  owed upwards
to the supranational scale and international institutional structures, downwards to the
regional scale and/or re-differentiated vertically (Jessop 2004: 53; Jessop 2008: 199).
The integration of  Europe, programme-based regional policy of  the European Union
together with new regionalism have all contributed to the “rise of  regions” on a Euro-
pean territory. The national compensatory regional policies have partly been replaced
with competition and growth policies and the role of  regions has been emphasised in
spatial dynamics. Regions have increasingly been participating in multi-level politico-
economic relations in the era of  deepening European integration and economic glo-
balization. A growing demand exists among regional actors to operate within interna-
tional politico-economic networks, arenas or scale in order to maximise the  nancial
bene  ts to be gained from the European Union’s programme-based regional politics
and structural funding interventions in particular. In addition, pressures to represent
the interests of  regional actors in both a national and an interregional politico-econom-
ic arena have emerged as the regions have increased their importance as both political
and economic actors in the state space. Regions are therefore becoming increasingly
obliged to participate in multi-level politico-economic relations and to adopt strategies
and policies of  their own in order to bene  t from national and international funding
sources and thereby secure their local interests in their pursuit to “survive” in a situa-
tion of  interregional competition.
8 Changing statehood: The spatial transformation of the Finnish state
The aforementioned phenomenon has formed a framework for the third empirical
chapter in which I concentrate on regions that are increasingly participating in multi-
level politico-economic relations in an era of  deepening European integration and eco-
nomic globalization. In doing so, they have adopted strategies for securing the local
interest, their spaces of  dependence (see Cox 1998) and survival in a situation of  inter-
regional competition. The rescaling of  the Finnish state provides a speci  c geographi-
cal context for examining regional actors’ key strategies in managing and constructing
new spaces of  engagement, “the space in which the politics of  securing a space of  de-
pendence unfolds” (Cox 1998: 2). I examine the spatial transformation of  state power
by focusing on the evolving regional strategies and practises through which the case
study region, Southwest Finland, is currently being relocated in the politico-economic
world “above” and “beyond” the national political space by regional actors in the pur-
suit of  securing their local interests. Regional actors seek to defend their interests, in
other words their existing spaces of  dependence and also construct new spaces of
engagement in order to be able to survive in the constantly transforming politico-eco-
nomic surroundings. My purpose is to examine the ways that regional actors pursue
the defence of  their interests in the multi-level politico-economic surroundings. I also
examine the ways in which the regional actors in Southwest Finland seek to position
their region’s relative location within the spatial structure of  Europe, in other words
the application of  their skills in the territorial positioning of  a region (cf. Sykes & Shaw
2008: 60–61).
Before engaging with these empirical issues, I introduce conceptual schemas and
construct an in-depth theoretical framework through which the research questions pre-
sented are clear to comprehend. The interdisciplinary  eld of  state theory in particular
provides a useful framework for scrutinising the current political-economic processes
which not only alter the practices of  regional actors within Finland but also potentially
challenge the historically constructed spatial con  gurations of  the state.
The purpose of  the theoretical framework is threefold. Firstly, my purpose is to in-
troduce the philosophical-methodological framework for this study. I pay particular at-
tention to the development of  critical science and critical political geography particularly
concentrating on the development of  inter- or post-disciplinary approaches to state the-
ory. Secondly, my purpose is to scrutinise the usage of  the concept of  scale in spatially-
oriented research. I thus argue that the transformation of  statehood is closely connected
with the conceptualisations of  both scale and space. Therefore, I dissect the closely
intertwined concepts of  scale and space in the same context. I also discuss the current
state rescaling research, concentrating particularly on the theoretical notions of  scale
and the changing conceptualisations of  space. I present the changing conceptualisa-
tion of  the concept of  space from a pre-given, state-centric, unchanging territorial plat-
form where social actions occur into more processual notions (cf. Brenner 1999a: 41).
I also discuss the changing conceptualisation of  scale which is based on a processual
notion of  geographical categories. The one-dimensional approach to the scale concept
has been questioned (see e.g. Cox 1998; Mans  eld 2005; Cerny 2006; Jessop, Brenner
& Jones 2008; Brenner 2009; Jonas 2011) for quite some time now and new openings
towards multi-dimensional approaches on socio-spatial relations have been introduced.
My third objective in the theoretical chapter is to discuss the spatial construction of
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state power under contemporary capitalism. I examine this by scrutinising the chang-
ing spatiality of  modern capitalism from the Keynesian-oriented welfare state towards
the competition-oriented regimes. I present three theorisations about competition state
development in this context,  rstly Cerny’s (1990, 1997) theorisation of  the competi-
tion state, secondly Jessop’s (2002a) Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime and
thirdly Brenner’s (2004a) Rescaled Competition State Regime.
2.1. The role of  discourses in examining the changing statehood
In order to study the changing statehood, I am particularly interested in the production
of  this transformation. When considering the diverse practices through which spatial
transformation of  statehood is produced, it is important to notice that these practices
gain their meaning and are justi  ed through discourses (cf. Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992:
191). Discourses signify the various ways of  talking about phenomena, understanding
them and rendering them meaningful (Aalto 2003a: 130). Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992:
192–193) suggest that:
“Discourses are best conceptualized as sets of  capabilities peop-
le have, as sets of  socio-cultural resources used by people in the
construction of  meaning about their world and their activities. It is
NOT simply speech or written statements but the rules by which
verbal speech and written statements are made meaningful. [… ]
They are a set of  capabilities, an ensemble of  rules by which rea-
ders/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they
hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful who-
le” (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992: 192–193).
Discourses have a virtual and dynamic character rather than being actual and static
(Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992: 193). This is to say that discourses are constantly trans-
forming representations of  structures and reality (cf. Häkli 1999: 126). In general,
language constructs and reworks the social reality. However, the relationship between
language and social reality is dual as the social reality at the same time constructs and
reworks the language and affects the ways of  using it: The meaning of  language, word
or a discourse is contextual, dynamic and created in social interaction (Pietikäinen &
Mäntynen 2009: 14–28). Therefore, it can also be argued that discourses are modi  ed
by human practice and that the language may be considered a social activity.
Jensen and Richardson (2004: 56) de  ne a discourse as “expressing a particular con-
ceptualisation of  reality and knowledge that attempts to gain hegemony”. Jessop and
Oosterlynck (2008: 1160) argue that discourses can even connect local hegemonies
into a more encompassing hegemonic project. An example of  a hegemonic project
is for instance the constructing of  the welfare state: a national project that gained a
hegemonic position in discursive space and also became materialised. Therefore, dis-
courses can be seen manifesting themselves in a speci  c power-rationality con  gura-
tion (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 64). I am not interested, however, in the structure of
language itself  but rather I look to examine language as a social action.
2. Data and methods
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Language and space are closely related to each other. In other words, discourses
frame and represent spaces and places (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 64). As Henri Lefe-
bvre (1991: 132) has aptly stated:
“Every language is located in a space. Every discourse says somet-
hing about a space (places or sets of  places); and every discourse
is emitted from a space. Distinctions must be drawn between dis-
course in space, discourse about space and the discourse of  space”.
In addition to certain material manifestations, e.g. infrastructural investments, chang-
ing statehood is about the transforming discourses and concepts (cf. Jessop 2002a:
6–7). Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008: 1160) argue that hegemonic discourses are insti-
tutionally embedded and in-built into individual routines; those become reworked and
reproduced discursively and are able to reorganise the balance of  state forces and also
contribute in the structural transformation of  the state. Discourses provide an inter-
pretative framework for understanding structural changes in the state, the crises that
accompany them and the responses that follow them. Nowadays these shifts usually
occur in the discursive emphasis placed on  exibility and entrepreneurism,  exible em-
ployment, the implication of  globalization for the dynamics of  capital accumulation,
the emphasis on knowledge-based growth within the economy and the signi  cance of
state intervention in creating favourable conditions for economic growth. (cf. Jessop
2002a: 133.) Since the changing statehood is produced discursively in political strug-
gles and decision-making, studying both discourses and the individuals participating in
constructing them becomes essential (cf. Aalto 2003a: 131).
2.2. General overview of  the research methods
In order to examine the changing statehood in empirical chapters, discourses consti-
tute a central framework to the examination. Discourses construct interpretations of
reality and rework the future options for the changing statehood. As my purpose is to
examine the discourses in changing statehood, I have utilised both content analysis and
Q methodology as methodological tools. In the empirical chapters 4 and 6, I approach
the research questions through content analysis. I have chosen content analysis as a
research method because it can be used in the analysis of  various research materials:
written, heard or seen. The objective of  content analysis is to create a verbal, well-de-
 ned depiction of  the phenomenon in a rather general form and analyse the collected
data objectively and systematically; content analysis summarises rather than reports all
details concerning the data (Neuendorf  2002: 15; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 91–112).
Therefore this method provides a valuable methodological tool in gathering the es-
sential information from a large amount of  research data. It is no wonder that content
analysis may be understood as a method which brings out “central” themes and issues
from the research material.
In the empirical chapter 5, I have utilised Q methodology, originally introduced by
William Stephenson in 1935 (Brown 1980: 5). It provides a scienti  c research method
to analyse subjectivity. Subjectivity acquires meaning in reworking social structures
and in the structuration and restructuration of  discourses but also in the revision of
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political lines (Aalto 2003b: 118). The Q methodology draws particular attention to
discourses and persons participating in constructing those discourses in their everyday
actions (Aalto 2003a: 132). Therefore, Q methodology will be used here to study both
the people constructing the discourses and those who are living through the ongoing
state transformation. This methodology provides a means for studying shared views
such as discourses or subjectivities and also similarities and divergences among indi-
viduals (Eden et al. 2005: 414). A strength of  the Q methodology is that it neatly com-
bines both qualitative and quantitative aspects (cf. Aalto 2003b: 118). However, for the
sake of  clari  cation, I discuss the Q methodological procedure and data utilized in de-
tail in the chapter 5. The reason behind this is the intensive methodological approach
of  this method which is closely related with the implementation of  the study.
Content analysis
In the following section, I will present a general overview of  the content analysis that
I have made up of  particularly in studying the practices through which the changing
statehood is produced and manifested in political texts and interviews. I will  rstly
introduce the general methodological aspects of  the content analysis. After that I will
introduce the collected data and further explain how I have utilised the content analysis
in two of  my empirical chapters.
In practice, there are several ways of  performing content analysis: it can be car-
ried out based on data, theory-guided or in a theory-based manner. A theory-guided
analysis exploits theory and has theoretical connections, but it is not directly based on
a theory. A theory-based analysis is based on a certain theory, model or thinking. The
data-based analysis attempts to construct a theoretical entity from the research data.
Units for the analysis are chosen according to the purpose and task of  the study, but
not determined in advance. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 95–112.) I have chosen data-
based content analysis as a research method for the qualitative data sets collected be-
cause it provides an in-depth method for analysing the qualitative data.
Content analysis may be thought of  as including different “phases” or “steps”: pro-
ceeding from empirical understanding towards more conceptual thinking (Figure 1). The
analysis of  the content begins with the in-depth study of  background theories and rel-
evant concepts. This is usually followed by a thorough and systematic reading of  the data
collected: texts, images or symbolic materials. The second step is to reduce the research
material. The reduction of  the data means that relevant questions are enquired of  the
data, and then, the resultant manifestations related to the research questions are encoded.
In other words, the irrelevant data is trimmed away from the data. Thirdly, data clustering
is carried out by searching for similarities and differences in the data. In clustering the
data, the encoded original data is examined carefully by looking for concepts describ-
ing similarities or divergences. Then the concepts or mental constructions signifying the
“same” are grouped together into a category. Fourthly, data abstracting is performed by
joining together the categories based on their contents provided it is meaningful. To be-
gin with, the subcategories are constructed and these subcategories are then united into
wider, general categories. Following this, the theoretical conceptualisations are created.
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After that each category is named with a description of  the contents of  the category.
In other words, classes, categories or themes are created from data. Fifthly, an inter-
pretation forms a crucial part of  the analysis in  guring out the meaning of  the results
gained in a wider societal context. The researcher generates a description from the
research subject with the help of  general concepts and compares the theory and the
conclusions with the original data when forming a new theory. As a result, a model or
a conceptual system formed on the basis of  data is then presented. (cf. Tuomi & Sara-
järvi 2009: 91–113.)
Figure 1. “Steps” in a content analysis (modi  ed from Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 109).
In-depth study of the data
Searching and listing reduced manifestations
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Applying the content analysis in the empirical chapters
In the empirical chapters, I have approached each research question by choosing ap-
propriate data. Furthermore, I have used two kinds of  research methods to be able
to answer the research questions. In other words, I have utilised what is often called
triangulation as the central method for data collection and analysis. Triangulation as a
method can be traced back to quantitative research and the idea of  multiple operation-
alism, which presented the use of  multiple methods in order to exclude the in  uence
of  a single method from affecting the results (Campbell & Fiske 1959; Jick 1979: 602).
Triangulation was originally developed in order to increase the validity of  a study by
seeking the degree of  agreement in the investigation outcome from the use of  multiple
methods and measurement procedures (Ma & Norwich 2007: 211).
Triangulation has several advantages for use as a research design. Firstly, by using
triangulation, the weaknesses in a single method will be compensated by the strengths
of  other methods. Secondly, triangulation may capture a more complete, holistic, and
contextual characterisation of  the research target and assist in revealing various dimen-
sions of  a phenomenon. This signi  es that the use of  multiple measures may reveal a
unique variance which in single methods may have been neglected. Thirdly, the use of
multiple methods can also lead to a synthesis or integration of  theories. Fourthly, trian-
gulation can also be used to achieve completeness of  data as it enables a more holistic
and contextual portrayal of  phenomena under examination. Fifthly, triangulation may
be used to achieve con  rmation of  data. Con  rmation is a process of  examining and
comparing data gathered from multiple sources to explore the extent to which  nd-
ings converge or are con  rmed. (Jick 1979: 603–610, see also Casey & Murphy 2009:
41–42.)
It is possible to categorise the types of  triangulation into  ve categories. Firstly, by
triangulating data sources a researcher can use the single method but multiple data.
Secondly, it is possible to use multiple observers or researchers rather than only one
per study. Thirdly, theory triangulation consist of  using multiple rather than single
theoretical perspectives in one study. Fourthly, methodological triangulation has two
approaches, within-method triangulation and between-method triangulation. This is to
say that a researcher either applies one method but multiple strategies in examining the
data or combines the strengths of  multiple methods in one study. The  fth category is
multiple triangulations which means the use two or more triangulation categories in a
same study. (Denzin 197 : 294–304; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 145.)
I approached the  rst research question, the key dimensions of  the changing state
strategies, by analysing the annual state budgets. I selected the annual state budgets
from 1965 onwards for every other year (Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle valtion tulo-
ja menoarvioksi vuodelle 1965, Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys v. 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973 and
1975, Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989 and
1991, Valtion talousarvioesitys 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009
and 2011). I chose the year 1965 as the starting year given the fact that the regional po-
litical legislation dates back to 1966. This regional political legislation aimed to launch
massive state spatial planning regimes throughout the territory. I continued the analysis
up to 2011. I chose the general justi  cations of  the state budget as a textual, qualitative
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material because they presumably contain explicit and widely shared political-economic
articulations of  the changing statehood at a given time. I considered the annual state
budgets as historical political texts which provide a longitudinal but at the same time
qualitative data set through which it becomes possible to trace the historical change
in state practices and to study the “internalised” state practices of  globalization (see
Cerny et al. 2005).
I have understood the state governance itself  to be a problematising and problem-
solving activity closely connected with territorial practices of  the state. In a similar
vein, I have considered the changing state strategies found from the research material
as answers to the questions which are understood as central governmental problems at
a given time. In the analysis, I have focused particularly on the interaction between the
state apparatus and state space. Annual state budgets uncover the changing rationales
behind the historical evolution of  state spatiality and are therefore seen as inextricably
connected with the territorial processes of  the state.
I began the analysis of  the annual state budgets with a profound study of  the data.
Firstly I read the data in a data-base manner. After I became thoroughly acquainted
with the data, I categorised the data along the unfolding themes with the purpose of
 nding temporal and contextual characteristics in each era. It turned out that the basic
dimensions of  the changing state strategies were acquiring meaning with respect to
three issues: general investment policies, education policies and regional policies. After
I had de  ned the content categorisation, I made a temporal analysis in order to de  ne
speci  c temporal aspects of  state spatiality. As a result of  the study, a temporal-con-
tentual framework was developed. This temporal-contentual framework is presented
in the last chapter of  this study. In this part of  my research, however, the categorisa-
tion of  data according to its content was not my only purpose but rather the further
understanding of  the temporal trajectory of  the changing statehood and state strate-
gies. I applied the constructed temporal and contentual framework in order to  nd out
whether the changing state strategies are inward-looking based on a national scale or
outward-looking beyond the national scale and whether the policy is based on territo-
rial cohesion or differentiation.
In responding to the  rst research question, I used the statistics as a supplemen-
tary source of  information in scrutinising the key dimensions of  the changing state
strategies. The public investment rate characterises changes in the political strategies
the state has employed in different historical contexts. Investments may thus be under-
stood to be indicative of  the changes in interaction between the state and its territory.
Statistics on public and private investments were used in order to elucidate the longitu-
dinal aspect of  investments rates. Furthermore, in examining the changing state spatial
strategies and the spatial transformation of  statehood, policy documents, established
research and predictions for the future development of  the Finnish state were used as
supplementary data.
When responding to the third research question, I made use of  personal interviews
in examining the key strategies that regional actors in Southwest Finland have assimi-
lated. A general feature of  personal interviews is that they provide data on people’s ex-
periences, opinions, objectives and thinking (Kitchin & Tate 2000: 213). I approached
the third research question by interviewing people working in the  elds of  regional
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development in Southwest Finland such as regional administration and public-private
organisations. I selected the interviewees on the basis of  research questions with the
aim of  selecting relevant people best suited to answering the questions. I also asked
interviewees to propose other suitable persons to be interviewed; in other word I also
used the snowball method in the selection of  respondents. I chose ten interviewees
from among the regional actors in Southwest Finland, who were selected on account
of  their interest in promoting regional interests and advantages in both national and
international contexts, i.e. they are regional development professionals, directors of
public-private organisations, developers of  regional business life, representatives of
regional development centres, persons involved in regional and international develop-
ment, experts in international relations and the Deputy Mayor of  the City of  Turku
with responsibility for Competence and Business Development. All the interviewees
have been listed in the appendix I. These interviewees can be considered as repre-
senting a speci  c “elite” understanding of  contemporary regional dynamics. That is to
say that those interviewed were people who both participate in the production of  the
transformation of  statehood but also interpret the consequences of  it.
In the interviews, I utilised a semi-structured theme interview procedure. I chose
the questions beforehand and the interviews mainly followed my initial preferences.
I divided the interview questions into two main themes, co-operation and competi-
tion, which were discussed from both regional and organisational perspectives. Firstly,
I asked interviewees about their co-operation, particularly the reasons and objectives
for their co-operational activities in local, national and international politico-economic
spaces, networks or scales. Secondly, I asked interviewees to list the competitors of
Southwest Finland’s regional actors and give details of  their supervision of  local in-
terests in this multi-level operational environment. In addition, I discussed the content
and ways of  understanding the term “competitiveness” with the interviewees. Inter-
viewees provided details of  their state governance affairs, particularly concerning  -
nancial resources. I allowed my interviewees a lot of   exibility to concentrate those
questions the interviewee considered the most relevant issue and conversation topic.
I interviewed all the respondents personally in the autumn of  2007. The duration
of  each of  the interviews varied from half  an hour up to 2.5 hours. Audio recording
interviews allowed me to make an accurate record of  the interviews word-for-word,
it also allowed me to fully concentrate on the discussion rather than trying to balance
conversation and note-taking (cf. Kitchin & Tate 2000: 218). I transcribed all the in-
terviews and analysed them as textual data in the form of  qualitative content analyses,
searching for similarities and differences and classifying the transcribed data.
As a supplementary data, I used the various regional documents and strategic plans
particularly in examining the key strategies that regional actors in Southwest Finland
have assimilated. These strategies and documents were produced for regional needs by
the Regional Council of  Soutwest Finland, the Employment and Economic Centre for
Southwest Finland (TE Centre), the Turku Area Development Centre, the city of  Turku
and the universities of  Turku. These documents included the Regional Programme, mu-
nicipal internationalisation programmes and regional strategies. I considered these ma-
terials, strategies, plans and programes as textual data revealing chracteristics about the
outward-looking strategies of  the region. The data analysed is listed in appendix I.
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I applied content analysis as a research method when analysing the transcribed per-
sonal interviews and regional strategies, plans and programmes. From the textual data
collected, I made categorisations and recategorisations according to the main themes
in the interviews. Under these main themes, I created categorisations and recategorisa-
tions according to interviewees’ narratives in a data-led manner. I considered mental
constructions and statements as units of  analysis. My purpose was  rstly to study the
drivers for securing the local interests of  regional actors in Southwest Finland towards
the present trajectory from the Keynesian welfare-oriented regimes to competition-ori-
ented regimes and whether this is causing pressures. Secondly, I scrutinised the regional
actors’ ways to position their region in national and international politico-economic
spaces, scales or networks. Thirdly, I examined the strategies, practices and targets of
the actors in Southwest Finland in their attempts to secure their local interest on na-
tional and international scales, networks or spaces.
3. Theoretical notions on changing statehood
3.1. Towards the postdisciplinary science
In the ensuing pages, I will construct a con  guration on the development of  the re-
search  eld in which I am interested when studying changing statehood. In order to
develop a deeper understanding of  this research  eld I have  rstly made some notions
on the development of  the discipline. I have principally concentrated on the develop-
ment of  Western Marxism into an inter- or postdisciplinary research  eld, particularly
when concentrating on research on the changing statehood.
Habermas (1976) has categorised types of  science into three varieties: empirical-
analytical, historical-hermeneutical and critical science. My study follows the tradition
of  critical science. According to Kitchin and Tate (2000: 14–18), it is possible to di-
vide the critical science into postmodernism, realism, poststructuralism, feminism and
Marxist approaches. Postmodernity represents a new way of  understanding the word;
wherein modernity is concerned with the search for the grand theory of  society seek-
ing to reveal universal truths and meanings, postmodernists argue that there is no one
absolute truth or one explanation. The position of  scientists as agents or participants is
recognised within postmodernist approaches. Rather than understanding, realism aims
to explain through scrutinising the underlying mechanisms and structures of  social
relations by identifying the building blocks of  reality. Poststructuralists focus mainly
on individual, methodological and epistemological issues placing language at the core
of  analysis. They argue that language mediates the relationship between society and
culture and therefore poststructuralists concentrate their focus on deconstructing the
multiple messages. Feminism points out that societal structures are “patriarchal” and
include hidden power structures which privilege some groupings over others. Marxists
are interested in the production and reproduction of  capitalist modes of  production
and consumption, particularly on the political and economic structures behind the pro-
duction and reproduction of  capitalism. (Kitchin & Tate 2000: 14–18.) Of  these ap-
proaches, Marxist approaches and critical realism are closest to this study’s viewpoints.
In the following, I will examine the tradition of  critical science particularly from the
1960s onwards in the context of  geography.
Since the late 1960s a group of  interrelated politicised approaches have developed
within human geography partly in critical response to the domination of  spatial analy-
sis (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 219; Cox 2005: 2). Although it is dif  cult to categorise
these approaches under a single adjective, the term initially used was “radical geogra-
phy” (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 219). According to Peet (1977: 11), interest in two
types of  issues emerged among radical geographers: Firstly, an effort to change the
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focus of  the discipline to the study of  urgent social problems, and secondly the search
for organisational models for promoting a social change began. Antipode was founded
as a journal of  radical geography in 1969.
Johnston and Sidaway (2004: 219–220) have claimed that the term “radical geog-
raphies” became less popular in the 1980s. In the 1980s, radical approaches partici-
pated with debates about the approach of  “philosophical realism”. Presently, the more
commonly used term is a “critical geography” (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 219–220).
No longer favouring the adjective “radical”, Peet and Thrift (1989) have preferred the
term “political economy” (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 220). Robinson (1998: 442) has
noted that the political economy was originally used in the late eighteen century by
economists, including Adam Smith and David Ricardo. However, the term “political
economy” was widely taken into use by various scholars during the 1960s at the same
time the concept acquired a range of  meanings. In the 1970s, particularly the work of
Marxists such as Castells and Harvey was meaningful in adopting the political economy
into the writings of  human geographers (Robinson 1998: 442). Focusing on accumula-
tion, regulation and capitalist space economies, Marxist political economy contribu-
tions captured the changing capitalist world in the 1970s and 1980s (Jones 2008: 379).
The research interest of  political economy has been on globalization, world-cities, neo-
liberalism, relations between the state and economy in addition to the spatial manifes-
tations of  material inequality and the condition of  the less privileged (Cox 2005: 6).
In the 1960s, the academic attention to Marxism emerged together with the critical
social movements but in radical geography, Marxism was probably the most exciting
approach around in the 1970s and early 1980s (Swyngedouw 2004: 41–44). Jessop
and Sum (2001: 91) allude to the idea that the overall relevance of  Marxism is de-
rived from its ambition to provide a totalising perspective on social relations in the
historically speci  c forms of  production. Swyngedouw (2004: 42–44) has presented
that Marxism contributed to geographical theory and practice over the past two dec-
ades, having undoubtedly a major in  uence in the discipline of  geography and being
one of  the most quoted and referenced science trends. It concentrated on inequalities
and injustices, particularly on why, where, and how deep those persisted (Swynge-
douw 2004: 42–44). Jessop and Sum (2001: 93) suggest that Marx’s critique of  po-
litical economy is an “obligatory reference point for any serious attempt to improve
our understanding of  the nature and dynamics of  capitalism as a historically speci  c
mode of  production”.
In explaining injustice and inequality and developing strategies for social change,
Marxism also concentrated on spatial issues in searching for alternative formulations
(Swyngedouw 2004: 42–44). In Marxist geographies, the spatial relations are seen re-
 ecting social relations. Therefore, Marxist geography can be seen as closely connect-
ing social processes and spatial relations, offering the most coherent attempt when
considering the space-dependent and space-forming nature of  the dynamics of  polit-
ical-economic relations (Peet 1977: 21–23, Swyngedouw 2004: 42–44). Swyngedouw
(2004: 54) has pointed out that Marxist perspectives have been criticised for their
deterministic, economistic and teleological analysis. However, despite the failings of
Marxist critique, only a few other perspectives have remained as credible as Marxism
in involving questions of  inequality and exploitation (Swyngedouw 2004: 54).
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Bob Jessop (1990) has adopted a doubly critical Marxist perspective in his earlier
studies of  state theorisations. On the one hand, he has utilised critical Marxism itself;
on the other hand, a Marxist critique of  alternative approaches has been used in Jes-
sop’s studies. For example, Jessop has been inspired by Marx’s predisciplinary critique
of  political economy although he draws on a wide range of  scholarship and research
by social scientists (Jessop 2002a: 1). In his book The Future of  the Capitalist State, Jessop
(2002a: 4–5) draws  rstly on institutional and evolutionary economics, particularly on
the regulation approach to the political economy of  the capitalist economy. Secondly
he concentrates on the political economy of  state and politics inspired by Gramsci and
Poulantzas. Thirdly he draws on critical discourse analysis and the discursive consti-
tution of  economic and political relations (Jessop 2002a: 4–5). However, in his later
contributions, Jessop together with Ngai-Ling Sum have criticised the regulation ap-
proach and further elaborated the thinking towards critical realism and cultural political
economy (Jessop & Sum 2006; Sum & Jessop 2010). Cultural political economy has
been developed particularly by Jessop and Sum to combine semiosis and Marxist politi-
cal economy in analysis (Jones 2008: 383). Jones (2008: 386) also argues that cultural
political economy has a great potential for geography and social sciences but that is still
in the process of  being developed.
Marxism has sometimes been presented as a variant of  the philosophy of  structural-
ism (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 228). Kitchin and Tate (2000: 15) presented that whilst
a pure form of  Marxism, historical materialism, gained attention in the late 1970s, the
attention had moved to other structuralist approaches and political economy by the
early 1980s. Both these approaches united the thinking between structure and agency
(Kitchin & Tate 2000: 15). Louis Althusser, a French philosopher, was one of  the key
participants in the structuralist debate in which he argued that capitalism cannot be
understood without proper attention to the discursive and political aspects (Swynge-
douw 2004: 50). Häkli (1999: 99–129) makes a reference that the starting point for the
structuralistic methodology has been examining the social structures having an effect
behind the observed or visible world. This, together with the objective of  explain-
ing concrete, perceived phenomena characterise the structuralistic methodology. Social,
collective emphasis and the aim to explain social phenomena with their structural rea-
sons have turned structuralism into a central methodological direction especially for
critical study (Häkli 1999: 99–129).
Häkli (1999: 108–113) has also noted that in the structuralistic methodology, the
research subjects of  geography began to be analysed in a new way. Invisible struc-
tures and the determinism of  their transformation connected to geographical order
found their way to the research agenda. Explaining spatial order with social structures
provided the opportunity to evaluate geography’s traditional research subject, spatial-
ity, at the same time as connecting it to theory formation. Therefore geography was
not merely held as a spatial science but rather closely connected to social sciences.
Structural geography concentrated particularly on socially-produced space where social
processes and space structuration were occurring as an interactive process. This shows
that regional differentiation has not been merely a consequence of  social, economic
and political structures but rather it has been a contributing factor in revising those
structures. (Häkli 1999: 108–113.) A merit of  both Marxism and structuralistic theory
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for geographical research is therefore the merging of  approaches of  social sciences
and spatiality-orientation.
The structuration theory of  a British sociologist, Anthony Giddens (1984), was a
signi  cant attempt to develop the structuralistic methodology in a less deterministic
way wherein structures do not determine the human activity but rather bound and
enable social intercourse. He has presented that structures and human activity should
be considered together rather than separately and emphasised the role of  societal in-
stitutions in mediating the activity and structures: Institutions form a base for social
human activity at the same time those institutions become maintained. Structuralism
has, however, has also been criticised because of  its core philosophy, realism, which is
sometimes considered as creating an apolitical and value-free illustration of  producing
knowledge. (Häkli 1999: 104–105.)
One way in which structuralism has emerged in the  eld of  geography has been
geographers’ adoption of  regulation theory, originally introduced by Aglietta (1979)
(Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 232; Swyngedouw 2004: 51). As a variant of  evolutionary
and institutional economics, the regulation approach studies the procedures and prac-
tices in which capitalism is reproduced or regulated (Johnston & Sidaway 2004: 232–
233). Jessop and Sum (2006: 376) point out that a regulationist research programme
has much to contribute to a critical social science particularly when combined with
state theory and critical discourse analysis. The regulation approach analyses the econ-
omy including both economic and extra-economic factors interpreting the economy as
an ensemble of  socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically selective insti-
tutions, organisations, social forces and actions organised around capitalist reproduc-
tion (Jessop and Sum 2001: 91). Johnston and Sidaway (2004: 232–233) suggest that
the regulation theory, which also draws on the works of  the Italian Marxist, Antonio
Gramsci, contains an understanding of  both ideology and power and multiple determi-
nations which shape the balances between “state”, “society”, “production”, “consump-
tion”, and social and technological forces which are seen to manifest and promote
socio-spatial transformations. The relationships between systems of  production, dif-
ferent geographical scales and their roles in regulatory recon  gurations have been a
central contribution to regulation theory of  Anglo-American human geographers. This
has contributed to the production of  different scales of  socio-politico spheres. Rescal-
ing of  state spatiality, chancing regulatory framework and transforming state policies
have drawn attention to the divergence between governance and a nation-state (John-
ston & Sidaway 2004: 232–233).
The study of  uneven development has long been one of  the foundational concerns
of  critical geographical political economy. The transdisciplinary research  eld of  in-
ternational political economy discuss the outcomes of  the interaction of  politics and
economics in a transnational political context as those are primarily determined by po-
litical action and not merely by economic-structural variables (Brenner 2004a: 12; Cerny
2009: 29). Recent research has drawn considerable attention to the capitalist political-
economic system and uneven geographical development under contemporary capital-
ism whereby social, political, and economic processes are not distributed evenly across
the state space. That is to say inequalities are manifested in a context- and case-speci  c
manner, both socially and spatially, through the differentiated regional development
22 Changing statehood: The spatial transformation of the Finnish state
between regions, scales and places, such as counties or city-regions. (Brenner 2004a:
12–13.) For example, Brenner’s (2004a: 12–13) investigation of  state rescaling is cen-
trally concerned with the regulation of  capitalist urbanisation and the changing politi-
cal form and institutional mediation of  uneven geographical development. He alludes
to patterns of  uneven geographical development under capitalism representing mani-
festations of  the tension under capitalism between equalizing and differentiating capi-
tal investments across state space, whether to emphasise the spatial consequences of
territorial differentiation or exploiting place-, territory-, and scale-speci  c conditions
of  accumulation.
Brenner (2004a: 24) argues that most of  the work on the changing statehood has
been oriented towards the speci  c methodological and thematic concerns in a par-
ticular discipline. He claims that there is an exception by which he refers to the Marx-
ist approaches that never underpinned traditional disciplinary boundaries. However,
this concentration on particular disciplines has changed during recent decades as new
theoretical approaches to state theory have been introduced through critical contribu-
tion to traditional Marxist models. These new approaches have explored a variety of
key themes in an interdisciplinary, if  not postdisciplinary manner (Brenner 2004a: 24).
In general, the present overall trend in socio-spatial research seems to be in the gen-
eralising of  the interdisciplinary approach to research issues (Jessop 2002a: 1). Jessop
and Sum (2001: 91–92) present that Marxism, a set of  approaches rather than a single
uni  ed system, is the most pertinent intellectual tradition refusing to accept the disci-
pline boundaries. They also go on to present that Marxism has a continued relevance
as a pre- or postdisciplinary tradition committed to the critique of  political economy.
Jessop and Sum (2001: 89) have attempted to refuse disciplinary boundaries and reject
the discursive and organisational constructions of  disciplinary boundaries in present-
ing a Marxist-in  ected, post-disciplinary “cultural political economy” in rethinking the
political economy. They particularly suggest that the contemporary political economy is
becoming post-disciplinary (Jessop & Sum 2001: 90). Also Brenner (2004a: 24) is will-
ing to position his study New state spaces within the emergent crosscutting currents of
postdisciplinary study within urban studies and state theory.
In a geographical way of  understanding the world, the emergent inter- or postdisci-
plinary research becomes particularly meaningful in uniting the issues concerning so-
ciety and spatiality. When considering the changing statehood, particularly its spatial
aspects, an inter- or postdisciplinary way to approach the subject matter gives a unique
way to understand the phenomenon. Furthermore when examining the changing state-
hood, the interconnected relationship between the structure and agency becomes par-
ticularly interesting in the institutional mediation of  uneven development. In the con-
text of  the state, tension between the objectives of  equalising or differentiating state
spatiality; particularly the production and resolving of  this tension in political struggles
is interesting. Also in the context of  the state, it is particularly productive to estab-
lish how the “central” and “peripheral” regions of  the state are discussed, politically-
struggled and  nally-de  ned. This production of  state spatiality also engenders mate-
rial consequences. Therefore discourses and change in discursive structures becomes
particularly interesting in examining the political rationales behind this tension.
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3.2. State rescaling – from state-centred concept of  scale into a
multidimensional research
The state-centred conception of  space – scale as a geographical level or hierarchy
In the following chapters, I will further concentrate on the vigorous debate of  scale
and its implications within political geography. In recent decades, scale has been un-
der discussion particularly in relation to the issues of  globalization, the nation-state,
regionalism and localism (see Howitt 2003: 138). The concept of  scale has provoked
discussions among human geographers and social scientists since the 1980s (Howitt
2003: 139). The scale question emerged at the core of  research interests and intense
theorisation with the rise of  Marxist geography and social theory in the 1980s and
1990s (Smith 2000: 725). Since the beginning of  1990s, the idea of  scale has challenged
dominant understandings of  social and political processes (Howitt 2003: 138). How-
ever, the conceptualisation of  scale has changed in the past years. My purpose is thus
to concentrate on the transformation of  the conceptualisation of  scale and space from
nation-state centric, hierarchical conceptualisations towards multidimensional concep-
tualisation.
Until the 1980s, the central position of  the nation-state was not questioned in scale-
attuned research (Smith 2000: 725). National states, geographically divided into smaller
economic regions, were seen as basic building blocks of  the capitalist world system
(Smith & Ward 1987: 160). The centrality of  nation-state originates in 1648 and the
Treaty of  Westphalia, where the political space was understood as becoming institu-
tionalised as self-enclosed territorial domains with exclusive state control and the prin-
ciple of  non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (Taylor 1994: 153; Brenner
1999a: 47). The modern interstate system was labelled with the intertwining of  territo-
riality with state sovereignty (Brenner 1999a: 47). Space in the modern state was con-
ceived as “a realm of  stasis, as a pregiven, unchanging territorial platform upon which
social action occurs” (Brenner 1999a: 41).
The foundations in scale-attuned theorisation of  contemporary statehood and the
state-theoretical analysis of  contemporary rescaling process are found in the works
of  Henri Lefebvre (1991, 2009). Henri Lefebvre’s 1991 work, The Production of  Space,
presents an idea of  the social production of  space and the transformation of  absolute
space towards abstract space that capitalism and neocapitalism, as he called it, are pro-
ducing. Also David Harvey (1982) discusses interestingly, particularly in his book The
Limits to Capital, production, capital, the dynamics of  accumulation and the production
of  spatial con  gurations.
The  rst notions of  the scale considered geographical scale mainly as an idea of  a
geographical level or territorial hierarchy. One may argue that scale attained a rather
simpli  ed content. The scale emerged as rather an unproblematically established con-
cept or as a product of  researcher’s methodology (Smith 2000: 725). For example, in the
1980s and 1990s Taylor presented his understanding of  scale as a vertical construction.
He discussed scale as levels of  “world-economy”, “nation-state” and “locality” where
the processes of  the world economy were manifested (Taylor 1993: 47). Although the
importance of  the concept of  scale as fundamental in human geography was admitted
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(Howitt 2003: 139), this predetermined, self-explanatory and taken-for-granted nature
of  the geographical scale concept among political geographers and political analysts
was criticised by referring to the dominant concept of  geographical scale as “the nest-
ed hierarchy of  bounded spaces of  differing size, such as the local, regional, national
and global” (Delaney & Leitner 1997: 93).
In past decades, the politico-economic changes that occurred, often labelled as
globalization, have challenged the perceived container-like qualities of  states and the
model of  state-de  ned societies and economies. Conceptualisation of  space has there-
fore attained a more nuanced content. Taylor (2000: 6) sets out that at the core of  the
idea of  globalization is the notion of  the enhanced importance of  trans-state proc-
esses. Philip Cerny (1995: 596) de  nes globalization as “a set of  economic and political
structures and processes deriving from the changing character of  the goods and assets
that compromise the base of  the international political economy”. He sees globaliza-
tion as a structure involving transgovernmental networks, policy communities, inter-
nationalised market structures, transnational cause groups and many other linked mar-
kets, hierarchies and networks (Cerny 1997: 270–271). Globalization may also be seen
as a process, practice, discourse and a paradigm, as a path-dependent process which
cannot be veri  ed empirically but rather a contested concept which constitutes a hege-
monic discourse (Cerny 1997: 256–273). In general globalization signi  es the changes
in world politico-economic life, e.g. the opening, deregulation and reorganisation of
the world economy, international footloose capital and foreign direct investments. The
concept alludes also to the transformed interdepencies of  places, localities and territo-
ries or questions of  political consciousness, identity and transcending national bounda-
ries of  social relations (cf. Brenner 1997: 274–276; Brenner 1999a: 42; Gualini 2006:
882–883).
The globalization debate has also highlighted the intertwining nature between so-
ciospatial and economic phenomena (Gualini 2006: 882). National states have contrib-
uted to the adoption and diffusion of  neoliberal political ideology and the deregulation
of  markets and institutions and in that way actually promoted the process of  globaliza-
tion (Lobao et al. 2009: 2). The discussion of  globalization has been associated with
the recon  guration of  state territorial organisation, particularly in Western Europe. It
has been argued that state-economy relations cannot be analysed adequately by con-
centrating only on the accumulation process and economic processes within a single
nation-state, at the same time excluding subnational, regional units, and on the other
hand supranational, international economic arenas from examinations. This is espe-
cially so as subnational regions have become arenas for societal activities, new units
of  competition and new arenas for political contestation. (cf. Brenner 1997: 274.) This
shows that the conceptualisation on space has attained multidimensional content re-
maining still as a rather hierarchical concept.
Therefore, the abovementioned changes have also problematised the national-
oriented conceptualisation of  space. Furthermore, the changes have challenged the
central status of  the nation-state as a primary unit in the accumulation process (cf.
Brenner 1999a: 40–41). The nation-state-centred approach was criticised by John Ag-
new (1994) with the notion of  “territorial trap”, by which he refers to the privileging
of  a national-territorial conception of  the state. The notion of  “territorial trap” rests
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on three theoretically and empirically problematic geographical assumptions; states as
self-enclosed geographical containers of  socio-economic and politico-cultural relations,
national/foreign or domestic/international polarisation and the conception of  national
spaces as units securing sovereign space (Agnew 1994: 91–92).
Scale as a socially constructed notion
Discursive in  uences and awareness of  the relational nature of  the scale concept con-
tributed to the scale discussion especially in the 1990s (Howitt 2003: 140, Paasi 2004:
538). The concept of  scale was previously used to analyse relations between given ter-
ritorial entities (Gualini 2006: 885). Now the idea of  scale as an ontologically given
category has begun to be rejected (Marston 2000: 220). Instead, attention was paid to
periodical transformations and the un-  xed nature of  geographical scale (Delaney &
Leitner 1997: 93). As Marston (2000: 220) puts it, the scale began to be seen as “a con-
tingent outcome of  the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices
of  human agents”. In other words, sociopolitical agency was seen as a central factor, a
“dimension”, in the production of  scale, a fact that the emergent social-constructivist
framework particularly emphasised (Gualini 2006: 884). This also began to question
the hierarchical content of  space as a spatial concept.
The understanding of  geographical scale as a socially constructed concept emerged
(Brenner 2001: 592). This theoretical project focussed attention on conceptions, ide-
ologies and relations between space and power (Delaney & Leittner 1997: 96). The
objective was to response to the inadequacy of  the geographic scale conception and
interest in scale constitution in order to better understand and respond to the current
rapid global socio-spatial dynamics (Marston 2000: 220–221). In order to better under-
stand this spatio-temporal structuration and dynamics of  power relations, discourses
and representations were brought to the core of  discussion (Delaney & Leittner 1997:
94). In other word, discourses began to be seen as “instruments” in producing the
scale. Attention was also increasingly paid to the symbolic-cognitive and ideological
dimensions of  scale (Gualini 2006: 885). Marston (2000: 221) presented the scale as
“constituted and reconstituted around relations of  capitalist production, social repro-
duction and consumption, and that attention to all three sets of  relations is critical to
understanding fully the social construction of  scale”. In summary, this approach high-
lights the formation of  scale in processes of  social, economic and political reworking,
becoming visible in both dimensions of  agency and discourse (cf. Gualini 2006: 885).
A thinking of  scale as a relational, discursive social construction has emerged (Paasi
2004: 538).
As Howitt (2003: 150) puts it: “The social and political construction of  scale is pre-
cisely social action”. The social production of  scale signi  es that neither material scales
nor abstract scales can be taken for granted (Jonas 1994: 258). This points to the rela-
tional nature of  rescaling. Already in 1994, Jonas (1994: 260) has shown that privileging
a single scale in geographical research indicates an uncritical internalisation of  a concept.
The notion of  scale as socially constructed is connected to the changing conceptu-
alisations of  space. Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) idea of  (social) space as a (social) product
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leads to fourfold implications and consequences. Firstly, it leads to the disappearing
or vanishing of  physical natural space to the background of  thinking. The second im-
plication is the contextual character of  space production as every society produces
its own space. The third consequence is the shift in interest “from things in space to
the actual production of  space”, in other words, to the production and reproduction
of  space. Fourthly, space production is closely connected with the time-dimension.
This indicates that social production of  space deals with historical aspects (Lefebvre
1977: 341; Lefebvre 1991: 26–46). In other words, the notion of  social production of
space is not merely space as a “physical container within which capitalist development
unfolds, but one of  its constitutive social dimensions, continually constructed, decon-
structed, and reconstructed through an historically speci  c, multi-scalar dialectic of
de- and re-territorialisation” (Brenner 1999a: 43).
The space as a social product forms an arena for political struggles. This points to
the production of  scale, in other words the relational and processual notions of  scale.
As Henri Lefebvre (1977: 341) puts it:
“Space is not a scienti  c object removed from ideology or poli-
tics; it has always been political and strategic. If  space has an air
of  neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents and thus
seems to be “purely” formal, the epitome of  rational abstraction, it
is precisely because it has already been occupied and used, and has
already been the focus of  past processes whose traces are not al-
ways evident in the landscape. Space has been shaped and molded
from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political
process. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally
 lled with ideologies” (Lefebvre 1977: 341).
Towards the processual notion of  scale
The understanding of  the relational nature of  the concept of  scale as well as the un-
derstanding of  the social construction of  scale has altogether directed attention to-
wards the production of  scale. In other words, attention has increasingly been directed
to the processual character of  scale production in political struggles. The development
of  the constructionist perspective has particularly brought the political nature of  scale
and the process of  rescaling to the core of  scale discussions (Howitt 2003: 140). In
this context, the term politics is not just limited to covering formal state structures or
governmental institutions; rather it contains the relationship between state and society
as well as state spatiality (Gualini 2006: 885). Despite the political nature of  scaling, it
should be noted, however, that scale-making appears not only as rhetorical or discur-
sive practices, but rather more tangible having material consequences and in  uences
on spatial relations (Marston 2000: 221; Gualini 2006: 885). This signi  es that the
target of  political struggles is in  uencing material consequences on statehood. This
is the reason why scale-making occurs in state space as social and political struggles
(cf. Marston 2000: 221), which emphasises the processual and political nature of
state rescaling (cf. Brenner 2001: 592). Rather than considering geographical scale
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as a predetermined, self-explanatory and taken-for-granted platform for geographi-
cal processes, the struggling and transforming nature of  scale and scale as an arena,
container and sociospatial hierarchical practices within contemporary capitalism have
emerged at the core of  investigations (Brenner 2001: 592).
As Gualini (2006: 895) puts it: “As space is no more conceived as a container, scale
also cannot be univocally referred to the “planned” spatial ordering of  de  ned activi-
ties: it is largely an unintended outcome, which is contingent upon these activities, but
not primarily dependant on them”. In a similar vein, Neil Brenner (1999a: 40) has de-
scribed space as no longer appearing as “a static platform of  social relations, but rather
as one of  their constitutive dimensions, itself  historically produced, recon  gured, and
transformed”. That is to say that the scalar organisation of  state space is never  xed
forever, but rather prone to restructuring, reorientation and reworking under socio-
economic pressures and changes (Brenner et al. 2003: 5). Spatial scale is therefore pro-
duced in time; it is historically speci  c and subject to change (Jones 1998: 26). In-
tertwining the temporal dimension of  changing statehood with the ongoing political
struggles becomes meaningful in understanding scaling as a heterogeneous, contested
process which can only be grasped as relationally emerged (Swyngedouw 2000: 70;
Brenner 2001: 605). As Anssi Paasi (2004: 542) puts it:
“Scales are not  xed, separate levels of  the social world but, like re-
gions/places, are structured and institutionalized in complex ways
in de/reterritorializing practices and discourses that may be partly
concrete, powerful and bounded, but also partly unbounded, vague
or visible. Scales are also historically contingent; they are produced,
exist and may be destroyed or transformed in social and political
practices and struggles”.
These notions focus attention on the processual notions of  scale and particularly
the rescaling process (Gualini 2006: 885). The scalar change and rescaling process are
unquestionably intertwined in the production of  state space (cf. Brenner 2009: 124).
The processual notions of  scale are examined in order to understand the ways in
which the scalar structures are being reorganised and reworked within contemporary
capitalism. Gualini (2006: 884) describes this as “the evolutionary notion of  rescaling”.
He presents that the representations of  space manifest and mediate the prevalent power
relations and hegemonic projects. The political nature of  scale-making is particularly
visible in the structuration of  spatial units and sociospatial organisations. Therefore, the
restructuring of  scalar organisations and institutions challenges the articulation of  exist-
ing spatial units (Gualini 2006: 885–893). Scalar structurations should therefore be un-
derstood as a dimension of  particular sociospatial processes, constituted and reworked
through everyday routines and struggles and intertwined with other forms of  sociospa-
tial structuration (Brenner 2001: 604–605). This is to say that the state spatial struc-
tures of  contemporary capitalism are understood as historically transformed, reworked
and restructured through the political strategies they enable (Brenner 2009: 126). The
processual methodology, a spatialised version of  Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational ap-
proach, was adopted in Neil Brenner’s (2004) book, New State Spaces, in which state
scalar selectivity was understood as an expression, a medium and an outcome of  politi-
cal strategies. The in  uence of  path-dependency cannot be ignored as the scalar  xes
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created in a speci  c historical-geographical context have a powerful structuring effect
on the future evolution of  scales (Brenner 2001: 607). In other words, the reworking
of  spatial structures, including the state spatial structure, is bound to the current spatial
structure which affects the reworking of  state space.
Anssi Paasi (2004: 538) has noted that “the politics of  scale should be located in
real-world practices where divergent struggles take place, and not only in theoretical
discourse”. Brenner (2001: 599–600), on the other hand, draws attention to two mean-
ings that have been attached to the term “politics of  scale”. He introduces singular
and plural connotations of  the politics of  scale to examine the creation of  new scalar
relations among scalar entities, not only the shifts in internal relations of  given scalar
entities (Gualini 2006: 895). In its singular meaning, the politics of  scale refers to “the
production, recon  guration or contestation of  some aspect of  sociospatial organisa-
tion within a relatively bounded geographical arena”, a self-enclosed geographical unit,
where the scale is understood as a boundary which separates the geographical unit in
question (Brenner 2001: 599). That is to say that the singular meaning of  the politics
of  scale refers to the previously dominated understanding of  space as a container, level
or hierarchy. Brenner (2001: 604) implies that the singular meaning of  the politics of
scale can then be re-described through Jonas’ (1994: 257) notion of  the “scale poli-
tics of  spatiality”. In the plural meaning of  politics of  scale, Brenner (2001: 600) sug-
gests that a politics of  scale refers to “the production, recon  guration or contestation
of  particular differentiations, orderings and hierarchies among geographical scales”,
in other words, the politics of  scale in its plural meaning refers to “the production of
differentiated spatial units as such, but also more generally, their embeddedness and
positionalities in relation to a multitude of  smaller or larger spatial units within a multi-
tiered, hierarchically con  gured geographical scaffolding”. This plural usage of  politics
of  scale captures the relationality of  all geographical scales and also their continually
changing positions as differentiated units within multi-tiered sociospatial hierarchies
(Brenner 2001: 600). This is to say that the plural usage of  politics of  scale clearly iden-
ti  es the relative character of  scaling.
Gualini (2006: 895) has stated that the constant discussions and theoretical de  ni-
tions about scale have further elaborated the conceptual bases, which have highlighted
the piquancy and applicability of  the concept, at the same time exposing it to “concept
stretching” and analytical incoherence. Despite constant re-evaluations of  the scale
concept and aspirations to further clarify the rescaling process, the concept of  scale
and the notion of  rescaling leave the conceptual bases of  the phenomenon somewhat
blurred (Gualini 2006: 894–895). This indicates that the concept of  scale is not unam-
biguous, and universally shared but under constant reconstruction and rather contro-
versial.
The theoretical notion of  scale and the process of  rescaling have not been accepted
without criticism. Kevin R. Cox (1998) criticised the discussion of  the areal approach
in the spatiality of  scale and noted that network is a more appropriate metaphor. In
conceptualising the politics of  local economic development, he has aptly termed as
spaces of  dependence, “those more-or-less localised social relations upon which we
depend for the realisation of  essential interests and for which there are no substitutes
elsewhere; they de  ne place-speci  c conditions for our material well being and our
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sense of  signi  cance” (Cox 1998: 2). Cox presents that the spaces of  dependence are
located in global networks of  relationships and interrelationships which constantly
challenge these spaces of  dependence. Securing spaces of  dependence is constantly
pursued through key regional actors, e.g. people,  rms and state agencies. In so doing,
the key regional actors are involved in more extensive networks of  social power. Cox
(1998: 2) terms “the space in which the politics of  securing a space of  dependence
unfolds” as a space of  engagement. His rejection of  the areal approach in the spatial-
ity of  scale and adoption of  the concept of  network is an interesting attempt to fur-
ther develop the alternatives for spatially-oriented research and the discussion on the
primary status of  scale concept. Therefore the conceptualisations of  Kevin R. Cox on
“space of  dependence” and “space of  engagement” provide a fruitful viewpoint in
my empirical examination.
Becky Mans  eld (2005: 458–461) has criticised the debate on the notion of  res-
caling regarding abandoning or ignoring the national scale and its importance. She
recommends moving beyond the rescaling argument to better understand and explain
political economic patterns and processes. Her aim is to use the term “dimension”
in order to illustrate the intertwined character of  multiple scales in a relational proc-
ess. Therefore she implies that national should not be considered as a discrete scale
but rather as a dimension of  political economic practices (Mans  eld 2005: 458–461).
Mans  eld (2005: 468) further argues that a scale should be considered as a process
and not as an object due to scale not having an ontological status outside social rela-
tions. As Jones (1998: 27) puts the same: “scale is an epistemological category, rather
than an ontological one”. From this perspective, national is not a level, hierarchy or
scale but rather a dimension of  social practice in the production of  space (Mans  eld
2005: 468). This directs attention to scalar dimensions of  practices rather than prac-
tices occurring at different scales (Mans  eld 2005: 468). Cerny (2006: 691) and Cox
(2009: 108) have criticised the rescaling theorisations of  Eurocentrism. However, Neil
Brenner (2009: 130) has responded to the critique by presenting contextually speci  c
state rescaling research conducted outside the European context, in Australia, South
Korea and India.
Abandoning one-dimensionalism – scale as one dimension in sociospatial research
Neil Brenner (2009: 131–132) has criticised the concept of  rescaling being increasingly
used as “a generically descriptive category, as an all-encompassing label for contemporary
socio-spatial transformations, [… ] lacking a clearly speci  ed empirical referent”. He sug-
gests that the initial phase of  theory development and explanatory research is now reach-
ing maturity: greater attention to be given to questions of  method, especially to the aims
at linking abstract concepts to concrete, contextually speci  c investigations. In order to
bring further methodological understanding into the rescaling debate, I have introduced
the Q methodology in an empirical context-speci  c framework of  state rescaling.
Brenner (2001: 597) describes geographical scale as arguably only one dimension of
the multifaceted and polymorphic geographies of  capitalist modernity, tied particular-
ly to vertical, hierarchical ordering of  social systems and territorial units (cf. Collinge
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1999). However, the process of  rescaling is only one form of  structuration among oth-
er forms such as place-making, localisation and territorialisation (Brenner 2001: 603).
In this context, Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008: 389–390) have also questioned
the privileging of  a single dimension of  sociospatial processes. They have manifested
that four distinct spatial lexicons have been developed by social scientists over the last
thirty years: territories, places, scales and networks, which must be viewed as mutually
constitutive and relationally intertwined dimensions of  sociospatial relations. Interest
in these issues is connected to the transformations of  sociospatial organisation, glo-
balization and urbanisation debates and the restructuring of  capital accumulation and
socio-political struggles (Jessop et al. 2008: 389–390). Jessop, Brenner and Jones de-
scribe one-dimensionalism, concentrating only one of  these spatial lexicons leading to
“short intellectual product life cycles for key sociospatial concepts, limiting opportuni-
ties for learning through theoretical debate, empirical analysis, and critical evaluation
of  such concepts” (Jessop et al. 2008: 389). They (2008: 391–393) also suggest the
one-dimensionalism leads to fourfold trap:  rstly to methodological territorialism that
subsumes all aspects of  sociospatial relations under the territoriality. Secondly, place-
centrism that concentrates on the place as the main dimension of  sociospatial relations.
Thirdly, scale-centrism focuses unilaterally on scale or discusses scale as the primary
basis around which other dimensions of  sociospatial relations are organised. Fourthly,
network-centrism focuses on networks as frictionless spaces of   ows and intercon-
nections of  networks. They suggest that the problems of  one-dimensionalism can be
avoided through more systematic, re  exive investigations of  the interconnectedness of
the aforementioned spatial dimensions of  social relations (Jessop et al. 2008: 391–393).
Neil Brenner also reminds us that state rescaling is not synonymous with state spatial
restructuring as such, but it represents one dimension of  contemporary state space,
along with territorialisation, place-making and networking (Brenner 2009: 131).
Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008: 392–397) point out, however, that the presented
theoretical framework is not to deny focusing on one dimension as a single entry
point into a more complex enquiry of  two or more dimensional approach. These
representations are intended to direct attention to the de  ciencies of  concentrat-
ing one-dimensionally on questions of  scale. Jessop, Brenner and Jones have termed
their attempt to theorise polymorphy in sociospatial relations as the TPSN frame-
work (territory-place-scale-network). Their objective is to promote investigations
of  how sociospatial relations interact in a particular spatio-temporal context under
contemporary capitalism. In addition they seek to discuss how sociospatial relations
reproduce and reorganise the geographies of  accumulation, state power and hegem-
ony. They also argue that their TPSN approach has signi  cant implications in ana-
lysing and periodising the historical geographies of  capitalist development. Jessop,
Brenner and Jones allude to the idea that the TPSN combinations are more suited
to a postnational, unevenly developing global economy and for the analysis of  both
historical and contemporary transformations of  sociospatial relations (Jessop et al.
2008: 392–397).
Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008: 398) present three types of  applications for the
TPSN research approach. Firstly, the TPSN research approach may be used in order to
classify different social-scienti  c accounts of  contentious politics. Secondly, the TPSN
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approach can be used to illustrate the strategies and tactics of  participants involved in
political struggles. These kinds of  participants are, for example, individual actors as
well as collective actors, organisations and institutions. Thirdly, it is possible to utilise
the TPSN research approach in order to ask new questions about the interaction be-
tween the spaces of  contentious politics and the geohistorical periodisation of  state
power and capital accumulation (Jessop et al. 2008: 398). These claims for a multi-
dimensional approach to sociospatial structuration of  social processes open new re-
search possibilities and approaches.
The TPSN framework of  Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) has however raised
questions and critique. The approach has been questioned by Edward S. Casey (2008:
402–404) and Michael J. Shapiro (2008: 411–413) on its choice of  four privileged di-
mensions, territory, place, scale and network as the leading dimensions of  sociospa-
tial relations possessing exclusive explanatory and predictive value. One may ask, for
example, why space is not chosen as one of  these dimensions. Margit Mayer (2008:
418) claims that the divergent and contradictory sociotheoretical assumptions as well
as methodological and political differences between the different sociospatial perspec-
tives should be made clear and congruent before synthesising these chosen but dif-
ferent sociospatial perspectives as a TPSN framework. She (2008: 416) reminds us of
the danger of  synthesising multiple spatial dimensions into one totalising polymorphic
framework may encourage a rei  cation of  the spatial form: by this she means that the
spatial form does not act but social actors do. Casey (2008: 402–404) recognises the us-
ability of  these four concepts in state theorisation at the current time whilst question-
ing these dimensions in later research. Furthermore, he questions the equivalence of
these concepts (Casey 2008: 402–404).
While supporting the need for developing a multi-dimensional approach Anssi Paasi
(2008) has criticised the TPSN approach of  Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) regard-
ing the possibility that the framework itself  may  x the conceptual meanings of  the
various dimensions of  spatiality and the relations between them. He criticises the ap-
proach for not explicitly conceptualising the four concepts utilised and also discusses
the shortage on methodological comments of  the presented representations with re-
gard to how these dimensions, their constellations and transformations can be studied.
Paasi also points out the Anglo-American context of  the approach presented (Paasi
2008: 405–410).
In general, Andrew E. G. Jonas (2011: 1–8) has suggested that more attention should
be paid to the questions of  territory and territorial politics of  the state among these
relational approaches, to which the “rescaling of  state” discussion belongs. He actu-
ally presents the idea that the distinction between territorial and relational approaches
is outdated when dealing with questions of  territory and the territorial politics of  the
state. He felicitously points out the absence of  discussions on the territory and territo-
rial structures of  the state in the relational approaches. For instance, territoriality and
territorial politics have often been secondary to discussions about globalization, compe-
tition and economic development. He continues to suggest that it should be possible to
show how the regional strategies of  economic development and state redistribution are
contingent upon territorial politics. In a similar vein, he recognises that the discussion
about regions and regionalism has become estranged from the theoretical concepts of
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territory and territorial politics. In other words, both relational thinking about territo-
rial politics and territorial thinking about relational processes are needed (Jonas 2011:
1–8). Despite the criticisms put forward (Paasi 2008; Casey 2008; Mayer 2008; Shapiro
2008; Jonas 2011), the approach introduced by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) seems
to be a highly relevant attempt to overcome the privileging of  a single dimension in
sociospatial processes.
The approach introduced by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) on the TPSN frame-
work and their claims of  using multidimensional conceptual bases in a single study is
particularly pertinent issue in my empirical examination. In the empirical chapters, se-
curing the spaces of  dependence and constructing new spaces of  engagement involves
conceptualisations particularly on scale and network but also territories and places. It
quickly became clear that merely using scale in examining the ways regional actors seek
to secure their spaces of  dependence provides an inadequate framework for this intri-
cate phenomenon. Therefore place also has to be taken into consideration especially
when considering the “space of  dependence”. The construction of  new spaces of
engagement is closely related to conceptualisations of  network, particularly how the
regional actors direct their activities in Europe-wide networks. Since my focus is on
changing statehood, territory is one of  the main issues in my study. Although the four
spatial lexicons Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) have presented are not necessarily
the only feasible spatial concepts to be utilised in research uniting social and spatial
aspects, the TPSN theorisation focuses on the dangers of  concentrating on one spatial
concept alone as a conceptual framework. However, in some cases scale is clearly a val-
id entry point into the multidimensional phenomenon. This indicates that the usage of
multidimensional conceptual bases is meaningful when examining changing statehood.
3.3. Changing spatiality of  modern capitalism – from the Keynesian
welfare state towards the competition state?
Investigating the changing statehood
Although my objective is not to theorise the state as such, some conceptual clari  -
cations are needed. Michael Mann (1988: 4–30) proposes that the state can be re-
ferred to in institutional or in functional terms, in other words, along its institutional
structure or according to its functions. He describes the four most persistent types
of  state activities:  rstly, the maintenance of  internal order; secondly, military ac-
tions against foreign foes; thirdly, the maintenance of  communication infrastructures
and fourthly, economic redistribution. Although the basic tasks of  the state have
remained, their weighting has altered over the course of  time.
Mann (1988: 4–30) also distinguishes two approaches to state power; the despotic
state power and the infrastructural state power. The despotic state power of  state
elite refers to actions which the elite are authorized to make without routine, institu-
tionalised negotiations with civil society groups. When considering capitalist democ-
racies, the infrastructural state power becomes particularly important. Infrastructural
power refers to the capacity of  state to interfere with civil society and to implement
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political decisions concerning locational decisions. Capitalist democracies can be seen
despotically weak but infrastructurally strong (Mann 1988: 4–30). The notion of  in-
frastructural power becomes particularly informative when considering the material
consequences of  changing statehood.
The grounding of  the state in the territorialisation of  political power is a most gen-
eral feature of  the state as a political form (Jones & Jessop 2010: 1120). As Jones and
Jessop (2010: 1120) put it:
“States comprise historically variable ensembles of  technologies
and practices that produce, naturalize and manage part of  terres-
tial space as a relatively bounded container within which political
power is exercised to achieve various, more or less well integrated,
policy objectives”.
It is evident that the interaction between state government and state spatiality is
especially powerfully dominated by what the government considers to be the central
political problems at a given time (cf. Moisio & Leppänen 2007). That is to say that
the state strategies which are chosen in order to answer those political problems seen
as the most imporant at a given time, restructure and rework the statehood. Therefore
enquiring into state strategies and state spatial strategies becomes essential when exam-
ining the changing statehood.
It is of  great concern to study the practices producing changing statehood. As Bob
Jessop (1990: 366–367) notes, it is not the state which acts, but the powers of  the state
are activated through the agency of  speci  c political forces and groupings, in other
words the state itself  does not exercise power but politicians and state of  cials located
in the state system activate the speci  c powers and capacities that it possesses. Chang-
ing statehood is produced by state governance and state actors by means of  policy se-
lection, decision-making, speech-making or other political actions. But at the same time
as being the producers of  this transformation, the actors and decision-makers are also
objects of  it (Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 20). Due to the dual nature of  various actors as
both producers of  the transformation of  statehood and also objects of  it, they attain a
role as key informants when examining the changing statehood. It can be argued that
the transformation of  statehood is produced in a political process. The political nature
in the production of  statehood is present in the political struggles between actors in
producing the changing statehood both within and beyond the state. In these political
struggles, the state space is re-evaluated, reworked and restructured.
The spatial structure of  statehood represents the prevailing state strategies, social
relations and political power relations. In other words, the politico-economic, ideologi-
cal and power structures that the state represents at given time are visible in the state
space as various formulations of  spatial form of  statehood within a given time period.
A change in the politico-economic environment will offer a possibility for the re-for-
mulation of  the state’s territorial and institutional structures; materialise the re-scaling
of  the state. (Moisio 2009a: 156–158.) Through policies in  uencing the state’s spatial
development, the related discourses and policy selections constantly reformulate some
of  the spatial units at the same time as others are reconstructed. In addition, a change
in the state spatiality will represent a transition in the ways in which the government
and other political actors value the state space (cf. Moisio & Vasanen 2008; Moisio
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2009a). This indicates that by examining the statehood at a given time, it is possible to
 gure out the ways of  state apparatus valuing its state space, particularly the value of
state space in answering s the prevalent central political problems.
The welfare state – from blooming days towards crisis
Joe Painter and Alex Jeffrey (2009: 47) have presented two kinds of  meanings that the
welfare state has acquired: either it refers to a type of  state or those state institutions
providing health, education and other welfare-related services. I have focused my inter-
est in the welfare state as a capitalist market economy with liberal-democratic political
systems.
In his classical study, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990: 26–28; 2002: 13–17) presented
three forms of  welfare regimes: the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic.
His three welfare state variations present different arrangements between state, family
and market. Firstly, the liberal welfare state is based on modest social-insurance plans
where entitlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma. At the same time,
the state encourages the market by subsidising private welfare schemes. In other words,
in the liberal welfare model, market solutions are actively promoted. Secondly, in the
conservative state, welfare rights are attached to class and status. The conservative
model relies heavily on a traditional family structure and the church, in other words,
the state will interfere only if  the family capacity is exhausted or insuf  cient. Thirdly,
the social democratic regime pursues a welfare state that promotes an equality of  the
highest standards. In other words, the social democratic welfare states aim to socialise
the cost of  familyhood with political commitment to use the state capacity to promote
geographical universalism in the provision of  public services. The costs of  an exten-
sive welfare system require the minimising of  social problems and the maximising of
revenue income (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26–28; 2002: 13–17). Of  these three diver-
gent models, the Finnish welfare state represents the social democratic welfare state
model. In Scandinavian social democratic welfare states, of  which the Finnish model is
an application, the states have actively de-familialized welfare responsibilities for great-
er individual independence and to strengthen families (Esping-Andersen 2002: 13).
When considering the welfare state, the theorisations of  Bob Jessop and Neil Bren-
ner about the development, crises and transformation on Keynesian welfare state are
particularly interesting. Bob Jessop (2002a) connects the welfare state development to
the accumulation regime of  Atlantic Fordism. He (2002a: 58) sees the capitalist type
of  state in Atlantic Fordism, the Keynesian welfare national state, as an outcome of
capitalist economic and social reproduction. He describes Atlantic Fordism as “an ac-
cumulation regime based on virtuous autocentric circle of  mass production and mass
consumption secured through a distinctive mode of  regulation that was discursively,
institutionally and practically materialised in the Keynesian welfare national state”
(Jessop 2002a: 55). Jessop (2002a: 59–72) describes the Keynesian welfare national
state as Keynesian because it aims to secure full employment in a relatively closed
economy on which the state economic strategies and regulation were premised. Secur-
ing full employment was done mainly through demand-side management. The welfare
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orientation becomes visible as the state contributes in generalising the norms of  mass
consumption and expands the welfare rights. The Keynesian welfare national state was
national as the national territorial state was seen as the primary scale in developing
and securing welfare policies. The role of  localities and regions were mainly to serve
national economic and social politics. The statist nature of  Keynesian welfare national
state is visible in state institutions having a dominant role in the institutions of  civil
society and being the main complements to market forces in the Fordist accumulation
regime. Furthermore, the sovereign state level was regarded as primary among the vari-
ous spatial scales of  formal political organisations and the international activities were
mainly enforced through interstate relations and were executed through international
and intergovernmental agencies. This manifests the relative primacy of  national scale
in economic and social policy-making: in this context Jessop’s thinking also emphasises
the hierarchical nature of  scale. These characteristic features manifest the linkage be-
tween the national state form and the Keynesian welfarism (Jessop 2002a: 59–72).
Urban sociologist, Neil Brenner (2004a) provides an interesting framework for ex-
amining the changing statehood. He has studied particularly the geographies of  spatial
Keynesianism by concentrating on the interplay between urbanisation processes and
changing patterns of  state spatial regulation. He argues that the Keynesian welfare na-
tional states were constituted on new ways of  organising, producing and transforming
politico-economic space, particularly the state space (Brenner 2004a: 116, 159). Ac-
cording to Brenner (2004a: 130), spatial Keynesianism may be understood as “a broad
constellation of  national state institutional forms and regulatory strategies designed
to alleviate uneven geographical development within the national space-economy,
and thereby, to promote stabilised national industrial growth”. The objective of  na-
tional states under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was particularly to redistribute sur-
plus through national social welfare policies and also through spatial political strategies
to centralise, homogenise, standardise, and equalise national political-economic space
(Brenner 2004a: 132). Brenner’s processual approach on changing statehood nicely em-
phasises the connection between agency and structure.
Drawing on Jessop’s strategic-relational theorisation and developing his “strategic-
relational-spatial” framework, Brenner (2004a) makes reference that statehood was re-
alised through state spatial strategies and state spatial projects. State spatial projects and
state spatial strategies were harnessed in order to provide a uniform and equal state
spatiality and to maintain national political and geographical cohesion, the reworking
of  the geographies of  capital investments, infrastructure and public services (Brenner
2004a: 116). Brenner (2004a: 145–160) continues to argue that spatial Keynesianism as
the state spatial project consisted of  constructing public services, infrastructure and the
integration of  local political institutions within national systems of  territorial adminis-
tration. State spatial projects were mobilised in order to centralise regulatory control
over local development and to establish centralised, uniform frameworks of  state ter-
ritorial organisation (Brenner 2004a: 145–160). Spatial Keynesianism as the state spatial
strategy aimed to embed local and regional economies within national space-economy
and to equalise the distribution of  industry, infrastructure and population across the
national territory. Regional policies, especially compensatory regional policies were
launched to direct growth capacities and employment to less developed regions and
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rural peripheries with  nancial aid, locational incentives and transfer payments. An in-
terregional redistributive mechanism, the “automatic stabilisers” of  taxation income,
was “built in” to national  scal and social welfare systems. These “automatic stabilis-
ers” re-channelled state funds towards less favoured or marginalised regions to enable
low-income regions to pay lower taxes while receiving higher levels of  governmental
expenditure. Also industrial and infrastructural policies were introduced to re-channel
industrial production to less developed regions and rural peripheries. Nationalised in-
dustries were directed to operate as a propulsive  rm or motor industry in state’s pe-
ripheral territories through its subcontracting and business linkages with private  rms.
In addition, nationalised spatial planning systems, linked directly to national economic
plans, were introduced in order to guide future patterns of  territorial development
comprehensively. (Brenner 2004a: 130–149.) In Brenner’s thinking, I found his focus
on the changing statehood by utilising state spatial projects and state spatial strategies
as “instruments” in producing a change particularly fruitful. His processual thinking
also directs attention to the temporal aspects on changing statehood.
However, various political economic shifts have occurred in the Western European
context in last forty years which have led into the crisis of  the Keynesian welfare na-
tional state in the 1970s and 1980s (Jessop 2002a: 80). Jessop (2002a: 84–90) and Bren-
ner (2004a: 161–171) have described the economic,  sco-  nancial, political and social
crises which occurred. By  sco-  nancial I refer in particular to the function of  the
state as a tax state having “ sco-  nancial powers” and redistributive capacities. I see
the  sco-  nancial system as a measure for the spatial redistribution of  welfare through
e.g. transfer payments or tax reliefs, which in a spatial context may be targeted either to
promote or hinder spatial equality. When considering the emerged crises, for instance
the Bretton Woods monetary system broke down and the European and global eco-
nomic spaces became more “open” and integrated. The mass production industries
have declined and competition with newly industrialising countries has intensi  ed. In
other words, industrial production has restructured along with the rise of   exible pro-
duction systems. In addition, the  scal crisis of  the Keynesian welfare national state
occurred with the rise of  mass unemployment, growing public debt, decaying public
infrastructures and shrinking state budgets (Jessop 2002a: 84–90; Brenner 2004a: 161–
171). These trends have questioned the legitimation of  the objectives of  the Keyne-
sianism such as full employment, balanced territorial structure and sustained economic
growth (cf. Brenner 2004a: 168). Jessop (2002a: 80–92) presents that these changes
have also destabilised the temporal political-economic and scalar structures and the
regulatory system of  Keynesianism. Furthermore, these changes have increased our
knowledge about state rescaling process and changing statehood being promoted by
regulatory failure and crises in the capitalist organisation (Jessop 2002a: 80–92).
A crisis emerges when established organisational structures no longer provide legiti-
mate and working political solutions in temporal political challenges. That is to say that
a need for change emerges in state strategies which are intended to solve the political
problems at a given time. The changes in the political surroundings initiate a political
process where new temporary  xes are presented in order to provide solutions and
to substitute the prevalent methods. Crises in the economic operational environment
especially act as stimulus, opening political space for new solutions, political strategies
37Theoretical notions on changing statehood
and political projects, alternative approaches to the regulation of  capitalist urbanisa-
tion. However, crisis does not automatically produce responses or outcomes. Rather,
crises create space for determined strategic interventions to establish new accumulation
strategies, state projects or hegemonic projects that signi  cantly redirect the course of
events. This indicated that crises may also act as potentially path-shaping moments.
(cf. Jessop 2002a: 92–94; Brenner 2004a: 163.) In spatial terms, state rescaling is a ter-
ritorial approach, consequence or method in producing the changing statehood. State
agency is fostering the rescaling as a response to crises as the value of  state space as a
production factor is changing. When examining the changing statehood in the Finnish
context, I found it particularly interesting to focus on those path-shaping moments of
politico-economic crises that emerged. This was at the core of  my interest because any
change in the politico-economic environment will call for an institutional reformula-
tion of  the regime of  accumulation and regulation. Political forces have made their
interpretations about the crises of  the post-war mode of  economic growth, its mode
of  regulation and the represented alternatives for the crises solutions. These divergent
interpretations about the characteristics of  the crises and the possible solutions have
led to political struggles. (cf. Jessop 2002a: 94.) During the politico-economic crises of
the Keynesian welfare state, new responses were developed to respond the emergent
politico-economic challenges. The strategic reorientation of  Keynesian welfare nation-
al state became visible through discourses regarding the changed economic situation,
market failure and temporal strategic concepts (Jessop 2002a: 124–133).
It is evident that state administrations have adopted neoliberal thinking as a response
to the emergent crises. As an economic project, neoliberalism calls for the liberalisa-
tion and deregulation of  economic transactions within and across national borders,
the privatisation of  state-owned enterprises and state-provided services, use of  market
proxies in the residual public sector and the treatment of  public welfare spending as
a cost of  international production. It promotes particularly market-led economic and
social restructuring. As a political project, neoliberalism seeks to alter the forms of
state intervention associated with the Keynesian welfare national state. This is so par-
ticularly in the crisis-originated forms of  intervention which aim to manage, displace,
or postpone crises of  accumulation regimes and their modes of  regulation in Atlantic
Fordism. It also involves an enhanced state intervention to promote new forms of
governance which are more suited to a market-driven globalizing economy. The inter-
vention is often rescaled in order to promote the conditions of  a market economy and
to promote supply-side competitiveness in multi-level politico-economic competition.
In practise, this means that state capacities are decentralised upwards, downwards, and
sideways. (Jessop 2002b: 454.) The principal political response for the crisis of  the
Keynesian welfare state is the attempt of  state actors to address the emerging prob-
lems of  state and to transform, rescale and rearticulate state and state activities to be
more able to answer the emerged new political problems at the same time pursuing to
develop new forms of  government and governance (Jessop 2002a: 123). Paradoxically,
the economic, social and political measures pursued to promote the neoliberal project
generally seem to increase state intervention (Jessop 2002b: 454).
Despite the ongoing political struggles, it seems clear that economic competitive-
ness has become a new point of  comparison when evaluating patterns of  state activity
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and as the primary target of  state activities (Heeg & O enbrügge 2002: 81). This indi-
cates that competitiveness in global competition has become the central objective of
state actors. The focus of  the state is particularly on providing conditions for growth
production: the objective of  the state is therefore constructing a more competitive op-
erational environment for footloose international capital and innovation-led economic
growth. As the state increasingly comes to use new forms of  economic intervention
aimed at marketing itself  and promoting the competitive advantages of  national in-
dustrial and  nancial interests within the global economy it can be referred to as a
competition state (Cerny 1990: 241). One characteristic of  a competition state is that
it provides conditions for the generation of  growth by shifting the focus of  economic
policies from demand-side measures to supply-side ones (Pelkonen 2008: 33).
Spatially thinking, the adoption of  competition ideology means that state strategies
will be realised through the most important city-regions (Brenner 2004a: 243). There-
fore, the urban policy has been targeted to maximise competitive advantages globally
(Cerny 2006: 689). The heightened position of  the objective of  competitiveness has
led to growing inequality in regional development and changed the spatial structure
of  industrialised European countries. Although ongoing global restructuring has led
to profound transformations of  scalar organisations, territoriality is still central in this
process of  rescaling (cf. Gualini 2006: 884). Despite the role of  state and the spatial
distribution of  state power may have changed, the state has a major role in territorial
distribution of  capital accumulation (Brenner 1997: 288). It is clear that in this op-
erational environment competition also occurs between political entities representing
spaces, places or territories and not only between economic actors (Jessop 2002a: 187).
In research literature, the transformation of  the welfare state has attained many con-
tributions. For example, Jamie Peck (2001) has interestingly pointed out that despite
tendencies to promote competition-oriented regimes, key public services provided by
the state have strong support in most countries although services have become more
conditional, changes in the service production have been executed and changes in
budgets have emerged. The general idea of  earning the welfare services and the grow-
ing emphasis on conditionality refer to a shift from the welfare state to the workfare
state. The workfare may be seen as a regulatory project which is contested rather than
a stabilised “postwelfare state”; workfarism is an ambition, a regulatory strategy rather
than an achieved structure. In this context, welfare and workfare can be seen as alter-
native modes of  labour regulation. (Peck 2001: 10–19.) As Peck (2001: 11, 342) puts it,
workfare can be seen as a political-economic tendency, both a critique of  the welfare-
oriented regime and an alternative for it. The workfare ideologies and strategies are an
outcome of  institutional experimentation, policy reforms and political struggles which
becomes as apparent in discursive representations, restructuring strategies and various
institutional forms (Peck 2001: 11, 342). Peck (2001: 84, 348) emphasises particularly
the shift toward workfare as a discursive project, which is re  ected in attitudes and
norms, but at the same time it has concrete expression in policies and programmes.
Workfare constructs new vocabularies of  regulation and as a regulatory antonym of
welfare. It is often used as a discursive response to welfare-oriented rhetoric of  passive
income support, entitlement and needs-based provision. The meaning of  workfare also
varies over time and space (Peck 2001: 84, 348).
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Workfare is a highly elastic and controversial term by nature. However, the idea
of  workfare does not mean the complete disappearance of  welfare itself  but rather
the transforming of  the logic, structure and dynamics of  the welfare system in order
to minimise dependency on welfare services and maximise work participation. (Peck
2001: 10; Peck and Theodore 2001: 429.) As Painter and Jeffrey (2009: 63) put it:
“workfarism is an approach to labour market policy in which bene-
 t recipients have to earn their money through behavioural chan-
ges and active participation in of  cial programmes that are suppo-
sed to make them ready for work and more employable”.
Workfare regimes privilege transitions from welfare to work, enforcing work rather
than privileging the eligibility-based, claims-processing, check-printing rationale of  wel-
farism (Peck & Theodore 2001: 429).
Peck (2001: 12) has de  ned workfarism in three dimensions, individually, functional-
ly and organisationally. Individually workfarism means discarding the entitlement-based
system and voluntary programme participation of  welfarist models. In workfarism
these are replaced with mandatory programme participation and behavioural modi  ca-
tion concerning work. Functionally workfarism becomes visible as active labour-market
policy in which the workforce is urged or pressured into labour-market instead of  gain-
ing welfare bene  ts. Organisationally workfarism involves a systemic orientation to-
wards work and labour-force arrangements. Jamie Peck together with Nik Theodore
(2001: 430) has differentiated three levels of  workfare policy development and transfer
process. Firstly the structural level of  different welfare regimes, secondly the political
level re  ecting the priorities and orientations of  domestic politics. The third level is
the more concrete, institutional level of  programmes, governance systems and policy
measures.
As Painter and Jeffrey (2009: 63) have noted, workfare in its purest form is relatively
rare, although it is internationalising and becoming increasingly widespread. Indeed the
politics of  workfare are manifested differently in different contexts and it has different
forms and variations in different states, which re  ect the political traditions and insti-
tutional structures of  the state in question (Peck 2001: 11). Peck and Theodore (2001:
429) point out that despite the path-dependent character of  welfare restructuring and
the emergent local forms of  workfare strategies, the national and local experiences
of  welfare restructuring re  ect a generalised movement toward more work-oriented
regimes.
When considering the impacts of  workfarism on state spatiality, Peck (2001: 362–
364) argues that the geographic variability becomes normalised, even an objective,
under workfarism. Along heterogeneity, spatial unevenness and complexity, nationally
constituted welfare regimes are giving way to locally constituted workfare regimes.
The scale privileged in workfare policy is commonly the local scale, but the estab-
lished oppositional and defensive forces, developed under the welfare era, tend to be
anchored at the national or federal level. However, Peck and Theodore (2001: 432)
present in their studies of  the phenomenon of  rapid international policy transfers in
welfare-to-work/workfare in the context of  the UK and US that rather than eroding
national state power, nation-states have acquired some kind of  regulatory roles in the
management, coordination and articulation of  new institutional structures and modes
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of  governance. They (2001: 455) suggest particularly that the role of  the nation-state
remains powerful as the nation-state has a key role as a regulator, manager and me-
diator in the reform and decentralisation processes: the power of  the state to enact
far-reaching welfare reforms is extended under this neoliberal context rather than hol-
lowed out.
It is evident that the crisis of  the Keynesian welfare state has led to the re-evalua-
tion of  the basic principles of  Keynesian objectives: social and regional equality. Fur-
thermore, the adapted competition-oriented objectives in all public spheres and the
reworking of  social policy have drawn attention to the issue of  eligibility as well as
social and regional equality. Although workfarism is quite rare in its purest forms, the
basic message of  it should be listened to carefully: particularly the eligibility question
when concerning social services. Jamie Peck’s theorisation (2001) on workfare becomes
particularly interesting when dissecting it in parallel with theorisations of  the competi-
tion state (Cerny 1990, 1997), the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (Jes-
sop 2002a) and rescaled competition state regime (Brenner 2004a). Considered in this
manner these will together bring further understanding on the research on changing
statehood, particularly in relation to questions of  social and spatial equality and in dis-
cussions about rationalising the public sector.
Theorisations about the competition state
I have chosen three partly overlapping theorisations for closer investigation on emer-
gent new forms of  statehood under contemporary capitalism. The logic of  changing
statehood has aptly been examined by three scholars: Philip G. Cerny (1990, 1997),
Bob Jessop (1990, 2002a, 2008) and Neil Brenner (2003b, 2004a, 2004b). There are
also other laudable interpretations of  the changing scalar structures of  the state which
are constructed, for instance in order to understand the changing scalar divisions of
labour in the state (e.g. Cox & Mair 1991; Cox & Jonas 1993). However, I have chosen
these three theorisations because they provide useful conceptualisations on changing
statehood, particularly exposing the logic of  competition state. The advantage of  these
theorisations lies in their capability to capture the processuality of  changing statehood
which directs the focus on the production of  statehood.
Philip G. Cerny (1990, 1997) has constructed a basement for competition state theo-
risations. Both Bob Jessop (1990, 2002a) and Neil Brenner (2004a) have theorised the
logic of  state transformation, especially the trajectory from Keynesian welfare state into
a more competition-oriented state form. Jessop provides a more generic analysis making
universal generalisations, concentrating particularly on the context of  the state (Jessop
1990, 2002a). Bob Jessop (1990, 2002a, 2008) has discussed the political economy of
state rescaling during the transformation of  the Keynesian welfare national state and
presented the idea of  the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. He concentrates
particularly on welfare policy transformation towards workfare-oriented competition re-
gimes. Brenner (2004a) has focused particularly on the spatial aspects of  changing state-
hood, in other words, the spatial transformation of  statehood. He has combined spatial
aspects of  changing statehood to the strategic-relational approach developed by Bob
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Jessop (1990) and developed a spatialised theorisation of  state space in his mesolevel
investigations both on a theoretical but also on empirical level. All three theorisations
are relevant from the perspective of  my own contribution.
Philip G. Cerny (2006) has discussed Bob Jessop’s and Neil Brenner’s theorisations
on state restructuring. He notes that both Jessop and Brenner place their analysis in
a laudable way within an interdisciplinary theoretical framework: Jessop in a broader
range of  issues as Brenner focuses particularly on state rescaling in more circumscribed
studies of  urban governance. However, they are both involved in the nature of  capital
accumulation which they see as the driving force of  changing statehood in addition to
economic globalization: the adoption of  accumulation strategies determines the direc-
tion of  a structural shift and institutional change of  the state from concentrated poli-
cy-making and economic regulation towards a more structurally differentiated process
of  a multi-level restructuring of  the state. Both Brenner and Jessop give socio-political
variables a high degree of  independence in explaining change. (Cerny 2006: 679–695.)
Cerny (2006) also argues that Jessop’s most interesting argument in his rigorous
analysis of  the changing “capitalist type of  state” is to claim that the kind of  “extra-
economic” institutional support that the Keynesian welfare national state is no longer
suf  ciently supporting the capitalist accumulation in its globalising, post-Fordist phase.
Brenner’s theorisation is closely related to the spatial aspect of  changing statehood as
he sees the search for a sociospatial  x as a necessary structural imperative of  capital-
ism itself; capitalism is not spaceless, but rather it depends upon spatial  xes. At the
same time, state policies have indirect spatial effects regardless of  whether they ex-
plicitly address the spatial dimension. (Cerny 2006: 679–695.) Although Cerny (2006:
679–695) recognises the merits of  Jessop and Brenner in theorising the transformation
of  statehood or the state, he raises criticism relating to their retention of  elements
of  classical Marxist analysis, especially in their focus on “accumulation strategies” and
Marxist theories on value. He also criticises their orientation almost entirely in devel-
oped industrial states, particularly Western Europe.
Cerny’s theorisation of  the competition state
Philip G. Cerny (1997: 251) has represented that the transformation of  the nation-state
into a “competition state” lies at the core of  political globalization. In his thinking
globalization forms a central factor behind the development of  a competition state. By
globalization, Cerny (1997: 256, 273) understands a polarising and fragmenting phe-
nomenon, a hegemonic discourse engendering the strategies and tactics which restruc-
ture the phenomenon itself. He also claims that the expansion of  competition state is
itself  promoting the process of  political globalization which relativises the sovereignty
of  states (Cerny 1997: 252).
The main focus of  a competition state is to promote economic activities within a
relatively open world economy (Cerny 1997: 272). Therefore, the competition state
can be characterised as the state using new forms of  economic intervention, mar-
ketizing the state itself  and promoting the competitive advantages of  its industrial and
 nancial activities (Cerny 1990: 241). A characteristic of  the competition state is also
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the deregulation of  economic activities and the promotion of  private investments, in-
novations and pro  tability in both private and public sectors. In terms of  policy trans-
formation, several levels of  government activity are affected in the competition state
development, particularly trade policy, monetary and  scal policies and deregulation
(Cerny 1997: 260–264). Cerny’s thinking clearly re  ects the emergence of  governmen-
tality: the role of  the state is transforming – political and entrepreneurial actors have to
learn new skills to be able to operate in several asymmetric “playing  elds”: networks,
scales, places and territories at the same time above and beyond the national politico-
economic spaces (cf. Cerny 2009: 36). This conceptualisation alludes to the theorisa-
tion of  Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) on their TPSN framework.
In tightening global competition, it seems clear that the competition state has to
act increasingly as a market player in international economic arenas. In other words,
state has to promote, control and maximise the returns of  market forces (Cerny 1990:
230). Cerny (1990: 205) claims that the competition state regime signi  es a shift in the
focus of  economic policy from macroeconomic demand management towards me-
soeconomic and microeconomic policies: the promotion of  enterprises, innovations
and pro  tability in both private and public sectors has thus replaced the objective of
the general maximisation of  welfare within national society. However, the neoliberal
reform of  the welfare state has not rolled back welfare itself  but rather restructured
and marketised it (Cerny 2009: 34). In general, rapidly evolving international market-
places have demanded  exible responses in generating preconditions for competitive-
ness: a change in the pursuit of  “comparative advantage” to a “competitive advantage”
has occurred along with the promotion of  a competitive state (Cerny 1990: 205; Cerny
1997: 259–260).
The new objectives that have emerged for public management which Cerny has
discussed seem to be increasingly workfare-oriented:  rstly to replace public provi-
sion with private provision. The second objective is to replace direct welfare payments,
for example an unemployment compensation or income support, with time-limited,
increasingly means-tested or work-related measures and the third is to maintain the
con  dence of  the international business and  nancial community with stable econom-
ic circumstances. This indicates that Jamie Peck’s (2001) theorisation of  the workfare
state is linked to Cerny’s thinking about the emergent workfare-oriented objectives of
public management. All these measures re  ect the major objective of  creating a work-
fare-oriented social policy in which the central aim is to create an attractive environ-
ment for private business endeavours. Therefore there is a danger that competition
state development eventually leads to a reduction in public services and the redistribu-
tive arrangements characteristic of  the national welfare states. (Cerny 1997: 269–270.)
In general, in a competition state one can observe a shift from the Keynesian wel-
fare objectives such as full employment, redistributive transfer payments and social
service provision towards a more entrepreneurial approach to both the private and
public sectors: the promotion of  enterprises, innovations and pro  tability (Cerny 1997:
259–260). As Colin Hay (2004: 40) felicitously puts it, it seems that all aspects of  state
policy are exposed to exacting and exhaustive competitive audit at the hands of  glo-
balization. However, political action is what primarily determines the outcomes of  the
interaction of  politics and economics in a transnational political context, not merely
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the economic-structural variables (Cerny 2009: 28–29). That is to say that despite the
process of  globalization or “embedded neoliberalism”, political actors are those who
primarily direct the policy-making and its outcomes. In general, the state acts as an
agent of  its own transformation into a competition state. This emerges for example,
in the state promoting the economic activities of   rms in order to promote their com-
petitiveness in international markets. This goes to suggest that the state is no longer
able to act taking economic activities out of  the market but rather the state acts as a
market actor itself  putting activities into the market. (Cerny 1997: 267–272.) It also
seems that the state is adapting entrepreneurial attitudes in its actions when seeking to
adapt itself  to changes in cultural, institutional and market structures. Therefore the
connection between the economic transformation and state agency is leading to state
restructuration as state actors and institutions are actually promoting globalization in
their attempt to adapt state structures to global realities. (Cerny 1997: 251–252.)
Cerny (1997: 265) has characterised the models of  a competition state. The strate-
gic or developmental state with strong technocratic guidance from the state remains
prevalent mainly in the Third World. The strategic or developmental state partly
hinders the integration of  these economies into global markets due to state’s strong
control over private companies. However in a globalizing world, states are less able
to act as strategic or developmental states and therefore the orthodox model of  the
competition state, the neoliberal state, with characteristics of  free market ideology,
 exibility and openness has become more prevalent in Europe and the United States
(Cerny 1997: 265–270). Cerny (1997: 269–270) continues to represent that state actors
are nowadays increasingly involved in international relations and transgovernmental
networks. The established new interdependencies, co-operation relationships and net-
working between national actors strengthen the transnationalisation of  the capitalist
world economy and the overall internationalisation of  subnational and local actors
as well (see Cerny 1997). This directs attention to the spatial categories involved in
Cerny’s thinking.
However, the process of  states adapting to the changes in cultural, institutional
and market structures does not lead to the decline of  the state but rather the increase
of  state intervention and regulation. This is done in the name of  marketization in
the national territory or promoting the competitiveness and internationalisation. This
indicates that the nation-state has clearly not “hollowed out” but rather that its role
has changed: states are more likely to monitor and supervise privatised services ac-
cording to  nancial criteria and performance indicators. (Cerny 1997: 251–266.) The
total amount of  state intervention will actually tend to increase as the state becomes
a part of  promotion, support and maintenance of  socio-economic activities (Cerny
1990: 230).
It seems evident that Cerny sees political globalization as the most important factor
in the background of  the transformation of  the nation-state into a competition state.
He has constructed a conceptualisation on a competition state which Bob Jessop and
Neil Brenner have aptly developed towards a more spatialised way of  theorising on
changing statehood. In this context, Cerny’s (2009) more recent theorisation on glo-
balization, neoliberalisation and place nicely illustrates emergence of  spatial categories
in his thinking, in which I am particularly interested: the development of  recent spatial
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categories in the globalizing politico-economic world. He has pointed out the failure
of  the nation-state as a long-term political project and political construct in the face of
globalization. He has pointed out that the state has adopted neoliberal doctrines which
have led to the erosion of  modern nation-state boundaries from below and above. He
has claimed that the state form we have used to name a competition state has presently
come to be characterised by an “embedded neoliberal consensus”. This consensus has
developed from the hegemonic status of  the need to capture the bene  ts of  globali-
zation and discard the redistribution away from the core of  discussions. The “em-
bedded neoliberal consensus” has led to the promotion of  competitiveness, growing
acceptance of  a more open world economy, reform of  national  nances, privatisation,
public-private partnerships and  exibilising the state itself. This has led into the under-
standing of  boundaries as less about distinctions between territorial units and more
about economic sectors, socio-cultural networks, state agencies and new groupings of
“winners” and “losers”. (Cerny 2009: 25–28.) This indicates a change in thinking to-
wards space- and network-oriented spatial categories.
Jessop’s Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime
The strategic-relational approach (Jessop 1990, 2002a) provides a useful theoretical
framework for understanding the reworking, restructuring and rescaling of  state space
in a speci  c spatio-temporal context. In his strategic-relational approach, Jessop (1990:
260) argues that the state is a social relation which can be analysed as the site, the gen-
erator and the product of  state strategies. In this context, the state is a site of  strategies
and a system of  strategic selectivity in which the ability of  political forces to pursue their
interests and execute their strategies in a speci  c spatio-temporal context differs due to
their access to control the state power and resources. Therefore in a speci  c spatio-tem-
poral context some political forces have greater access to create their strategies to gain
access to state power and state resources. In addition, strategic selectivity emphasises
the state’s differentiated impacts on the balance of  political forces and strategies which
they can pursue. The state as a generator of  strategies serves as an institutional base
for political struggles and enforces hegemonic projects. On the other hand, the state
is a product of  strategies because of  both its structure and its operational framework
can be understood in terms of  their production in and through past political strategies
and political struggles (see Jessop 1990: 9–10, Jessop 1990: 260–261; Jessop 2002a: 40).
This may be understood that the current strategic selectivity of  the state is a result of
the past patterns of  strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted for its transformation
(Jessop 1990: 261). This emphasises the relational character and the path-dependent
character of  state strategic selectivity (Jessop 1990: 9–10, 260; 2002: 40).
Jessop (2002a: 123) describes the emerging new state form  rstly as a “Schumpet-
erian competition state”, which has developed as a response to the challenges and op-
portunities of  the present politico-economic development. The term competition state
refers to the state’s aim to secure economic growth, international competitiveness and
to protect jobs and welfare within its borders. Jessop (2002a: 123) claims that
“the principal political response can be summarised brie  y as the
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attempt by state managers, of  cials, economic and other forces to
transform the Keynesian full employment state into a Schumpete-
rian competition state, to rescale and rearticulate its activities, and
to develop new forms of  government and governance to address
the emerging problems of  state as well as market failure”.
On some levels, the logic of  the Schumpeterian competition state manifests the
workfare-oriented tone in Jamie Peck’s (2001) thinking. This is especially so when con-
sidering the trimming of  the welfare state into the competition-oriented state, particu-
larly the rationalisation of  social political aspects and eligibility of  welfare services.
The Schumpeterian competition state is a changing regulatory framework which fa-
cilitates labour market  exibility and mobility in national economic space. It also liber-
alises and deregulates the movement of  foreign capital and foreign direct investments.
However, the transformation of  regulatory framework is not an automatic process but
rather involves political struggles. The rise of  the Schumpeterian competition state is
re  ected in changes in economic discourse and concepts. It is mediated through dis-
courses about the economic situation and the crisis of  the Keynesian welfare national
state. The emphasis is particularly on  exibility, entrepreneurialism, lifelong learning
and knowledge-based growth. In addition, the emergence of  globalization discourse is
seen as signifying a shift in the capital accumulation dynamics. (Jessop 2002a: 124–138.)
There is a signi  cant spatial aspect in Jessop’s theorisation. He pays attention to the
scalar restructuring of  states: the emergence of  competition states becomes visible on
various territories as cities, regions and national states promote their competitiveness
on the regional, international and supranational levels, respectively. The competition
state development often involves refocusing economic strategies around the features
of  speci  c economic spaces. Jessop claims that the emergence of  Schumpeterian com-
petition state can be seen in many scales from entrepreneurial localities to the national
effort to increase competitiveness on international, pan-regional or supranational basis.
In this transformation, the role of  the state in generating favourable conditions for
economic growth is emphasised. All these efforts are re  ected in the concept of  com-
petitiveness. (Jessop 2002a: 95–133.) However, Jessop (2002a: 252) points out that the
relativisation of  scale has decreased the expected primacy of  national scale. Despite
this, no other scale of  economic and political organisations has attained a similar kind
of  scalar primacy (Jessop 2002a: 179). This is not to propose a decline of  the national
state but rather the national state remaining a crucial institutional site and discursive
framework for political struggles (Jessop 2002a: 212) which is a central focus in my
study.
The recent changes in economic and social policies that exist at different times in
different places, lead to major implications in the politics and restructuring of  the
welfare state. Therefore the qualitative shifts in the role of  the welfare state are to
be further highlighted; the reorganisation of  labour processes, accumulation regimes
and modes of  regulation cause challenges and have major implications for the poli-
tics of  the welfare state. The  scal pressures have attributed greater demands for a
change in the Keynesian welfare state and enhanced the crisis-tendencies of  Atlantic
Fordism. (Jessop 2002a: 140–144.) These change pressures have led to changes in all
three aspects of  welfare policy: insurance,  sco-  nancial redistribution and collective
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consumption. As a result, these aspects of  welfare policy are witnessing the subordina-
tion of  social policy to economic policy. Downward pressures on the social wage have
also emerged. Jessop points out that the use of  social policy to enhance the  exibility
of  labour markets and to create  exible workers suited to a globalizing, knowledge-
based economy have emerged. He summarises these changes by further developing
his Schumpeterian competition state towards a Schumpeterian workfare postnational
regime (SWPR). Jessop also emphasises the path-dependent character of  the emerging
welfare-workfare mix. (Jessop 2002a: 247–259.)
Four characteristics particularly distinguish the Keynesian welfare national state and
the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. Firstly, the Schumpeterian workfare
postnational regime aims to promote supply-side policies, international competitive-
ness and socio-technical innovations rather than full employment and planning. Sec-
ondly, economic policy has gained priority over social policy in the SWPR. Thirdly,
there is a shift from barely national-scale policymaking towards interscalar partnerships
in resolving the current economic, political, social and environmental problems in the
SWPR. Fourthly, in the SWPR there is a shift from tripartite corporatist arrangements
between business, labour, and the national state and top-down planning towards a
growing reliance on partnership, networks, consultation, negotiation and other forms
of  re  exive self-organisation. (Jessop 2002b: 459–460.)
In Jessop’s (2002a: 250–254) terms, the SWPR is Schumpeterian as it tries to im-
prove the structural and systemic competitiveness of  the most important economic
spaces in relatively open economies. In addition, it promotes innovation and  exibility
of  activities. On the other hand, the term “workfare” refers to the expanded notion of
economic policy and the subordination of  social policy. The main concern is to priori-
tise the welfare service production for business life at the cost of  individual needs. The
SWPR is postnational as it identi  es the increased meaning of  various spatial scales
or territories; the signi  cance of  national territory as a power container has decreased
(Jessop 2002a: 250–254). However, Jessop’s Schumpeterian workfare postnational re-
gime is a regime rather than a form of  the state due to the fact that “it involves more
diffuse patterns of  international policy transfer, partnership working, local solutions
and governance networks” (Painter & Jeffrey 2009: 67).
Characteristic of  a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime is its attempt to pro-
mote innovation and  exibility in relatively open economies. The core concept is the
knowledge-based economy which becomes visible in the development of  accumulation
strategies, state projects and hegemonic visions. (Jessop 2002a: 250.) In a Schumpeterian
competition state the economic competitiveness is increasingly seen to depend on extra-
economic factors (social, cultural, and environmental), which leads to substantial expan-
sion of  the economic spheres (cf. Pelkonen 2008: 36).
Of  the four ideal-type alternatives of  SWPR strategies; neoliberalism, neocorporat-
ism, neostatism and neocommunitarianism, neoliberalism and neocommuniatarianism
are rather controversial to each other. Neoliberalism is the hegemonic strategy for eco-
nomic globalization with a primacy in the United States and other Anglophone coun-
tries. It promotes the market-led transition towards new economic and social regimes as
well as free competition and also reduces the role of  law and state. In addition, neolib-
eralism promotes internationalisation and privatisation. Neocommunitarianism, at the
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other extreme, aims to limit free competition. It opposes the extension of  capitalist
logic to other spheres of  life. It also promotes the social economy as a challenge to the
logic of  capital accumulation in the economy and enhances the role of  third sector.
Its emphasis is on social use-value and social cohesion. Between these two extremes
lies neocorporatism and neostatism. Neocorporatism aims to rebalance competition
and co-operation, and expands the role of  public-private partnerships. At the core of
neocorporatism is the protection of  its major economic sectors in an open economy.
Neostatism, on the other hand, is a market-conforming but state-sponsored approach
to economic reorganisation which has the aim of  regulated competition instead of  ex-
tensive state control. In other words, the state intervenes to guide the development of
market forces. It guides national strategies rather than planning in a top-down way. It
promotes public-private partnerships under the state guidance. There are various, path-
dependent routes to each forms of  the SWPR. However, these ideal-type strategies
are rarely found in pure forms but rather combined in a case-speci  c manner. (Jessop
2002a: 259–264; 2002b: 460–464.) For example, Pelkonen (2008: 59–63) has examined
the merging of  Jessop’s ideal-type alternatives of  SWPR strategies in a Finnish context
of  technological upgrading. However, Painter and Jeffrey (2009: 68) have claimed that
the unclear future of  the state is de  ned in constant political struggles and political
decisions due to its political nature. Therefore, the present neoliberal trajectory and the
SWPR have alternatives (cf. Painter & Jeffrey 2009: 68).
Jessop’s theorisation of  Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime presents some
kind of  combination and further development of  Cerny’s (1990, 1997) theorisation of  a
competition state and Peck’s (2001) theorisation of  workfare state. Colin Hay (2004) has
identi  ed some differences between the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime
and Cerny’s (1990, 1997) competition state. Hay manifests that for Jessop it is particu-
larly the shift from a Fordist regime to post-Fordist regime of  accumulation that has
promoted the transformation of  the Keynesian welfare state instead of  globalization in
Cerny’s thinking. He presents that Jessop’s Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime
is still in a process of  emergence, and is not a stable construction. Hay also proposes
that Jessop allows variations in both of  his conceptualisations of  the Keynesian national
welfare state and the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime which identi  es the
 uctuation between political dynamics and economic logic (Hay 2004: 41).
Brenner’s Rescaled Competition State Regime
In his book, New State Spaces (2004), Neil Brenner has elaborated theoretical founda-
tions for a processual approach to the production of  state spatiality in order to escape
the “territorial trap” (see Agnew 1994). He focuses on the transformation in the spa-
tial dimension of  statehood. In particular, Brenner focuses on state rescaling, in other
words the transformation of  state power and statehood in spatial terms. He has pre-
sented a “spatialised version” of  Jessop’s strategic-relational approach in which state
scalar selectivity is understood as an expression, a medium and an outcome of  political
strategies (Brenner 2004a).
Neil Brenner (2003a, 2004a) draws fruitfully from Bob Jessop’s strategic-relational
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theorisation of  state form, state projects and state strategies and expands Jessop’s
strategic-relational theorisation into a “strategic-relational-spatial” framework. He em-
phasises that the state spatiality is never permanently  xed but rather a politically con-
tested process (Brenner 2004a: 89). Brenner (2004a: 92) introduces three dimensions
of  state spatial con  gurations under the auspices of  capitalism. Firstly, the spatial
form of  the state is closely related to its territoriality and the formation of  its politi-
cal-territorial units. Brenner reminds us that territoriality remains the most important
attribute of  state spatial form where state regulatory activities are executed. Secondly,
state spatial projects refer to speci  c programmes and initiatives which directly or in-
directly affect state spatial structures and the geographies of  state policy, at the same
time targeting spatially differentiated or integrated state institutions and structures.
That is to say that state spatial projects may refer to the state’s internal scalar division
of  its administration as well as to programmes to modify the geographical structure
of  governmental activities (Brenner 2004a: 92). Thirdly, Brenner (2003a: 205; 2004a:
93) argues that state spatial strategies target spatially selective accumulation strate-
gies or hegemonic projects referring to the capacity of  state institutions to in  uence
the geographies of  accumulation. Politicians and other political actors represent their
ways of  reasoning as temporal  xes that are suitable for dealing with current political
problems,  xes which have the appearance of  state spatial strategies and take their
form in a discursive space. It is clear that state spatial strategies are articulated through
various policy instruments and economic development initiatives. These policy instru-
ments have however differentiated scalar and spatial effects, discursive but also mate-
rial, as social forces interfere with and in  uence in spatial privileging (Brenner 2003a:
205, Brenner 2004a: 93).
In other words, Brenner proposes that the state scalar structures are historical-
ly malleable, reworked and restructured through the political strategies they enable
(Brenner 2004a: 11). He (2004a: 110–111) represents that the evolution of  state spa-
tiality is strongly a path-dependendent process. Brenner claims that the reworking of
state spatial structure does not occur simultaneously in various places but rather at
different speeds in different places at different times. In this reworking of  state spati-
ality, the past decisions have an in  uence on the current development, in other words,
historically inherited con  gurations contribute to the current reworking, restructur-
ing and reconceptualisation of  state spatiality. He argues that his strategic-relational-
spatial framework towards the changing statehood offers a way to scrutinise the path-
dependent layering process (Brenner 2004a: 110–111).
Through these theoretical foundations for his processual methodology, Brenner
has conceptualised medium and long-term tendencies of  state rescaling in Western
Europe. He has concentrated particularly on capitalist urbanisation processes and
the context of  uneven spatial development. Brenner has also been interested on
how and why political strategies are temporally mobilised to rework the state scalar
organisation (Brenner 2009: 127). He (2003b, 2004a, 2004b) has studied the state
spatiality and particularly the state spatial restructuring in the Western Europe. This
mesolevel approach includes abstract concepts but also extensive empirical research.
In particular, Brenner has examined the temporal trajectory of  spatial planning poli-
cies from spatial Keynesianism towards urban locational policies. In his studies, the
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restructuring of  state space has accelerated and intensi  ed during the 1980s leading
to fundamental urban policy reform in Western Europe (see Brenner 2004a). The
way in which Neil Brenner combines abstract concepts and empirical material in his
“strategic-relational-spatial” research provides an interesting framework of  examining
the medium and long term state rescaling also in the Finnish context. The geographi-
cal location in European margins, the late opening of  Finland to global competition
and adoption of  the principles of  spatial Keynesianism for decades have all together
moulded unique circumstances according to which state rescaling occurs in Finland.
According to Brenner (2004a: 176), the rescaling of  statehood has eroded and
destabilised the nationalised formations of  urban governance and the redistributive
forms of  state spatial policy that prevailed under the Fordist-Keynesian period (Table
1). Brenner points out that a shift in spatial policies of  the state occurred during the
crises tendencies of  spatial Keynesianism. The region-originated endogenous devel-
opment strategies were established to promote economic growth and technological
innovations in a particular region (Brenner 2004a: 193–194). Brenner (2004a: 193)
alludes to this laying the foundations to a scale-sensitive approach to spatial policy
of  state and identi  ed the speci  c role of  a region not merely as subunits of  the
state or an administrative hierarchy. In Brenner’s highly sophisticated theorisation on
urbanisation, cities and regions came to be recognised as having their own place-spe-
ci  c socio-economic assets, developmental trajectories and structural problems to be
solved in political decision-making. These new forms of  spatial policy concentrated
on national urban policies targeted to address the new socioeconomic problems of
large cities (Brenner 2004a: 193).
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Brenner (2004a: 176–206) further continues his analysis and presents the new ap-
proach to urban governance as a locational policy where the main aim of  state is to
enhance the economic competitiveness of  particular regions in supranational circuits
of  capital. The urban locational policy, the institutional reorganisations and regula-
tory strategies mobilised by post-Keynesian competition states, target cities and urban
regions as sites for the enhancement of  territorial competitiveness. Urban locational
policies aim to promote economic growth and in particular to enhance the economic
competitiveness of  subnational units such as regions, territories, cities and city-re-
gions in supranational circuits of  capital accumulation. In other words, the creation
of  competitive advantages becomes a central policy goal. In this transformed context,
cities are increasingly to be seen as growth engines through which the national com-
petitiveness is to be promoted (Brenner 204: 176–206).
Variable
Politico-economic framework








territorial and social integrity



















state as an enabler and facilitator







regulation of  national central banks,
public investments by the state
market regulation,
international free trade principles,
enhanced capital mobility












individualisation of  social risks
Table 1. Characteristics of  Fordist-Keynesian capitalism and competition regimes (revised from
Brenner & Theodore 2002: 22–25).
51Theoretical notions on changing statehood
The urban locational policies have emerged through the interaction of  multiple
scales of  political authority. Urban locational policies have been oriented towards the
positioning of  major cities and city-regions in supranational circulation of  capital ac-
cumulation. The approach is based on an assumption that different territorial units
compete against each other to maximise pro  ts and economic growth. Therefore, the
main aim of  urban locational policies is to secure territorial competitiveness and pro-
mote economic growth by maintaining and expanding the capacities for pro  t-making
and economic growth. (Brenner 2004a: 204–207.)
In his attempt to develop a scale-attuned theorisation of  contemporary statehood
and the state-theoretical analysis of  contemporary rescaling process, Brenner (2004:
176–304) has appointed the emergent competition-oriented state form as the concept
of  “rescaled competition state regime” (RCSR). Brenner considers the rescaled com-
petition state regime to be rescaled because it rests upon scale-sensitive political strat-
egies in order to promote subnational spaces in supranational capital accumulation
spheres. He proposes that Western European nationalities, subnationalities and locali-
ties have established place- and scale-sensitive approaches to institutional renewal and
regulation. Many of  these have concentrated on cities and city-regions. In establish-
ing these place- and scale-sensitive approaches, state actors have targeted state spatial
projects in order to decentralise key aspects of  economic regulation to subnational
institutional scales and actors. On the other hand, recent state spatial strategies aim to
re-concentrate socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructural investments within
the globally most competitive city-regions. Brenner continues that the spatial develop-
ment of  post-1970s Western Europe is characterised by the enhanced concentration
of  socioeconomic capacities, high-skilled labour and advanced infrastructure invest-
ments into major metropolitan regions. A growing differentiation among local and
regional economies and enhanced levels of  connectivity and interdependence among
the most dynamic, globally integrated metropolitan cores have emerged. The increas-
ing functional disarticulation of  major urban regions from their surrounding periph-
eries and from other marginalised areas within the same national territory has also
emerged. The state form is considered as a competition state because it privileges the
goal of  economic competitiveness over welfare objectives. Brenner uses the term re-
gime because this state form represents “an unstable, evolving institutional-geograph-
ical mosaic rather than fully consolidated framework of  statehood”. (Brenner 2004a:
176–304.)
Neil Brenner has aptly modelled the ongoing transformation of  state spatiality par-
ticularly in the Western European context. His processual approach to the changing
statehood unites theoretical concepts and empirical material in a way that offers a
fruitful approach to the research foci. It also shed light on the nationalised, context-
speci  c ways of  reworking the statehood. Particularly his conceptualisation of  state
spatial strategies has been utilised in my research on the changing statehood in Fin-
land; state strategies and state spatial strategies get their meaning when examining
the political struggles and the production of  the changing statehood in particular.
The processual notion put forward by Neil Brenner concerning the transformation
provides an informative way of  examining temporal changes in state spatiality. I have
pursued this particularly for the purpose of  developing further the methodological
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understanding in utilising Neil Brenner’s conceptual framework. Although the ap-
proach of  Neil Brenner is widely conceded, it has also confronted criticism concern-
ing its approach to the question of  how state rescaling and regulatory processes are
territorialised and how territorial politics can in turn shape wider processes of  regula-
tion and state rescaling (Jonas 2011: 7). Jonas (2011: 7) suggests that instead of  relying
on a notion of  territory and territorial politics as the outcome of  wider processes of
globalization and state rescaling, it should be possible to show how regional strategies
of  economic and state redistribution are contingent upon territorial politics.
In the forgoing, I have discussed the most central conceptualisations concerning
changing statehood, particularly concerning the theorisations on a competition state.
I have introduced these conceptualisations in order to provide a framework for my
empirical examinations on changing statehood in the Finnish context. In the following
sections, I will  rstly empirically examine the changing state strategies and furthermore
changing state spatial strategies in Finland. Secondly, I will enquire into how regional
actors perceive and reason the recent regional development of  Finland and in par-
ticular how they conceive the recent attempts to foster metropolitan city-regionalism.
Thirdly, I will present the drivers to secure the local interests of  the Southwest Finland,
the case study region which I have chosen. I will also examine the evolving strategies
of  regional actors to locate their region in relation to different spatial “scales”. In other
words, I study the territorial positioning of  Southwest Finland in the context of  evolv-
ing and integrating European politico-economic space. Furthermore, I will introduce
the constructed strategies and targets of  regional actors when securing their local inter-
ests in a multi-level operational environment.
4.1. The changing state strategies from 1965 up to the present times
The interaction between the state and territory is in the process of  constant transi-
tion. Governments use different measures to affect the relationship between the state
and its territory at different times, and the institutional structures of  the state, such as
its legislation, assume crucial importance in the process of  expanding the state power
within its con  nes.  The state may use public infrastructural investments such as the
construction of  roads, railways, airports, seaports and telecommunications systems to
intensify state/territory relations. These physical and social infrastructures can thus
be seen as capital goods for which users do not pay a market price (cf. Rietveld 1989:
256). As such, public investments in social infrastructure such as education belong to
these measures through which the state seeks to “stretch” itself  throughout its terri-
tory. It is self-evident today that states should provide the basic infrastructure without
which capitalist exchange could not operate (cf. Dicken 2003: 131).
From a spatial point of  view, there are two perspectives when considering public in-
vestments. It has been common to examine the impacts of  public investments on eco-
nomic growth within a particular state. In such a view, the public infrastructure can be
understood as a factor in  uencing the location of  private investments. The provision
of  a basic infrastructure in a certain region can thus be argued to lead to an increase
in the productivity of  private production factors (Rietveld 1989: 255–272). It has been
common in economic geography to study the role and impact of  public investments in
affecting regional divergence (Costa-i-Font & Rodriguez-Oreggia 2005: 310). In such a
view, the domestic infrastructure is a factor explaining industrial relocation (cf. Gram-
lich 1994). Public infrastructure may have a role in attracting industries from other
regions in a context where there are negative effects of  industrial concentration in the
place of  departure (Costa-i-Font & Rodriguez-Oreggia 2005: 310), while Haughwouth
(1999), for his part, has studied the impact of  state infrastructure growth on the inter-
state distribution of  economic activity.
State investments are regarded as instruments which uncover something crucial
about the changing interaction between the state and its territory. It is argued that pub-
lic investments serve well to characterise changes in the spatial strategies of  the state as
these are employed in different historical contexts. In other words, public investments
are practices which always re  ect their time. In the ensuing pages, the general justi  ca-
tion sections of  Finnish state budgets from 1965 to 2011 will be used to disclose the
4. Changing statehood – The case of  Finland1
1 Chapter 4 is partly based on the article Towards a Nordic competition state? Politico-economic transformation
of statehood in Finland, 1965–2005. The article has been co-authored (equal authorship) together with S. Moisio &
L. Leppänen (2007) and published in Fennia – International Journal of Geography.
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changing strategies of  the state apparatus as it has sought to manage and steer politico-
economic practices. The year 1965 has been chosen as the initial point given the fact
that Finnish regional policy legislation, which had the aim of  launching a massive state
intervention throughout the territory, dates back to 1966.
As indicated in Figure 2, investments (including both public and private investments)
have  uctuated signi  cantly in the history of  Finland, and these  uctuations re  ect
the changing state strategies that are to be introduced in the following pages. Roughly
speaking, three investment eras can be distinguished. The  rst was before the Second
World War, when Finland was mainly an agricultural society and the investment rate
 uctuated between approximately 10% and 20%. Investments tripled from the early
1920s to the late 1930s, even though the recession in the early 1930s was a crisis which
caused a signi  cant reduction in state investments (Hjerppe 1988: 124).
Figure 2. The investment rate (gross  xed capital formation/GDP) from 1917 to 2005 indicates
that there have been three “investment eras” in the history of  Finland since gaining independ-
ence: 1) c. 1917–1939, 2) c. 1944–1989 and 3) 1990– (source: Statistics Finland 2006).
 World War II was an interruption during which investments dropped signi  cantly
and the second investment era began shortly after the end of  the war and continued
until the late 1980s. The investment rate rose gradually over this period from approxi-
mately 10% to over 33%. The development that took place from the 1960s onwards
therefore exempli  es the more general trend in Western Europe that had already begun
in the 1930s, when states began to interfere directly in the actions of  society through
subsidies, income transfers, grants, loans, tax advantages, public investments and the
state ownership of  production facilities. In the Finnish context, the latter half  of  the
second investment period is usually considered to mark the creation of  the welfare
state, thus being characterised by a record of  signi  cant public investment in both
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1990s was coupled with a considerable decline in investments, to be followed by the
third “investment era”, which began more or less in the early 1990s and has continued
up to the present time. Central to this period is not only a signi  cant decline in the rate
of  investments (to c. 10%), but also a signi  cant increase in the proportion of  non-
material investments by the state at the expense of  material ones.
The changing strategies of  the state are examined as these are presented in the an-
nual budgets. The purpose is to identify the basic dimensions of  these changing strate-
gies with respect to three issues: general investment policies, education policies and
regional policies. The reason for making such a distinction is that the spatiality of  the
state is not moulded only in the context of  “of  cial” regional policies in Finland often
called as “small regional policies” but also, and perhaps even more so, in the context of
general economic and social policies.
Looking inward: territorial equalisation in the 1960s and 1970s
Centralised state planning was launched in Finland in the mid-1950s, but it was only in
the mid-1960s that the rationale which considered the state to be an indivisible entity
could be said to have been in operation in full swing. From that time onwards the state
took a decisive role in strengthening and supporting the diffusion of  settlement and
economic activities into peripheral areas, with the help of  public investments aimed
at homogenising spatial economic development in a manner typical of  an equalising
state. The laws and decisions enacted in order to establish an integrated nation caused
a considerable growth in state expenditure (Hallituksen esitys…  1964). From the very
beginning, the interaction between the state and territory was based on the ideas of
growth and “unity”.
The state made a forceful expansion into its territories in the 1960s and 1970s and
had already started to construct territorial equality and uni  ed welfare systems during
the  rst of  these decades (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1967). The same phenomenon
continued throughout the 1970s. In general, the state’s distribution of  its centralis-
ing power throughout its territory was a crucial strategy in the 1960s and 1970s, and
perhaps surprisingly, it included plans to transfer tasks and authority from the cen-
tral administration to the regional and local level in view of  a perceived need to relo-
cate of  ces and institutions outside the Helsinki region (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1974). The argumentation of  harmonious and equal territorial development of  one
nation was highly visible in the state budgets of  the early 1970s, coupled with the
need to create a well-balanced territorial structure with full employment (see Tulo- ja
menoarvioesitys…  1968, 1974). Far-reaching measures to construct an integrated and
well-balanced nation-state based on both regional and social equality were thus high-
lighted at that time (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1974). In summary, the politics of
one nation included a wide range of  practices such as development of  the educational
system and the construction of  basic infrastructure throughout the territory. These ac-
tions were coupled with the promotion of  industrial production and the construction
of  further transport infrastructure.
The development of  vocational education and extension of  the higher education
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system played an important role in the budgetary argumentation of  the 1960s. There
was an awareness of  the need to develop an educational system which would overcome
both regional differences and differences between the social classes. As far as basic
education was concerned, the schools network expanded signi  cantly and the prepa-
ration of  the state-wide comprehensive school system started in 1964. A law on the
development of  the higher education system over the period 1967–1981 was enacted
in 1966, and new universities were established in the “development regions”. This was
when the term “development regions” was established and “development regions”
were de  ned for the  rst time (cf. Vartiainen 1998: 4). In order to ful  l the require-
ments of  equal opportunities to study, the government developed a system of  study
grants in the late 1960s and this was coupled with the launch of  the State Study Grants
Centre in 1969. Further work on developing the grant system continued in the 1970s
and was presented as one of  the key state strategies in the national budgets (Tulo- ja
menoarvioesitys…  1967, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974).
The argument based on the need to develop the education system persisted further
throughout the 1970s and the focus of  state strategies in the early years of  the decade
in particular was clearly on providing and guaranteeing equal study opportunities on a
regional basis. Implementation of  the comprehensive school system began in northern
Finland in 1972. The speci  c aim of  this system as explained in the budget documents
was to reduce differences between the core areas and the more peripheral parts of  the
country. All in all, the state increased education opportunities in the development areas
at all educational levels from the mid-1960s onwards (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys… 1970,
1972, 1974). As articulated in the state budget for 1973, “In order to equalise the per-
sisting regional differences in vocational education, it is hoped to increase educational
opportunities in the development areas by directing a considerable proportion of  the
student places to these regions” (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1972: 16). The state budg-
ets of  the 1960s and 1970s also indicate that the expansion of  the entire education sys-
tem to cover the whole country was considered to be of  the utmost importance. Given
the crucial importance of  the education system in the national context, the creation of
a uni  ed educational system can be said to be inherently intertwined with an attempt
to create societal order throughout the territory.
In addition to active education policies, the government began to implement an ac-
tive public investment policy from the late 1960s onwards. This included large pub-
lic investments in welfare infrastructures such as local hospitals, of  ce buildings and
transportation which increased the visibility of  the state in peoples’ everyday lives. The
construction of  transportation infrastructure continued throughout the 1970s with the
electri  cation of  the rail network, road investments and automation of  the telecom-
munications network. Particularly the transport investments must be seen as crucial
attempts to connect the geographical peripheries under the direct in  uence of  the
central government. Even though investments in infrastructure were not a focal point
of  the state budgets in the 1970s (contrary to the 1960s, when industrial investments
required massive public  nancing), they nevertheless remained central to them. Invest-
ments in the state-owned Post and Telecommunications of  Finland were already being
legitimised in the early 1970s by emphasising the signi  cance of  economic growth es-
pecially in less developed areas (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1970, 1972, 1974; Valtion
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tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1976, 1978). In general, extensive public investments and  -
nancing were argued to be the key means of  promoting balanced regional development
and social cohesion. The mining industry in northern Finland, for example, together
with geological research in those areas, was strongly supported in the state strategies.
In other words, the territory of  the state was regarded as a fundamental economic and
social resource, a type of  spatial capital. As a result, industrial and power plants, mines
and forest industries were established in less developed areas, largely with public in-
vestments. In addition to these investments in infrastructure, large forest improvement
strategies were emphasised in the state budgets (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1967).
State ownership was the backbone of  the welfare state strategies, which aimed not
only to improve economic growth but also to foster national integrity. The budgets
in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted close linkages between employment, societal or-
der and public investments. The basic objective was to increase consumer demand. In
the 1970s, when the argumentation legitimising large public investments was notably
evident, state strategies were often justi  ed with reference to poor employment condi-
tions. In fact, in the mid-1970s, when the number of  unemployed exceeded 100,000,
President Urho Kekkonen declared a state of  national emergency. As late as 1979, the
state budget proposal (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1978: 13) still clearly revealed
a classical Keynesian tone: “weaknesses in domestic investment and consumer demand
have been the reason for the high unemployment”.
It was argued in the 1960s and 1970s that unemployment was the major threat to
societal order and economic growth, and the ability of  public investments to smooth
over the cyclic variations in employment was often highlighted in state strategies from
the mid-1960s up to the mid-1980s (Hallituksen esitys…  1964; Tulo- ja menoarvioesi-
tys…  1967, 1968, 1970; Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys… 1976, 1978). Public invest-
ments were especially directed to areas which suffered from unemployment (Tulo- ja
menoarvioesitys…  1974). In addition to employment, public investments were also
seen as measures designed to avoid production shortages. In 1975, for example, the
government argued that “economic policy has been especially directed towards sup-
porting investments in industry in order to create additional export capacity for the
needs of  the new economic boom” (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1974: 9). Arguments
also emerged for a need to increase production capacity because of  the rapid growth
of  exports to the Soviet Union. Interestingly, the justi  cations for public investments
gradually altered from employment aspects towards the management of  production.
The aforementioned educational and investment policies were both remarkably in-
ward-looking in the 1960s and 1970s, and the same applies to the regional policies,
which paid special attention to the welfare conditions and economic growth in the “less
developed areas”. Concepts such as “development regions” and “balanced regional de-
velopment” were notably visible in the state budgets of  the latter half  of  the 1970s
(Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1974; Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1978). Various
measures and actions took place in the less developed areas in the 1970s to balance
out the developing territorial differences. The speci  c objective was to use public fund-
ing to promote entrepreneurship that would later operate in a  nancially independ-
ent manner. One of  the most important actions in the 1970s was the establishment
of  Kehitysaluerahasto Oy in 1971, an organisation which started to  nance small and
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medium-sized enterprises in the development areas. Its main of  ce was built in Kuopio
(Herranen 2009: 167). The external development potential of  companies in the devel-
opment areas in particular was subsidised through state funds (Tulo- ja menoarvioesi-
tys…  1970), and  nancial subsidies were also allocated directly to the promotion of
industry. The mining industry, power production, electri  cation, the construction of
hydroelectric power plants, ore prospecting and geological explorations in the develop-
ment areas were particularly supported by the state (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1976, 1978). In other words, rational state planning, the material infrastructure, natural
resources and an attempt to foster economic growth formed a single entity.
Education, investments and regional policies in the 1960s and 1970s revealed a
strong need to raise the development regions to the same level as the rest of  the coun-
try. The “policies of  one nation”, an attempt to construct a coherent national state
with well-balanced economic development throughout its territory coupled with the
objective of  attaining territorial control both vertically and horizontally, were strategi-
cally pursued through education, investments and regional development policies. These
interlinked policies were based on an understanding that the state territory was the key
constituent of  societal order as well as a strategic asset for increasing economic pros-
perity. These policies also clearly reveal that the state strategies in the 1960s and 1970s
were mainly inward-looking and based on equalising principles.
The understanding of  national competitiveness in the state budgets changed re-
markably from the 1970s to the late 1990s. Despite the inward-looking state strategies,
the concept of  competitiveness had already emerged in the budgets by the early 1970s,
but it referred speci  cally to a need to develop national competitiveness through active
labour and education policies which were to be spatially extensive. State investments in
education were therefore seen as a crucial prerequisite for gaining competitive advan-
tages in international trade. The term competitiveness therefore referred at  rst mainly
to the price competitiveness of  the state owned industries (Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1970). Some initiatives for launching research and development projects were already
being made in the late 1970s, but this form of  reasoning remained marginal to the state
strategies until the 1990s.
In the 1970s the concept of  national competitiveness was inextricably con-
nected with the promotion of  industrial structure and employment (Valtion tulo- ja
menoarvioesitys…  1978). In this form, the rhetoric of  “being competitive” was highly
visible in the state budgets of  the late 1970s (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1976,
1978). It is also important to note that the concept of  national competitiveness in the
1960s and 1970s was inherently spatial in nature, as it referred especially to balanced
economic and regional development.
Looking inwards and outwards: state strategies in the 1980s
Development of  the welfare state in Finland reached its culmination in the 1980s, as
education, investment and regional policies gradually took on new forms (Valtion tulo-
ja menoarvioesitys…  1980, 1982), so that investments in social capital, know-how and
education increased in state budgets in the early part of  the decade and investments in
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research and innovation towards the end. It was now argued that national competitive-
ness could be constructed and maintained through research, product development and
the promotion of  exports (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1982). The state budget
for 1987, for example, emphasises that “the enhancement of  the professional skills
of  personnel and their motivation towards their work are the factors on which real
competitiveness is ultimately based” (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1986: 9). The
budgets therefore started to highlight the importance of  research in promoting the
competitiveness of  domestic production. For the  rst time universities were explicitly
linked to the concept of  economic competitiveness, although regional stability in high-
er education was still highly valued in the state strategies (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesi-
tys…  1980, 1988).
The increasing importance of  non-material investments, especially in the form of
research and development, indicated a signi  cant change in strategy in the late 1980s.
In fact, investments in research and development increased signi  cantly from the 1980s
onwards, with the aim of  reaching an “international level” (Figure 3). State subsidies
were allocated to the development of  new applied technology, product development
and production systems (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1980), and it was now con-
ceived that regional policy funding for entrepreneurship would improve the country’s
long-term competitiveness (Valtion tulo-ja menoarvioesitys…  1982, 1988). As a result,
public funding was increasingly being diverted away from direct investment assistance
and towards research and development subsidies (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1984, 1986) (Figure 4). It is important to note that regional access to research activity
was also taken into consideration and growth in the research sector was channelled
outside the Helsinki region (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1986).
Figure 3. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of  the GDP (source: OECD
MSTI Database 2010).
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Where the construction of  the welfare state, especially in the 1970s, had taken place
with the help of  large public infrastructure and service investments, these basic infra-
structure investments had largely been completed by the early 1980s. It is also impor-
tant to note that the possibility of  using state investments for achieving permanent im-
provements in the employment situation was questioned for the  rst time in the state
budgets of  the early 1980s (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1980, 1982). This criti-
cism took place in a situation in which political interventions by the state had started
to be increasingly perceived as economically harmful rather than advantageous. It was
in this context that the justi  cations for the use of  public investments changed from
the improvement of  employment to the creation of  competitiveness. In 1981, for ex-
ample, the government emphasised that a rapid and balanced expansion in investments
was necessary for regeneration of  the production structure and the competitiveness
of  production. However, the government also went on  to stress that great variations
in investment activity could potentially lead to unstable economic development, which
would weaken the possibilities for creating favourable preconditions for sustainable
economic growth (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1980).
Figure 4. Rates of  investment in the public and private sectors from 1975 to 2004 (source: Sta-
tistics Finland 2007).
Where the state-owned companies were heavily subsidised in the 1960s and 1970s,
a change in thinking with regard to the productivity of  state-owned companies took
place in the early 1980s. It was now argued that state-owned industries should op-
erate as real enterprises with the objective of  making an economic pro  t (Valtion
tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1982, 1986). This is considered as the  rst step towards
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the gradual privatisation of  the state-owned industries that took place especially in the
1990s. Moreover, this new principle indicates that the notion of  competitiveness was
becoming a more central part of  government strategy. It was now argued that it was
necessary to allocate funds to  elds that had the prerequisites to survive in the face
of  international competition without continuous public sector investments. It must be
noted, too, that this policy was launched even though the unemployment rate was high
and there were shortages in the supply of  skilled labour in southern Finland, especially
in the growing branches of  industry and in the service sector (see Valtion tulo- ja
menoarvioesitys…  1984, 1986, 1988).
A distinct need to renew regional policies emerged in the late 1980s in response to
increasing regional differentiation. This was argued in the state budget of  1989 with
reference to changes in economic structures: “The structural change in industry and
the growth in the service sector together with the increasing importance of  knowledge
and research investments in fostering international economic activity have given rise to
a need to intensify regional policy measures” (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1988:
32). Regional policies were gradually reformulated, with a new emphasis on industrial
restructuring and service sector growth, and the increasing importance of  knowledge
and research investments also surfaced in their reformulation in the late 1980s. It is
also striking to note that the idea of  internationalisation was for the  rst time added to
the previously inward-looking and equalising regional policies of  the mid-1980s. This
internationalisation was closely connected with the need to increase regional competi-
tiveness through know-how and research activity (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1988).
Regional policy reform was articulated especially with reference to competitiveness.
The decline in economic competitiveness was characterised as a threat that would jeop-
ardise not only economic development and employment but also the growth of  for-
eign trade (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1986). For the  rst time regional policies
were explicitly connected to the improvement of  living conditions in the Helsinki re-
gion. Moreover, the balance between economic growth and the autonomous develop-
ment of  the regions surfaced as an important issue in the state budgets. The devel-
opment activities mentioned in the state strategies began to concentrate especially on
southern Finland. As a consequence, the role of  the development areas in the state
budgets diminished in the course of  the 1980s (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…
1984, 1986, 1988).
Economic competitiveness gained in importance in the state strategies at the ex-
pense of  employment which had characterised the period from the 1960s up to the
late 1970s. This transformation can be taken as an indication of  a gradual change from
Keynesian strategies towards Schumpeterian competition strategies. The absolute ne-
cessity of  economic growth was justi  ed by increasing the requirement for competi-
tiveness, and professional high-tech skills, the development of  technology and related
R&D activities were already being considered by the late 1980s as forming a back-
ground to the competitiveness of  the state, which sought to bolster economic growth
(Valtion tuloja menoarvioesitys…  1982: 29, also 1984, 1986). The concept of  com-
petitiveness thus became a ubiquitous formulation in state budgets at the expense of
the price competitiveness typical of  the 1970s (cf. Tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1972).
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In addition to the increasing demand for competitiveness, the notion of  internationali-
sation became central to the state budgets in the late 1980s. All these changes that took
place in the 1980s indicate a gradual shift from inward-looking to outward-looking
state strategies which were structured around and which thus constituted the “national
scale”. This was so even though inward-looking and equalising policies still played a
central role, especially in the  elds of  education and regional policy.
An outward-looking state: emerging competition strategies from the early 1990s onwards
By 1990 the economic boom had been continuing for some time and the unemploy-
ment rate was at its lowest point since the early 1970s (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesi-
tys…  1990). The boom passed its peak at this point, however, and the national econ-
omy fell into a period of  deep stagnation, as a result of  which both public and private
investments decreased markedly (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1992). Employment also
declined rapidly, the problems of  structural and long-term unemployment deepened
and the public sector was unable to increase employment with its own activities (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  1994). Also the private  nancing sector drifted into dif  culties, in
other words  nancing was not easily available. The bottom of  the economic depression
had passed by the end of  1992 however, and the government started to seek to restore
sustainable economic growth and improve the employment situation. It was now argued
that the low rate of  in  ation would support competitiveness, accelerate investments and
increase employment (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1994).
It was in the middle of  the deep economic recession that pro  tability and effective-
ness, the key catchwords of  the neoliberal rule of  maximising economy, were adopted as
key principles of  public administration (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1990). The
growing demands to increase effectiveness led to a number of  administrative reforms
which it argued would secure the service basis of  the welfare state (Valtion talousarvio-
esitys…  1992). These reforms in all sectors of  the administration have continued up to
the present day.
In general, education and research were highly valued in the state budgets throughout
the 1990s. New polytechnics were established to increase the instruction in applied tech-
nology, and growing demands were expressed to increase the ef  ciency of  the whole
education system, which was now being increasingly conceived of  as the backbone of
economic growth. The new, outward-looking state strategies called for an increase in
measures to gauge the effectiveness of  the education system (costs per unit, quantitative
objectives) (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1990; Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1996),
and it was now argued, especially internationally, that competitive research and develop-
ment activities were essential for the nation to survive in the integrating and expanding
world markets (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1992). The emphasis on R&D was coupled
with growing demands to create an “information society” based on technological inno-
vations. In fact, the concept of  the information society became a key reference point in
the state budgets, implying that it was a central role of  the state to create the precondi-
tions necessary for the internationalisation of  Finnish science and technology (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  1992, 1996). State budgets have clearly disclosed that government
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expenditure on research and development is viewed as crucial in order to increase the
country’s international competitiveness in global markets. This strategy is coupled with
a noticeable aim to educate highly-skilled workers, who are seen as the sources of  tech-
nological innovations and economic success. That is to say, the country’s international
competitiveness and its very survival has been closely connected with technological in-
novations and the technological skills of  the people.
Given the fact that it is especially the neoliberal theory of  technological change
which relies on the coercive powers of  competition to drive the search for new tech-
nologies and new production methods, the budgets reveal a fairly clear change towards
strategies typical of  competition states. In other words, they disclose a belief  that there
is a technological solution to each and every problem, so that technological innovations
become an integral part of  the state which seeks to foster international competitiveness
(cf. Harvey 2005: 68).
From the early 1990s onwards, investments in economic innovations and non-ma-
terial assets were argued to be important for economic growth. It was now argued
that the national economy demanded massive non-material investments in education,
research, product development and marketing. As such, the state began to develop new
infrastructures for creating an attractive business climate (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesi-
tys…  1990; Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1996). The need to attract foreign direct invest-
ments into Finland emerged in its rhetoric in the late 1990s in particular, when it was
emphasised that economic and industrial policies must ensure that Finland provides
advantageous conditions for the relocation of  both domestic and foreign investments
(Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1998).
The establishment of  the Centre of  Expertise Programme in the 1990s, coupled
with the gradual development of  the “national innovation system”, epitomises the way
in which both centralised research and development and technological innovations have
become incorporated into contemporary regional policies (Valtion talousarvioesitys…
1998). Indeed, considerable changes in regional policies took place in the state budg-
ets from the early 1990s onwards. Not only have the ways of  thinking about regional
development changed, but regional policy concepts have also been renewed during the
past  fteen years. Networks, innovations, clusters, city districts and private-public part-
nerships have more or less replaced the previous spatial language in which concepts
such as development regions, central place hierarchies, regional development and re-
gional stability were often employed.
European integration has naturally had a major impact on regional policy practices
since 1995, but it is also the emphasis on international competitiveness, high-tech and
privatisation which has had a signi  cant impact on the changes in these policies. The
programme-based regional policies of  the EU adopted by Finland in the mid-1990s
further emphasised the principles of  both the autonomous development of  regions
and their specialisation. Now urban and rural policies have become increasingly sepa-
rated from each other and the state has started to act as a provider of  the precondi-
tions necessary for entrepreneurship (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1990; Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  1992, 1994). Thus the Finnish government currently acts as a risk
taker which  nances “innovative” companies, especially in the high-tech sector (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  1992, 1994, 1996). As a consequence, substantial  nancial resources
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are now being allocated to the information and communication technology sector in
particular (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1996, 1998). The Schumpeterian formulation
of  competitiveness has therefore been clearly visible in the national budgets from the
mid-1990s onwards. As Jessop (2002a: 121–122) points out, it is especially typical of
competition state policies that public resources are increasingly allocated to the promo-
tion of  technological innovations that are assumed to increase the pace of  economic
growth.
Regional development became increasingly understood from the 1990s onwards as
the responsibility of  the regions rather than the central government. In general, the
state began to oblige the regions to strengthen their international economic competi-
tiveness and attractiveness without giving them any notable degree of  political self-de-
termination (cf. Hautamäki 2001: 44–45). In Finland, the decision-making concerning,
for instance, of  transport infrastructure and higher education has been fairly tightly
under the authority of  central administration, while the vocational education is largely
the responsibility of  local actors; the majority of  the organisers of  vocational educa-
tion are municipal organisations. Because the regional actors consider both the higher
education system and traf  c infrastructure to be factors which greatly affect regional
development, the decision-making in those branches has remained a central target for
local actors’ interest supervision for decades.
The notions of  international competitiveness were already built into all state poli-
cies by the late 1990s and investments were being allocated especially to improve the
international competitiveness of  private companies and production structures in major
urban regions (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  1996, 1998). Know-how infrastructures and
entrepreneurship played a crucial part in these new policies. Thus the budget articula-
tions from the early 1990s up to the present day re  ect the fact that the city-centric
and outward-looking approaches to spatial policy have fundamentally challenged, if
not entirely superseded, the forms of  territorial redistribution that were launched in
the 1960s.
Looking outwards: Innovation policy as a new state strategy
In the early 2000s, the general justi  cations of  state budget indicated balanced and rap-
id economic growth (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2000). After the mid-2000s the world
economy bypassed the peak of  the economic cycle into slower economic growth.
However, in Finland the economic growth continued and employment rose throughout
2000s until the economic recession began in the mid-2008 and the economic growth
decreased (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2006, 2008). Presently the world economy has
slowly recovered from the  nancial crisis and growth is expected to be rapid during
next few years. This is expected to be re  ected positively also in the Finnish economy
(Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2010).
The politico-economic challenges that the Finnish state will confront have been re-
peatedly elicited in state budgets throughout the 2000s. The challenges originate from
both the state’s internal and external conditions. The inward pressures of  the state,
particularly the change in the age structure of  the population will eventually lead to the
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ageing of  the population and a decrease in working-age population. This will create
a risk of  the national economy weakening and endanger the economy of  municipali-
ties. It will also endanger the welfare services provided and sustained by municipalities
(Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). The outward pressures of
the state are based on the ongoing changes in the world economy, global competition
and the transfer of  less competitive business  elds to locations abroad (Valtion talous-
arvioesitys…  2006). Therefore the demand for a change in the measures targeted to
respond to the emerging political problem began to be identi  ed during the 2000s.
The emerging politico-economic challenges have forced public actors to further
tighten the principles of  pro  tability and effectiveness, adopted as key principles in
public administration in the 1990s (Valtion tulo- ja menoarvioesitys…  1990). The prin-
ciples of  effectiveness and productivity have been raised to the core of  those strategies
directed to secure the welfare services. However, the objective of  welfare itself  and the
objective of  securing the welfare services have both remained highly visible in the state
budget rhetoric. In this context, the national economic growth and high rate of  em-
ployment are seen as preconditions for securing the welfare services and maintaining
a balanced regional development in the state space (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2002,
2010). Therefore economic growth, productivity and effectiveness of  the public sector
are at the core of  state strategies in the 2000s.
The rhetoric of  state budgets in the 2000s manifests that the challenges that the
Finnish state has confronted, particularly the competitiveness in global market compe-
tition, require new allocated methods of  response. The main aim of  state actors is to
promote the development of  the Finnish state as a competitive and attractive place for
the international businesses to locate their business activities (Valtion talousarvioesi-
tys…  2004, 2006). Therefore education as well as research and development activi-
ties were both highly valued in the state budgets throughout the 1990s as methods
of  constructing a functional operational environment for business life. In the 2000s,
education and research along with innovation activity has further increased their im-
portance at the core of  state strategies targeted to improve the competitiveness of  the
Finnish state in global market competition (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2006, 2010).
Innovations and know-how, particularly investments in education, research, technol-
ogy development and innovation activity, are seen to provide the preconditions for
economic growth and competitiveness by providing an internationally high-quality op-
erational environment for private business life (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2006, 2010).
The high level of  education and knowledge have even been seen to construct a basis
for the further development of  the state (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2002). Therefore
I argue that innovations and innovation activity have particularly found their way to the
core of  state strategies after the economic recession of  the late 2000s.
In general, immaterial investments are seen as highly relevant for the success of  the
national economy. However, in the 2000s, the slight increase in allowances in education
has been considered inadequate. The need to allocate resources to the most important
development targets and in particular to the most productive targets has emerged, par-
ticularly in the  eld of  education (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2006). This is to suggest
that the spatial focus of  regional development has been altered during the 2000s of
which the major reform enforced in the  eld of  higher education is indicative. When
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compared to previous decades, the development has changed from expanding the
higher education network towards the reduction of  it particularly when considering
its spatial scale. This is a manifestation of  a penetration of  pro  tability and effective-
ness into all branches of  state activities. Small branches in higher education networks
were to be put together to form larger, multi-discipline educational branches (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  2006). The most valuable single renewal was the reworking of  the
university system in 2010, in which several consolidations of  Finnish universities were
prepared and realized (e.g. merging of  the University of  Turku and Turku School of
Economics and establishing the University of  Eastern Finland by merging the uni-
versities of  Joensuu and Kuopio as well). However, the most  nancially notable was
the creation of  Aalto University in 2010 from the merger of  three Finnish universi-
ties, the Helsinki School of  Economics, Helsinki University of  Technology and the
University of  Art and Design Helsinki. Furthermore, other universities were changed
into the institutions subject to public law since the beginning of  the 2010 (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  2008, 2010).
In the 2000s, a shift from the  nancial support of  regions towards the promo-
tion of  endogenous development of  regions as well as the promotion of  precon-
ditions for regional development has occurred in full swing. When considering re-
gional development, particularly the promotion of  the preconditions for regional
development is emphasised in state budgets instead of  direct state subsidies. It is
stated in state budgets that the government promotes the endogenous development
of  regions based on their particular strengths. Furthermore, the objective of  state
governance is the promotion of  regional growth preconditions, the strengthening of
regional know-how and the improvement of  regional co-operation rather that  nan-
cially supporting actual development (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2000, 2002, 2004).
This all indicates that a shift in the focus of  regional policies has occurred during the
2000s.
Furthermore it could be argued that a change in the content of  regional policy has
occurred. This has occurred due to the general understanding of  regional develop-
ment having altered slightly to consist mainly of  the endogenous regional develop-
ment or development of  preconditions for growth generation instead of  maintaining
 nancial subsidies of  the state as the core measures of  regional policy. In general,
regional development is realised through regional programmes  nanced both by the
Finnish state and partly  nanced by the European Union (Valtion talousarvioesitys
…  2002, 2004, 2006, 2010). The evaluated state budgets clearly signify a shift in re-
gional policy thinking to a new era from the mid-2000s onwards.
In the early 2000s, polycentricity was the objective of  Finnish regional policy in
spatial development of  the state. The objective in urban policy was the development
of  regional centres, a balance in migration, and the creation of  a network of  vital re-
gional centres consisting predominantly of  small and medium-sized centres (Valtion
talousarvioesitys…  2000). In the early 2000s, the target for urban policy was particu-
larly seen to focus on problems and development possibilities of  large urban regions.
In state budgets, urban policy was set out as a programme directed to solve problems
caused by growth, long-term unemployment and social displacement, which is to say
that urban policy was mainly seen as a problem-solving activity rather than a measure
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constructing competitiveness (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2002).
However after the mid-2000s, the emphasis of  state budget rhetoric slightly trans-
forms as the large city-regions and particularly the metropolitan region are increas-
ingly perceived as constructing competitiveness in global market competition. The
state budgets began to promote the development of  the competitiveness of  the met-
ropolitan region in the form of  metropolitan policy (Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle…
2011). This indicates that the focus of  urban policy is changing towards metropolitan
or city-regionalism-oriented thinking.
4.2. Changing state spatial strategies
Understanding the territorialisation of  state power : inward-looking and equalising state strategies at
a time of  internal and external pressures
The spatial form of  state and historically speci  c forms of  state spatiality manifest the
outcomes of  spatially selective political strategies (Brenner 2004a: 84). In articulating
these spatially selective state political strategies, economic development initiatives, spa-
tial planning programmes and public infrastructure investments are utilized as well as
various sectoral policies such as regional policies, urban policies, industrial policies but
also labour market policies and housing policies (Brenner 2004a: 93). It seems evident
that a transformation in state spatial projects and strategies has a profound impact on
statehood. It can also be argued that the territorial structure of  the state represents the
prevalent state strategies, social relations and political power relations (Moisio 2009a:
156). Therefore, the territorial structure of  the state offers a way to examine the chang-
ing statehood.
Changes in the politico-economic operational environment have caused the state to
reconsider its spatial strategies. The changing statehood is a strategically-selective and
politically-contested process (Brenner 2004a: 89). Furthermore, the transformation of
state spatiality is clearly a path-dependent process which occurs on the basis of  the
current territorial structure of  the state. That is to say that the historically constructed
spatial con  gurations affect the speed, penetration and shape of  the restructuration of
state spatiality. In Finland, the de  nition of  core and peripheral regions and the inter-
action between those regions have been an essential part of  the trajectories of  the state
spatiality (Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 22). In this context, it is important to delve deeply
into how and why some state territories are considered as more valuable than others in
relation to the national economy, national culture and to national politics.
The trajectory of  Finnish state space from Finnish independence up to the 2000s
has aptly been described by Moisio and Vasanen (2008: 20–31). They have construct-
ed generalisations from the prevalent forms of  state spatiality in a certain historical
situation. With these generalisations it is possible to seize on some wider trajectories
regarding the relationship between the state and its spatiality. It is also possible to
scrutinise the alternatives presented for the future development on state spatiality by
comparing the visions put forward. Moisio and Vasanen (2008: 20–31) have divided
the development of  Finnish state space into four temporal phases: the areal state, the
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spatially decentralised welfare state, the spatially decentralised competition state and
the metropolitan state.
According to Moisio and Vasanen (2008: 23–29), the areal state describes the Finn-
ish state spatiality from independence to the 1950s. In an areal state (Figure 5), a small-
scale cultural-political core region was located in the Helsinki capital region and a wide
state periphery existed elsewhere. The visibility of  the state was minor. A central politi-
cal problem of  the time was a question of  land and natural resources, forests in partic-
ular, in other words the  nancial bene  t that land was producing, ownership questions
about land and resource distribution. This indicates that state territory was held as an
important production factor (Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 23–29).
Figure 5. The areal state (source: Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 24). The grey area indicates the core
region of  the state and the white area the state periphery.
 The history of  Finland is often conceptualised as a continuing attempt to survive
on a turbulent world political map (see Jakobson 2006). It is argued here that from the
early 1950s up to the late 1980s the logic of  survival especially revolved around the is-
sue of  securing the territorial state, its membership of  the non-communist camp and
its political institutions. These formed the basis of  state sovereignty from the early
1950s to the late 1980s. It is proposed here that power politics in Finland had a major
impact on the ways in which governments understood the relations between territory,
population, security and societal order.
Keijo Korhonen, one of  the key political  gures in Finland during the Cold War
period, stressed in 1969 that “The foreign policy of  every country is a result of  both
external and internal circumstances, of  both existing conditions and the political will”
(Korhonen 1969: 31). In a similar vein, the interaction between the Finnish state and
its territory in the 1960s and 1970s may be understood as a result of  both internal
69Changing statehood – The case of Finland
and external circumstances, of  both existing conditions and the political will. In other
words, the state space at that time was a manifestation of  changing political contexts in
which global economic ideologies mattered as well as power politics.
The “central political problem of  the government” which developed in Finland
from the 1950s onwards included two inherently intertwined issues: national integrity
and economic growth, i.e. it was inherently tied up with security policy concerns. It
was in this political context that the idea that the state had the ultimate responsibility
to create territorial and social integrity began to develop. This goal was inextricably
conditioned by both internal and external pressures, which were connected with the
more or less undisputed ideological goal of  the leading political groupings. The Social
Democrats, Conservatives and Agrarian Party all shared the view that Finnish society
should belong ideologically to the non-communist camp. Externally, therefore, the ris-
ing industrial and military power of  the Soviet Union operated arguably as a signi  cant
stimulus for developing national integrity.
In the late 1960s, President Urho Kekkonen pointed to a need to create a “uni-
form pattern of  behaviour for the Finnish nation” (Jakobson 2003: 16). Even though
personal contributions should not be overestimated in the context of  historical de-
velopment, neither should the actions of  powerful individuals be underestimated. As
far as the expansion of  the power of  the Finnish state from the 1960s onwards is
concerned, the efforts made by Urho Kekkonen should especially be taken into ac-
count. As Prime Minister in the early 1950s, Kekkonen had already sought to launch
a political programme which epitomises the later Keynesian territorial policies of  the
state. In his important political pamphlet, Does our country have enough presence of  mind to
become prosperous?, Kekkonen (1952) not only required that the government should take
an active role in enhancing regional development, but he also argued that strong state
regulation should exist throughout the country. Kekkonen thus demanded active state
participation in the development of  the peripheral areas. His idea was that the national
state should operate as the key initiator of  development, given the lack of  private sec-
tor investments in the peripheral regions. He therefore introduced a major investment
and  nancing programme especially to promote industrialisation in northern Finland:
“The special conditions with regard to industrialisation in northern
Finland, the scarcity of  capital and the tendency for private entrep-
reneurship to support the southern part of  the country in parti-
cular mean that we cannot construct industry in northern Finland
– at least not as quickly as the bene  ts of  our national economy
demand. If  the mission is to be carried out as it has to be, other
measures have to be found. The only useful means is that the state
should use public investments in northern Finland to build up its
heavy industry” (Kekkonen 1952: 118).
In order to make the investment programme possible, Kekkonen (1952) claimed
that the income level of  the people should not increase notably in the short term. All
these radical political openings were legitimised by reference to the challenges posed by
both foreign and domestic politico-economic pressures which threatened the societal
order within the con  nes of  the state. Kekkonen thus conceived the creation of  an
integrated nation as a means to secure this sovereign political unit in the era of  both
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internal and external uncertainty. As such, the central governmental problem was in-
herently connected with the strength of  a collective body. The increasing power of  the
centralising state was considered crucial to providing a territorial basis for social equal-
ity and social order. All these actions were clearly aimed at transforming the state into a
powerful locale, an unquestionable framework for societal interaction.
During the era of  the 1960s and 1970s, the underlying idea when considering the state
territoriality was to secure the territorial unity of  the state. This was seen best achieved
through constructing a national consensus, creating welfare throughout the state and
preventing radical political movements from spreading in the state space. The politics of
one nation were pursued through various processes aimed at producing a regionally and
socially homogenised state space. Internally, it was the danger of  political and social un-
rest posed by the communists and socialists that was seen to require state interference. In
Taylor’s terminology (2006), the creation of  territorial integrity from the 1960s onwards
was inextricably connected with guardian practices which were aimed at controlling so-
cial relations within the state. The national territory was thus clearly understood as a seat
of  power and a fundamental resource for securing a sovereign state. The state became
an inward-looking, equalising unit which operated through the creation of  both spatial
and social capital. In short, the Finnish state and its territory began to interact in such a
way that they became mutually constitutive (cf. Lefebvre 2003: 87). The state constructed
what Carl Schmitt (2003: 67–79) calls nomos: the measure by which the land in a partic-
ular order is divided and situated and the form of  social and political order determined
by this process. Moreover, the internal and external pressures led to the development of
what Michael Mann (1984) calls the state’s infrastructural power across its territory: the
state possessed infrastructures that penetrated universally throughout the civil society.
In this context, despite the fact that the political viewpoints were overriding in the
1960s and 1970s, the economic factors were no less a present issue in public discussion.
During each decade, the competition between states has been economic, of  course, but
in the case of  Finland, the issue of  economic competition has been tightly connected to
political issues. The underlying idea was that the strengthening of  the state’s economic
competitiveness would contribute to economic growth and lead to national consensus;
the more rapid economic growth in Finland than in the neighbouring states was seen
as important for retaining the territorial unity and territorial security of  the state so that
the Finns would not begin to experience lack of  con  dence towards their own territo-
rial state. On the other side, the domestic economic competition was seen as harmful to
the national social order (see Moisio 2011; Moisio et al. 2011). Already from the 1950s
onwards, economic growth, industrialisation and social equalisation were considered fun-
damental prerequisites for containing the communist ideology within the state. Indeed,
social scientists tailored theories according to which Finnish communism was a “spatial
disease” which was located not only in the poor neighbourhoods of  the major urban
centres but especially in the vast peripheries within which the power of  the state was
poorly developed (cf. Koikkalainen 2004). Therefore it can be argued that the present
idea of  economic competitiveness deviates signi  cantly from the earlier conceptualisa-
tion; the ability to compete has been loosened from the objective of  cohesion of  the
state.
In a similar vein, Finland was no less subject to the tendencies of  globalisation or
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internationalisation pressures in this era than it is today, but the content and mean-
ing of  those pressures have profoundly changed as the economic globalisation has
moved into a new phase. In the 1960s and 1970s, the economic pressures emerged
as subsidiary to the political pressures towards the territorial integrity of  the na-
tion and its citizens. In general, this is not to deny the growing economic pressures,
for instance the growing presence of  transnational corporations, global mergers or
acquisitions, but to remind that in the Finnish context the opening of  the state for
global competition, however, occurred in a later phase than in the Western European
states. This indicates that the ways of  reasoning the economic competition and inter-
nationalisation have profoundly changed. This also arrests attention to the qualitative
changes both in the globalising world and its demands for states as well as to the
central political problem of  the state. Both of  these changes have demanded qualita-
tive changes in state strategies.
Alleviation of  the patterns of  uneven spatial development by directing state spatial
strategies towards the channelling of  infrastructure investments, industrial activities
and social welfare policies evenly across the surface of  the national territory was char-
acteristic of  the spatial Keynesianism (cf. Brenner 2004b: 479). In addition, charac-
teristic of  the Keynesian era was also the direction of  state spatial projects towards
the establishment of  uniform frameworks of  state territorial organisation (Brenner
2004a: 116). In Finland, the government thus began in the 1960s to create industrial
environments in the less developed areas. In general, the development of  the state’s
infrastructural power included massive investments in the material infrastructure of
the peripheries, signi  cant transfer payments to the less developed areas, develop-
ment of  the social security system and the construction of  a uni  ed education system
and a nationwide university network. The government began to implement an active
public investment policy and  nancing from the late 1960s onwards in order to pro-
mote balanced regional development and social cohesion. This included large public
investments in welfare infrastructures and the establishment of  state owned industry
particularly in Northern and Eastern Finland. In other words, the territory of  the
state was regarded as a fundamental economic and social resource, a type of  spatial
capital. The principle of  equal rights to services across the territory of  the state was
at the core of  the development of  infrastructural power. The state, therefore, took
the key sectors of  the economy such as health care and education out of  the market
on the grounds that access to basic human needs should not be determined by market
forces. As the state budgets clearly disclose, the state sought to foster not only its vis-
ibility but also the national consciousness through these interventions which entailed
expansions in public expenditure. As Painter and Jeffrey (2009: 46) have felicitously
put it, the dissemination of  welfare by reducing poverty, inequality and inadequate ac-
cess to education, health care and housing has be seen to reduce the appeal of  more
radical solutions, the risk of  widespread social unrest and the possible overthrow of
the capitalist economic system. Therefore the utilisation of  the wide state territory
and stable societal conditions were seen to prevent radical resistance movements and
to protect the prevalent political system and the role of  state territory was seen as a
key constituent of  societal order and as a strategic asset for increasing economic pros-
perity. Through its intervention, the national consciousness and the national integrity
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were constructed. This “one nation politics” clearly emphasised the welfare ideology:
the principles of  spatial and social equality as its core values. (cf. Moisio & Leppänen
2007.)
From the 1960s onwards welfare state policies started to colonise the everyday life
of  the Finns through bureaucratisation and discourses of  state planning and surveil-
lance (cf. Lefebvre 1991). As such, a unique expansion of  state infrastructural power
across its spaces took place through state regulation, which, it was argued, would
increase economic ef  ciency. The government therefore accepted that the state
should focus on full employment, economic growth and the welfare of  its citizens,
and if  necessary intervene in or replace market processes in order to achieve these
ends. The expansion of  the state’s infrastructural power was further “bolted to the
ground” by the regional political legislation, which was aimed at producing societal
trust among the different social classes across the regions. The spatial expansion of
state power was executed through decentralisation of  state activities into peripheral
regions. The spatial extension of  state power, in other words extending the infra-
structural power of  state in state space from the 1950s to the end of  the 1980s was
manifested in Finland in the spatial structure of  a decentralised welfare state (Figure
6) (Moisio and Vasanen 2008: 25–26).
Figure 6. The spatially decentralized welfare state (source: Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 24). The
map shows the hierarchical ordering of  cities and municipalities in the Finnish state space; the
size of  the  gure re  ects the hierarchical signi  cance of  the centre.
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Constructing a spatially decentralised competition state
In Finland, the security-political meaning of  state space changed throughout the 1990s
with political upheavals in Finland’s neighbouring countries, the end of  the cold war
and the disintegration of  the Soviet Union (Mäkinen 1999: 68). The security-political
reasons for supporting the eastern parts of  Finland in particular eroded and the im-
portance of  state territory for social cohesion decreased (Remahl 2008: 121; Moisio &
Vasanen 2008: 27). As Remahl (2008: 120) has stressed, the economic depression of
the 1990s caused deep and long term changes in the society: long-term unemployment,
widening income disparities, poverty and widening regional welfare differences. Fur-
ther pressures were applied through European integration, opening the economic sys-
tem to international competition, rapid development of  information technology, en-
hancing neoliberal ideology and global market economy (Remahl 2008: 120). Together
with emerging pressures for change it caused policy actors to reconsider the ideological
bases for the spatially decentralised welfare state. Although the universality principle
was not entirely questioned, the erosion of   nancial resources and the opening up of
a global economy and pattern of  trade were raising new challenges for political actors.
Already in the 1990s the principle of  competitiveness, adapted from international
political arenas, emerged at the core of  thinking and as a central concept in characteris-
ing the society. Nowadays, neoliberal principles and the competition state ideology are
seen to be penetrating the structures of  the Finnish welfare state, and to a great extent
its Nordic equivalents, in response to the problems that an inef  ciently run welfare
state was seen to cause. In more radical views, this is seen to have already happened in
Finland (e.g. in Helsingin Sanomat, 23rd August 2008).
At the core of  competitive state strategies are the reconcentration of  state resources
in those selected “growth regions” that are seen to be worthy of  state support, e.g.
infrastructure investments and socioeconomic assets, in order to complement local ini-
tiatives and achieve success in global competition (cf. Cox 2009: 113). In this context,
Antikainen and Vartiainen (2005: 143–148) have examined the development of  the
urban structure and urban system in Finland. When considering the state spatiality in
Finland, city-regions have come to be seen as producers of  competitiveness, growth
generators and as producers of  welfare from the 1990s onwards; this growth centre
approach has characterised the Finnish urban policy in the 1990s. Particularly from
the 1990s onwards, the Finnish urban regions have emerged at the core of  the strate-
gies announced to promote Finland’s survival and success in global competition. The
core of  Finnish urban policy has been a set of  polycentric ideologies, realised from the
1990s onwards through three urban programmes: the Centre of  Expertise Programme
(1994), the Regional Centre Programme (2001) and measures established by the Urban
Policy Committee, particularly the Urban Programme (1997) (Antikainen & Vartiainen
2005: 143–148; Kähkönen 2006: 7). The aims of  these development measures have
been to create new jobs, foster regional development, distribute economic growth and
welfare to the areas surrounding growth centres, as well as promote the strengths and
deal with the problems of  these urban areas (Regional Centre Programme 2009; Cen-
tre of  Expertise Programme 2009, see also Kähkönen 2006).
The abovementioned implies that Finland has also begun to employ city-regionalism
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as a locational key to national economic competitiveness, a similar development to that
which has been occurring in Western Europe since the mid-1980s as speci  c cities
have increasingly come to be seen as dynamic growth regions through which the na-
tional welfare can be secured (cf. Brenner 2004b: 470). At the core of  growth-oriented
politics is the idea of  urban regions as major generators of  innovations, knowledge
and know-how, and their in  uence on the state’s overall success, welfare and economy.
Moisio and Vasanen (2008: 26–27) have aptly named this era in state spatiality as a spa-
tially decentralised competition state (Figure 7) in which an attempt to construct strong
regional entities to various parts of  state that are able to “compete” in a tightening
international knowledge market is central.
Figure 7. A spatially decentralised competition state. The  gure represents the interpretation
of  Moisio and Vasanen of  the central element of  the decentralised competition state, the func-
tional city-regions; the central cities and their spheres of  in  uence in Finland (source: Moisio &
Vasanen 2008: 24).
 The objective of  regional competitiveness and specialisation of  urban regions
strengthened from the mid-1990s. Despite city-regions emerging at the core of  Finn-
ish urban policy, there was a strong ideological and political support for regionally and
socially equal development in Finland (Remahl 2008: 121).
In Finland, the objective of  strategic polycentricism occurred in the late 1990s (An-
tikainen & Vartiainen 2005: 145). By strategic polycentrism, Antikainen and Vartiainen
(2005: 144–146) have referred to the post-recession situation where gradual region-
al differentiation began and the recognition of  differentiated signi  cance of  regions
emerged. It was now recognised that some regions have wider signi  cance in the na-
tional urban system than others and this was accomplished for example in the urban
network study of  1998 (Vartiainen & Antikainen 1998) by using statistical criteria and
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studying the functionality of  urban regions (Antikainen & Vartiainen 2005: 145). An-
tikainen and Vartiainen (2005: 145) continue to propose that the post-recession period
of  differentiation can be seen as the actual starting point for concerns over an unbal-
anced urban and territorial structure. The idea of  strategic polycentricism also shows
that the emerging regional inequality had became more acceptable in hegemonic dis-
course.
Since the beginning of  the 2000s, neoliberal principles and the competition state
ideology have fully penetrated the structures of  the Finnish welfare state as a response
to the problems that an inef  ciently run welfare state was seen to cause. Finland’s sur-
vival and success in global competition has become the government’s central mission
– a new political “problem” which demands new approaches and responses (Moisio
2008: 10). The concept of  competitiveness has become a starting point for political
acts due to it being manifested as an overall objective which obliges political actors
to undertake certain measures in order to improve competitiveness. In the discussion
of  the competition state, it seems evident that the welfare state is often articulated as
the opposite state form to the competition state. The “old” welfare state is also often
expressed as an in  exible structure suffering from exiguous competition and the new
trimmed welfare state is presented as providing a change in this situation. (Kantola
2006: 165–176, see also Jessop 2002a: 133.)
Anu Kantola (2006) has examined the construction of  competition state terminol-
ogy in Finland. In her studies, competitiveness has emerged as the core terminology and
a point of  comparison for other terms, such as knowledge, innovations, technology,  ex-
ibility, entrepreneurialism and globalization which are intertwined around the concept of
competitiveness. Moisio (2007: 242) has argued that a whole new vocabulary has been
adopted in regional politics, where creativity, economic competitiveness, know-how and
innovations take spatial shape in the form of  metropolises, growth centres, nodal points
and networks.
Despite the consensus achieved regarding the need to enhance state competitiveness,
the political struggle of  the state space was largely un  nished in the mid-2000s. Regional
actors did not have well-de  ned opinions about the spatial development of  state (cf.
Remahl 2008: 123). As Finland has turned to neoliberal politico-economic principles of
unregulated markets, enhanced capital mobility and restricted state intervention, it also
began to promote the principles of  economic competition in its spatial development.
The question was primarily whether to focus on further competitive development of
the major urban regions or on the less-competitive smaller urban regions (Antikainen &
Vartiainen 2005: 150).
In Finland, the political acceptance of  spatial differentiation became visible in 2003, as
the programme of  Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s  rst government (Finnish Govern-
ment 2003: 28) highlighted the regions’ responsibility for their own success:
“Regional success supports growth of  the national economy and is
re  ected throughout the country. Regional expertise, entrepreneur-
ship and employment will be strengthened, thus boosting growth
and creating potential for maintaining the basic infrastructure of  the
welfare society. Better regional competitiveness will be invested in by
enhancing regional expertise, strengths and development initiative.”
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This statement indicates a partial transfer of  the responsibility for the success of  the
regions in international competition to the regions themselves. The welfare state ideol-
ogy was nevertheless still prominent in the rhetoric of  the government’s programme
in 2003. At the same time, the programme-based regional policies of  the European
Union were similarly emphasising active attitudes on the part of  regions, responsibility
for their own success and creation of  the prerequisites for differentiated regional poli-
cies (Kähkönen 2006).
Matti Vanhanen’s second government took the urban policies and preconditions for
spatial differentiation a stage further in its programme published in 2007, paying par-
ticular attention to policies for large urban regions. Its objective of  reinforcing the
international competitiveness of  such regions signi  es a response to the central politi-
cal problem of  the time. In addition, the government introduced a metropolitan policy
into its programme in 2007 in order to address certain special issues affecting the Hel-
sinki metropolitan region, and in particular to identify solutions to problems associated
with land use, housing and traf  c, as well as to promote business and internationalisa-
tion and prevent social exclusion. The government programme of  Matti Vanhanen’s
second cabinet (2007) clearly manifests the growth centre approach as the promotion
of  big cities is aimed at reinforcing the international competitiveness of  major urban
regions whereas the metropolitan policy is more likely seen as a problem-solving activ-
ity.
However, the argumentation about regional development and regional equality has
changed in recent years. The focus has moved from solving problems in the metropoli-
tan region towards promoting the competitiveness of  Helsinki metropolitan region in
global competition. The competitiveness of  Helsinki metropolitan region is repeatedly
highlighted in policy documents as a measure that would ensure the welfare and eco-
nomic development of  the whole nation; implying that Finland would succeed in inter-
national competition if  it had a metropolitan region with suf  cient vitality. In addition,
the Helsinki metropolitan region is often highlighted as the most productive region,
from which af  uence can be diffused to the whole country (see Suomen Aluekehit-
tämisstrategia 2020 2010). These arguments re  ect the idea of  a metropolitan region as
a nodal point (cf. Heeg & Oßenbrügge 2002: 83).
Innovation policy as a new state spatial strategy
In Finland, the economic recession which began in the latter half  of  2008 has stimu-
lated the changing statehood into a new phase. As Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008: 1160)
imply, crises often produce discontent with strategic choices and increase in alternative
discourses and solutions. Although a mere crisis cannot produce a change, it opens po-
litical space for new political openings (Heiskala 2006: 14). As the crises erupt, political
space is opened and political struggles will emerge for state strategies and state spatial
strategies. Particularly during crises, actors constantly de  ne and rede  ne the chosen
measures to current political problems and propose new innovative strategies, projects
and visions (Jessop & Oosterlynck 2008: 1160).
After the mid-2000s, knowledge and innovations were brought to the core of  state
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strategies directed to improve and secure the national competitiveness in global com-
petition. This shows the increase in the importance of  immaterial investments. A no-
table  nancial investment was made by the state in 2009 in a consortium of  three
university-level institutions in the Helsinki region to be known as the Aalto University
(Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2008). The statement by the in  uential businessman Antti
Herlin (2008) that the Aalto University was “a matter for the whole nation”, gives a
strong indication of  the importance of  education as a strategy for promoting Finland’s
survival and success in global politico-economic competition.
The main objective of  state strategies is presently to produce state spatiality which
would attract international capital and promote innovativeness. The present innovation
policy displays the present neoliberal market economy development with its central ob-
jectives of  economic growth and creating preconditions for business life. As it is stated
in the state budget (Valtion talousarvioesitys…  2009):
“The aim is for Finland to provide a working environment with an
internationally high standard for businesses, one that also foreign
companies will  nd appealing as a location for their research and
development operations. During an economic recession it is im-
portant to secure investments in expertise and innovation in order
to create conditions for new growth and renewal.”
The roots of  innovation policy are traceable to the formulation of  the science and
technology policy in the 1960s and 1970s (Lemola 2002: 1483). Particularly from the
end of  the 1990s, the innovation policy has challenged the technology political dis-
courses (Kolehmainen 2008: 3). Lemola (2002: 1483–1486) divides the Finnish sci-
ence and technology policy into three eras of  which the  rst is the formation of  basic
structures of  Finnish science and technology policy in the 1960s and 1970s; the sec-
ond the strengthening of  technology orientation in the 1980s and the third the build-
ing of  knowledge-based society from the 1990s onwards. Lemola (2006: 13–14) has
also noted that supporting technical research and development activity and promoting
innovations has previously been at the core of  innovation policy. A wider de  nition
of  innovation activity has however been adopted which concentrates particularly on
the promotion of  preconditions for business life but contains also more “soft” issues.
Innovation policy signi  es particularly the state activity or state (public) intervention
aimed at promoting technology development in the market economy (Lemola 2006:
13–14).
The concept of  a national innovation system (Figure 8) has been utilised in Finn-
ish innovation policies since the beginning of  1990s (Suorsa 2009: 19). The Finnish
science and technology Information Service (2010) de  nes the innovation system as
follows:
“The national innovation system is an extensive entity comprising
the producers and users of  new information and knowledge and
know-how and the various ways in which they interact. At the core
of  the innovation system are education, research and product de-
velopment, and knowledge-intensive business and industry. Varied
international cooperation is a feature running through the system”.
78 Changing statehood: The spatial transformation of the Finnish state
The Science and Technology Policy Council of  Finland was established in March
1987 (Ministry of  Education and Culture 2011). It was reformulated into a Research
and Innovation Council in January 2009, chaired by the Prime Minister. It formulates
national science, technology and innovation policies. In general, the Ministry of  Edu-
cation and Culture and the Ministry of  Trade and Industry are particularly responsible
for science and technology policies. Education and training, science policy, universities
and polytechnics, and the Academy of  Finland fall within the responsibility of  the
Ministry of  Education. Industrial and technology policies, the Finnish Funding Agency
for Technology and Innovation (Tekes), and the VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland fall within the responsibility of  the Ministry of  Trade and Industry. (Finnish
science and technology Information Service 2010.)
The immediate preparation of  a National Innovation Strategy was determined in the
Government Programme of  Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet (2007).
The National Innovation Strategy (2008: 4), established in 2008, asserts the signi  cance
of  innovation activity at the core of  state strategies as follows:
“In order to succeed, Finland needs to be a global leader in its
chosen innovation segments. [… ] This leadership will secure the
competence of  business life and national economy in the face of
ever-increasing international competition. Finland must be able to
create globally signi  cant added value and attract expertise and in-
vestments to the country.”
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However, despite speaking of  changes in the welfare state and adopting compe-
tition-oriented principles, the adoption of  innovation policy does not mean discard-
ing the objective of  welfare itself. The main objective of  the innovation policy – the
growth of  productivity, is particularly targeted to increase and secure the welfare of
Finnish society (The National Innovation Strategy 2008: 4). As it is stated in the Na-
tional Innovation Strategy (2008: 4):
”The sustainable and innovation-based improvement of  produc-
tivity is widely required in corporations and other organisations in
order to increase welfare. The aim is for Finnish companies to suc-
ceed and grow on the international markets as a result of  competi-
tiveness based on expertise and the development of  productivity.”
The statement indicates that the argumentation about welfare is still a central part
of  political control and welfare itself  has not become a secondary question, although
methods for producing it have changed (see Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 20).
The relationship between innovation policy and regional policy has been a particular
point of  political discussion. According to Kangasharju (2009: 3–4) the aim of  the re-
gional innovation policy is presently to  nd innovation potential throughout the whole
state space by motivating regional actors and spreading information about the pos-
sibilities and meaning of  innovations. The main objective of  the regional innovation
policy is therefore the diminishing of  the local character of  knowledge. According to
the Council of  State, the regional innovation policy is only this and it does not include
cohesion objectives unlike the regional policies (Kangasharju 2009: 3–4). Katri Suor-
sa (2007: 15–26) has studied the regionality, innovation policy and peripheral regions
in Finland, Sweden and Norway. She suggests that regionality is not widely discussed
in recent Finnish national innovation policy documents and therefore the innovation
policy has somewhat ignored the regional dimension of  innovation activities. However,
Kangasharju (2009: 4) argues that the regional innovation policy has a strong regional
political view. He claims that it is dif  cult to distinguish regional policy from regional
innovation policy because of  the innovation-oriented character of  both policies.
I  seems that innovation policy has penetrated all social policy and various policy
sectors have been harnessed to serve innovation policy, such as education policy, re-
gional policy, metropolitan policy as well as agricultural and foreign policies (cf. Suorsa
2007: 16). This indicates that the innovation policy has become the main accumula-
tion strategy in Finland, a speci  c economic growth model complete with its various
extra-economic preconditions, which also outlines a general strategy appropriate to its
realisation (see Jessop 1990: 198–201).
The general acceptance of  innovation policy has given the innovation policy even an
economic hegemony. As Jessop (1990: 199) describes an accumulation strategy:
“Such a strategy must advance the immediate interests of  other
fractions by integrating the circuit of  capital in which they are imp-
licated at the same time as it secures the long-term interests of  the
hegemonic fraction in controlling the allocation of  money capital
to different areas of  investment advantageous to itself ”.
Jessop (1990: 201) reminds us that “a strategy can be truly “hegemonic” only where it
is accepted by the subordinate economic classes as well as by non-hegemonic fractions
t
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and classes in the power bloc”. In Finland, the well-de  ned status of  innovation activ-
ity at the core of  state strategies clearly signi  es the general acceptance of  innovation
activity as a new measure to secure and to further develop Finland’s survival and suc-
cess in global competition (cf. Ministry of  Employment and Economy 2008; Ministry
of  Employment and Economy 2010).
The rise of  innovation policy together with the adoption of  neoliberal principles
and the competition state ideology has clearly caused pressures on state spatiality. The
spatial consequences of  innovation policy consist of  the establishment of  national in-
novation centres which were proposed in the national innovation strategy in the 2008.
In establishing these innovation centres,  nancial programmes such as The Strategic
Centres for Science, Technology and Innovation (SHOK), Centre of  Expertise Pro-
gramme (OSKE), Cohesion and Competitiveness Programme (COCO) as well as
the  nancial programmes of  the European Union and other development measures
directed to develop an attractive operational environment are to be utilised. Firstly,
the Strategic Centres for Science, Technology and Innovation (SHOK) established in
Finland in the late-2000s, are public-private partnerships for speeding up innovation
processes. Their main goal is to thoroughly renew industry clusters and to create radi-
cal innovations. In addition, centres provide a permanent co-operation and interaction
forum for companies and research organisations. (Tekes 2009.) Secondly, the Centre of
Expertise Programme (OSKE), established in 1994, regionalised the innovation policy
and brought innovation-oriented thinking to the fore in regional policy (Kolehmainen
2008: 3). The Centre of  Expertise Programme aims to increase regional specialisation
and strengthen co-operation between centres of  expertise where the highest interna-
tional standard of  knowledge and expertise exists (Centre of  Expertise Programme
2009). Thirdly, the Cohesion and Competitiveness Programme (COCO) aims to de-
velop regional prerequisites of  innovation activities by developing the co-operation
between regional actors. The aim of  the programme is to enhance the competitiveness
of  all regions while balancing regional development through supporting the interaction
and networking of  key operators in regional development (Ministry of  Employment
and the Economy 2009b).
Antti Hautamäki (2009) has described in a more detailed way the actual construction
of  innovation centres by strengthening the co-operation between local actors, enhanc-
ing the urban networks, developing the network of  higher education and by synchro-
nising various funding programmes in innovation centres which are to be construct-
ed. With the strengthening of  co-operation, Hautamäki (2009) refers especially to the
strengthening of  horizontal co-operation between the municipalities, regional councils,
companies, organisations, the local actors of  state governance but also citizens in order
to promote and supervise the regional interests. That is to say that a network of  the key
regional actors forms the basis in constructing innovation centres in a particular place.
Hautamäki sees the strengthening of  urban networks, enhancing the functional areas
and supporting the innovation zones as signi  cant especially around the innovation
centres. This emphasises that the territory in question is itself  important when con-
structing innovation centres. By developing the higher education network Hautamäki
emphasises the securing of  know-how for regional purposes. The synchronising of
programmes signi  es the collection of  different programme tools (e.g. the Strategic
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Centres for Science, Technology and Innovation, the Regional Centre Programme, the
Centre of  Expertise Programme, programmes of  Tekes, Sitra and the Academy of
Finland as well as the structural funding interventions) to serve in building innovation
centres (Hautamäki 2009). The establishment of  innovation centres clearly emphasises
the role of  regional endogenous development. When considering the role of  the state,
the measures presented to construct innovation centres clearly manifest a shift from
government to governance. One may ask what the role of  the state governance will be
in selecting and de  ning the actual innovation centres to be developed further.
The Finnish Regional Development Strategy 2020 (Suomen Aluekehittämisstrate-
gia 2020 2010) constructs a vision of  Finnish regional development in 2020. It is a
proposal for the basic guidelines and politics of  long term regional development for
the year 2020. The Finnish Regional Development Strategy 2020 (Suomen Aluekehit-
tämisstrategia 2020 2010: 84) and National Innovation Strategy (2008: 27) articulate
that regional innovation centres should be constructed on the basis of  the regional
strengths and national choices. The operational environment of  those innovation cen-
tres should be global. Both the Finnish Regional Development Strategy 2020 (Suomen
Aluekehittämistrategia 2020 2010: 84) and National Innovation Strategy (2008: 27)
state, however, that it is possible to construct only few innovation centres in Finland
which would be competitive in global markets. On the other hand, neither the Finnish
Regional Development Strategy 2020 (Suomen Aluekehittämisstrategia 2020 2010) nor
the National Innovation Strategy (2008: 27) provide a precise proposal of  how many
innovation centres should be established. At the core of  establishing competitive in-
novation centres is the question of  competitive spatial structure of  Finland. All these
documents nonetheless highlight the fact that competition ideology has clearly found
its way to the core of  thinking. That is to say that innovation centres are clearly seen
as a response to the challenges of  global competitiveness. One may wish to consider
whether the unde  ned amount of  innovation centres may actually increase competi-
tion between regions.
The hegemonic discourse of  the current time presents a strong metropolitan re-
gion at the core of  competitive state spatiality. This goes to show that a consensus
in public debate has been achieved regarding the need of  a metropolitan region in
developing Finnish competitiveness and the national economy (see e.g. Suomen Alue-
kehittämisstrategia 2010: 13). Therefore, according to the Finnish Regional Develop-
ment Strategy 2020 (Suomen Aluekehittämisstrategia 2020 2010) the development of
the territorial structure is continued according to the “network metropolitan” model.
However, the structure of  the network metropolitan region or its geographical scope
is not de  ned in a more detailed way. The status of  the rest of  the state space remains
nevertheless subject to political struggle. The blurred position of  the rest of  the state
space may lead to an inter-regional competition in national political space.
Due to the speci  c spatial structure of  the state not being thoroughly de  ned in
policy documents, various visions for changing statehood have been presented. Firstly,
Hautamäki (2008) has presented the establishment of  5–6 regional innovation centres
based on regional strengths and the regional university network (Figure 9). The central
idea in his vision is that the metropolitan region alone is not suf  cient or politically cor-
rect in strengthening the competitiveness of  Finland in global competition (Hautamäki
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2008, Hautamäki 2009). Secondly, Santtu von Bruun (2009) has illustrated an idea of  a
network metropolitan region which would compete with other metropolises on a glo-
bal scale. At the core of  his thinking is the gathering of  regional strengths, particularly
competence-related recourses together in order to create scale advantages. The idea of
a network metropolitan region consisting of  5–7 big urban regions is particularly based
on a heavy utilisation and development of  rail infrastructure between the metropolitan
region and city-regions of  Hämeenlinna, Lahti, Turku and Tampere (see Taavitsainen
2009: 14–17). Thirdly, Sotarauta (2009: 1–13) has even put forward that some counties,
subregions or municipalities are not able to survive in the tightening competition. He
felicitously names these regions as “the regions of  elegant recession”. Sotarauta further
suggests that the state, counties and municipalities should provide assistance in order
to shutdown some of  the activities in these regions in order to secure the compulsory
basic services and to  nd the right level to be maintained in future (Sotarauta 2009:
1–13). This clearly manifests a neoliberal way of  thinking.
Figure 9. The Finland of  innovation centres. The  gure represents the vision of  Antti Hau-
tamäki of  the location of  the innovation centres to be built in Finland and the geographical
covering of  these innovation centres (source: Hautamäki 2009).
The fourth vision presented on state spatiality is the metropolitan state. In Finnish
public discussion, the metropolitan state has often been represented as “the worst sce-
nario” of  Finnish regional development (see e.g. Hautamäki 2009) if  nothing effective
is done to prevent this development (Figure 10). In the vision of  a metropolitan state,
the core idea is to challenge the polycentric model of  urban structure. The vision of  a
metropolitan state suggests that the global competitiveness of  Finland would develop
in only one transcendent metropolitan region where development resources are to be
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directed instead of  less developed regions (Katajamäki 2009: 32). The idea of  a met-
ropolitan state presented by Moisio and Vasanen (2008: 28) is based on the concept
of  a strong polarisation of  state spatial development into developing and regressing
regions at the same time re  ecting the strong adoption of  neoliberal doctrines. In a
metropolitan state, the importance of  the state space as a production factor, as a spatial
capital, would further decrease. In addition, the role of  the state would also change as
the importance of  the state as an organiser of  social relationships and as a realiser of
national policy would decrease (Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 28).
Figure 10. A metropolitan state (source: Moisio & Vasanen 2008: 24). The  gure represents
the core areas of  development in a metropolitan state as darkened; the Helsinki metropolitan
region, a few growth centres and the development corridors.
 According to the Ministry of  Employment and the Economy (2009a: 74–75) it is
rather clear that innovation-related policies have been unsuccessful in compressing the
differences in competitiveness among Finnish regions. Some policy actions may have
even promoted regional divergence (Ministry of  Employment and the Economy 2009a:
74–75). The Evaluation of  the National Innovation System (Ministry of  Employment and the
Economy 2009a) was initiated with the aim of  guiding the development and renewal
of  the Finnish innovation system. In the Evaluation of  the Finnish National Innovation Sys-
tem (Ministry of  Employment and the Economy 2009a: 76), it was further manifested
that Finland would bene  t from redesigning its policy combination in order to foster
the reallocation of  its resources to their most productive uses. In practice this means
allocating resources from “disadvantaged” regions to already “advantaged” ones. In the
Evaluation of  the Finnish National Innovation System it is clearly stated that Finland is ex-
periencing a growing divergence in the competitiveness of  its regions, mainly because
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of  the relatively smaller size of  ef  cient  rms in “disadvantaged regions” (Ministry of
Employment and the Economy 2009a: 74). In he Evaluation of  the Finnish National Inno-
vation System, productivity is seen as the best measure of  competitiveness. Furthermore
the contribution of  innovation policy to productivity growth is the best measure of  its
success. It is clearly stated in the evaluation report that:
“Regional imbalances should be of  no concern for direct national
innovation support [...]. The reason is that any regional agenda may
lead to slower productivity growth and cumulative losses in value
added” (Ministry of  Employment and the Economy 2009a: 77).
Sami Moisio (2009b) describes the ongoing centralisation of  state space as an in-
dicator of  the ongoing thinking about the state space. He aptly names the ideology
background of  further centralisation of  state space as territorial economism which is
manifested in centralising regional political ideology. Moisio (2009b: 19–22) has listed
central features of  “territorial economism”. First of  all, in territorial economism it
will be a question of  the ef  cient trimming of  the whole state in totally new glo-
bal circumstances. Competition, effectiveness and the centralisation of  state space are
particularly emphasised. The relationship between the operation of  the market and
centralisation of  state space is justi  ed and scale advantages are sought. According
to territorial economism, general social policy has to follow the changing production
structure. A difference between the new and old politics is clearly made up. In general,
giving up the old policy attached to the Keynesian-oriented values such as balanced
regional and social development is considered as a good and sensible, even “natural”
practice (Moisio 2009b: 19–22). According to Moisio (2009b: 20–22), in the territorial
economism the state is seen as an entrepreneurial-like unit in which the costs caused by
ineffective territorial units can only be minimised. The other characteristic feature of
territorial economism is the division of  regions and citizens according to economical
criteria, which goes to say that the aim of  regional equality is deemed contradictory to
national competitiveness. In territorial economism, spatial centralisation is seen a pre-
requisite for competitiveness. Regional policy is seen equal to supporting agriculture,
equalisation, the closed economy and political consensus. In other words, redistribu-
tional regional policy is seen as contradictory to the market economy. In territorial
economism regional political bene  ts and spatially decentralised territorial structures
are presented as unfair; individuals should be free to choose their residences but this
freedom of  choice cannot cause disadvantages to other people. Therefore the equality
takes on a kind of  new content as the capital region as funding other regions is seen
to insult the rights of  wealthier regions. The criticism of  this kind does only not apply
to rural environments but also the big cities located outside the development triangle
of  southern Finland. Territorial economism clearly promotes the idea of  giving up of
the principle of  spatial universality (Moisio 2009b: 20–22). However, territorial econo-
mism cannot yet be seen as a prevalent way of  thinking about territorial development,
although many of  its indicators are already visible in the legitimation of  the present
development.
5.1. Q methodology combining qualitative and quantitative aspects
The reworking of  the society has spatial consequences as competing state strategies
have emerged with the aim of  responding to the current political problem of  the state,
enhancing competitiveness and the “survival” of  Finland in various global politico-
economic arenas. It is evident that state space has acquired new meaning along with
the changing political problem of  the state. This has led to a spatial restructuring of
the state and to a re-conceptualisation of  the state space, i.e. the spatial manifestation
of  state power, as the government seeks to respond to various political challenges.
Thus, in view of  this ongoing transformation and the somewhat unclear trends away
from spatial decentralisation and towards spatial centralisation, in the Finnish context it
is crucial to examine how regional actors perceive and reason the recent regional devel-
opment, and in particular how they regard the recent attempts to foster metropolitan
city-regionalism. More speci  cally, this chapter discloses a political con  ict between
different forms of  urbanisation and demonstrates the inherently con  icting nature of
state spatial restructuration in the Finnish context. In this way, I argue that despite the
political con  ict between different forms of  urbanisation, a consensus still exists in
Finland over the legitimacy of  the welfare state and that welfare itself  has not been
invalidated as an objective. Rather the question concerns the further transformation of
statehood, “trimming” of  welfare state.
In order to answer the second research question about how the political struggles of
state spatial strategies emerge in regional actors’ ways of  perceiving “the Helsinki met-
ropolitan region” and the recently emerging metropolis politics, subjectivity is placed
at the core of  the analysis. To be able to examine subjectivity in a scienti  c manner, I
have chosen the Q methodology as a methodological tool. The Q methodology is an
intensive tool for the analysis of  subjectivity, which is to say that the collection of  data,
its analysis as well as the interpretation thereof  are closely intertwined in the research
process. It is often mentioned that Q methodology consists of  the following methodo-
logical steps, which are to be followed in order achieve reliability. These “steps” are the
speci  cation of  the problem, collection and theoretical structuring of  the Q sample
and P sets (participants), the speci  cation of  the instructions, post-sorting settings, sta-
tistical analyses and rotation of  factors, and the interpretation (Brown 1980: 258–259).
I found these “steps” to be useful in my examination. I will further discuss the data
collection and analysis in the ensuing pages. After that, I will present the factors found
in the Q methodological analysis which I have named here as discourses.
After specifying the research question, I collected data for my Q methodological
5. Polarisation of  views on spatial
development in Finland
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study. The raw material for the Q methodology, the concourse, is a collection of  all
possible statements the respondents can make about the subject in question, con-
taining all the relevant aspects of  the discourses (Brown 1986: 58–59; Aalto 2003b:
119; van Exel & de Graaf  2005: 4). That is to say that representativeness is the main
principle in collecting the concourse (cf. Watts & Stenner 2005: 75). Despite all ef-
forts at objectivity, the in  uence of  the researcher in choosing the concourse cannot
be avoided however (Brown 1980: 53). As Brown puts it, the selection of  statements
in a Q sample is important, but it still remains more of  an art than a science (Brown
1980: 186).
I compiled the concourse of  384 arguments to cover the recent debate on chang-
ing statehood in Finland. The collection was initiated in a data-led manner. My pur-
pose was to concentrate on the discussion about spatial centralisation and spatial
decentralisation tendencies within the state space, discussion about national unity
and the issue of  the spatial polarisation of  Finland. My objective was to reveal how
the possible change in regional balance, the emergent city-regionalism and particu-
larly the established metropolitan policies have been de  ned in Finland. I collected
an extensive set of  arguments from several Finnish newspapers (Helsingin Sanomat,
Lapin Kansa, Karjalainen, Ilkka, Suomenmaa), a magazine (Kuntalehti), public policy
documents, Internet pages and written records of  speeches in a data-led manner.
The years examined were 2003–2008. The collected concourse included clauses, sen-
tences or thematic entireties of  a few sentences. These were assumptions, arguments,
claims and statements. The spectrum of  different subjects was rich, yet in spite of
this richness, the subject matters were nicely re  ected in relation to changing state-
hood: the spatial centralisation or decentralisation. The collected concourse distinctly
reveals that the regional development is understood as a very wide phenomenon
which is in  uenced by both “of  cial regional policy” and general social policy, i.e.
education policy and transport policy. As one argument in the concourse puts it:
“The most important political document in regional policy is the state budget”.
The discussion reveals the uncertainty about the direction of  the transforma-
tion of  statehood in particular. Despite this, the concourse manifests the unanimity
opinion on the need for a transformation itself  in order to trim Finland for success
in global competition. The collected concourse  rstly contains general statements
about the ongoing transformation of  statehood for example, “the increase of  suc-
cess, welfare and national economy have to be the objectives of  regional develop-
ment”. Secondly, the concourse contains arguments which strongly argue for the
spatial development either for its spatial centralisation or spatial decentralisation like
“the development of  a strong metropolitan region is essential for the future success
of  Finland” or “for the sake of  Finnish competitiveness it is reasonable to invest in
small and medium-sized cities”. Thirdly, the concourse contains arguments which
exemplify those issues considered to be threats in the transformation of  statehood in
Finland, even quite strong statements like “Finland will unavoidability be torn apart:
the development and regression of  parts of  Finland”. The spatial differentiation of
“winners in southern Finland” and “losers in northern Finland” was also elicited.
However, the inevitability of  the transformation in general was clearly displayed in
arguments.
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The discussion on the spatial decentralisation of  state power to peripheral regions
is brought out in the concourse. Decentralisation is seen on the one hand as “wise
regional policy” and on the other hand, “it is not a modern-day activity”. Further-
more, the importance of  higher education branches is clearly recognised as “promot-
ers of  regional development” and the higher education network is characterised as a
“modern regional policy”. The role of  transport connections is also emphasised as a
central measure in transforming growth to peripheral regions as well. However, the
perceived failure of  national regional policy in constructing balanced national spatial
development is put forward in the concourse: even a notion of  “reversed regional
policy” is mentioned when describing the present regional policy measures and pri-
orities. In addition, the “atrophy” of  peripheral regions and leaving the regions only
a role as “suppliers of  raw materials” was also brought out in the concourse. In gen-
eral, regional development is perceived strongly as state-led activity.
The concourse represents a con  ict between the polycentric territorial structure
and the metropolitan state. In general, the arguments collected show that those plac-
es where the growth is produced will gain more importance in future regional policy.
The big cities are seen as key actors when considering the development of  the na-
tional economy, displayed as “the engines of  development”, “central innovation en-
vironments” and “the concentrations of  education and knowledge” from where the
added value produced “radiates welfare” to the whole state space. In the arguments
which manifest a spatially centralising form of  statehood, the development of  the
Helsinki metropolitan region is seen as a “necessity” for the future success of  the
Finnish state.
It became clear when collecting the concourse that the spatial transformation of
statehood has acquired a meaning in the policy  elds of  transport, education, urban,
metropolitan and growth centre policies, state activities with regard to the decentrali-
sation of  public governance, peripheral regions and the transformation of  welfare
state. These themes were very often re  ected in the concepts of  competitiveness,
growth or national unity. After the thematic structure of  arguments became clear,
I formulated a theoretical structure (Table 2) to assist in securing the scope of  the
concourse and later on particularly in choosing the  nal concourse. My purpose was
to collect neutral arguments, arguments supporting spatial centralisation and argu-
ments supporting spatial decentralisation in each category. After the categorisation
of  the concourse, I supplemented it at points where de  ciencies were found. I con-
sidered the concourse as complete when new arguments began to repeat what had
already been collected rather than adding new elements into the debate (see Eden et
al. 2005: 416).
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 I chose the  nal Q-sample of  36 arguments by classifying the arguments  rstly in
terms of  their content into the above policy  elds (transport, education, urban, metro-
politan and growth centre policies, state activities with regard to the decentralisation of
public governance, peripheral regions and the transformation of  welfare state) and sec-
ondly according to their positive, neutral or negative meanings towards the centralisa-
tion of  state space. When the collection of  the concourse was complete I chose at least
one argument of  each category describing the positive, negative and neutral meanings
towards the centralisation of  state space from each policy  eld (transport, education,
urban, metropolitan and growth centre policies, state activities with regard to the de-
centralisation of  public governance, peripheral regions and the welfare state). These
chosen arguments formed the  nal Q sample. I reworked the linguistic form of  some
of  the arguments for the sake of  clari  cation. Eventually I selected 36 representative
samples to form the  nal Q sample (Table 3).







A. Transport policy Aa Ab Ac
B. Education policy Ba Bb Bc
C. Metropolitan policy Ca Cb Cc
D. Urban and growth
centre policies Da Db Dc






(peripheral regions) Ga Gb Gc
H. State activities
(welfare state) Ha Hb Hc
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Table 3. The Q methodological sample.
1. Fast and reasonably priced telecommunications and transport connections are of
central importance for the competitiveness of  regions.
2. It is possible in Finland to maintain only three top-rank universities capable of
reaching international standards. We should concentrate on the development of
those three universities.
3. If  society invests heavily on developing the Helsinki region, the competitiveness of
our economy will decline signi  cantly because of  increasing costs.
4. Those places where growth is generated will increase in importance in future re-
gional policies.
5. The concern over regional inequality and a division of  the nation into privileged
and less privileged is justi  able.
6. Finland will inevitably be divided into two parts; one of  progress and one of  re-
gression.
7. From the 1960s to the 1990s the state was the main driving force behind the suc-
cess of  Lapland. Now it is assuming the role of  a bystander and even creating new
problems.
8. The regional policy approach seems to have disappeared and has been replaced by
a quiet acceptance of  the fact that different parts of  the country are developing
differently.
9. The Helsinki region is not large enough to constitute a metropolis. It is better to
create something small and special. The whole of  Finland as an item of  export is
more impressive than the Helsinki region alone.
10. Special rights and an autonomous status (as in Åland) should also be granted to
Lapland.
11. The idea of  decentralisation is outdated.
12. The welfare differences between regions are minor, the accessibility of  services is
assured and basic public services are operated well throughout the state territory,
even in the sparsely populated rural areas.
13. In terms of  Finland’s competitiveness it is sensible to invest in small and medium-
sized cities, which usually are the most cost-ef  cient.
14. The state has recently been taking smaller and larger steps in retreating towards the
capital city. Now it is time for it to return, not only to some regional centres but to
all corners of  the country.
15. The network of  higher education institutions in its current form is wide and frag-
mented, with plenty of  room for improvement.
16. Highway investments must be targeted at areas with traf  c and people.
17. It is not fair that the limited funding of  road maintenance is directed ever increas-
ingly to densely populated Southern Finland.
90 Changing statehood: The spatial transformation of the Finnish state
18. Both polytechnics and universities are important generators of  regional development.
19. Large metropolitan regions are becoming more and more important to the success,
welfare and economics of  the whole country as a lot innovations, new information
and expertise is produced in those areas.
20. The state is giving up its wide responsibility of  regional development and focusing
the most innovative economic development measures to major cities.
21. Financial resources are adequately provided for regional development.
22. The state has been “retreating” to the south in the last decades, focusing its op-
erations on the Helsinki area even though regionalisation has been emphasized in
public discussion.
23. There is no returning to a decentralised welfare state.
24. The metropolisation of  Helsinki would also lessen the con  ict between Helsinki
and the rest of  Finland.
25. Setting the focus on metropolises is costly to society.
26. The Nordic welfare state model provides a competitive advantage for Finland even
today.
27. It is true that Lapland has lost all of  its political weight in Finland.
28. Decentralisation of  the central administration represents sensible regional policy. It
is important for the provinces that the decentralization trend continues.
29. The maintaining of  settlement practically throughout the country remains a viable
aim for Finnish social policy, and a compensatory regional policy is a good instru-
ment for achieving this.
30. It is more pro  table to invest in the development of  major cities than in that of
other areas.
31. We must stop talking about university merges or decreasing the higher education
institution network in conjunction with regional policy.
32. The powerful metropolitan region that is developing around Helsinki is a necessary
factor for Finland’s future success.
33. Stable social circumstances, an egalitarian society, knowledge and human capital are
success factors in the global economy. A regionally unequal society may lead to the
erosion of  these success factors and the erosion of  competitiveness based on them.
34. It is possible to decentralise the government within the Helsinki metropolitan region.
35. Somehow it seems that the decision-makers have been focusing more and more on
Southern Finland while forgetting the eastern and northern parts of  the country.
36. The state has to begin taking responsibility once again for the regional impacts of
its own actions.
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After the Q sample had been selected, I chose 39 test subjects. Q methodologi-
cal analysis is an intensive methodological tool in which small participant samplings,
typically 20–40 participants, are exploited (Aalto 2003b: 118–120). In Q studies the
sample elements are statements which interact; that is to say, a subject is asked to sort
the statements, constantly comparing them (Brown 1980: 51). The people I chose as
participants were the 20 chief  administrators of  all regions of  Finland and 19 selected
administrators from selected subregions, including an executive manager, a develop-
ment manager, business development directors, an executive secretary of  a subregion,
directors of  subregions, and also chairpersons of  subregional decision-making bodies.
I have listed all respondents in the appendix I.
Despite the obvious political aspect of  this topic, I did not consider the respond-
ents, the heads of  regional and subregional administrative bodies, as party-political ac-
tors. My objective was to examine the opinions of  the respondents from a regional
viewpoint rather than consider them as party-political actors. When considering the
chief  administrators of  regions, these persons are the directors of  regional councils
which act as authorities in regional development, are responsible for the general devel-
opment of  the region in question and are also liable for provincial planning. In Fin-
land, every municipality belongs to some regional council. The overall decision-making
body of  regional councils is the assembly of  municipalities. The general administra-
tion, preparation and execution of  the provincial decisions are led by the managing
board authored by the assembly of  municipalities. The chief  administrator of  regional
council presents the issues of  the regional council to the managing board, which is the
political organ making the actual decisions. Although several chief  administrators of
regions are politically active, their role in this study was considered as of  cers, chief
administrators of  regional councils. In a similar vein, among the interviewees of  su-
bregions there are both party-political actors and civil servants but they are, however,
considered as of  cers in this examination. This is to say that I have excluded the politi-
cal orientation of  respondents from this study.
As distinct from the party-political actors who mainly participate in producing the
spatial transformation of  statehood, however, the chief  administrators of  the regions
and the subregional representatives had experienced the spatial effects of  the ongo-
ing spatial transformation of  statehood and were able to re  ect upon their discoveries
in addition to having a broader view of  the spatial development of  the Finnish state
space. Nevertheless, this did not exclude them from participating in the production of
the spatial transformation of  statehood. It was for this reason that I chose the chief
administrators of  the regions as the actual target group and subregional representatives
to complete the sample. I selected these people with a view to territorial representa-
tiveness, the respondents’ knowledge and experience of  regional operations, the su-
pervision of  regional interests and the future scenarios of  the regions in question. My
interest was in their reasoning with regard to the spatial transformation of  statehood
that has recently occurred in Finland, especially the emerging political con  ict between
different forms of  urbanisation.
I sent the respondents the Q sample (arguments on cards and a Q methodology
matrix), sorting instructions and some supplementary questions to explore their view-
points by mail, for two reasons. Firstly, to minimise the in  uence of  an interviewer
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and to expose the subjectivity of  the respondent, and secondly, to overcome the prob-
lem of  arranging personal meetings with individual respondents scattered across the
country, a natural result of  the drive for regional representativeness. In any case, the
response rate of  61.5% turned out to be excellent in terms of  both representativeness
and regional scope.
In the sorting instructions, I asked respondents to  rst read the arguments through
and then classify the arguments into three categories, agreeable arguments, disagreeable
arguments and  nally those arguments which the respondent did not consider relevant
or on which they did not have an opinion at all. Then I asked the respondents to place
the arguments on cards in a Q methodology matrix which is a normal distribution
matrix (Figure 11), so that a score of  5 denoted a statement that was most like the
respondent’s opinion and -5 one that was most unlike the respondent’s opinion. The
arguments that the respondents considered neutral were to be placed in the centre.
Naturally, I did not give any information for respondents about the classi  cations I
have made beforehand concerning the thematic structure of  the concourse.
Figure 11. The Q methodology matrix.
 In many Q methodological studies, a possibility for a post-sorting interview to help with
the interpretation of  discourses found and to produce illustrative material is often under-
taken (e.g. van Exel & de Graaf  2005: 10). However, post-sorting interviews are not the
only option for the gathering supporting information from the participants. A “response
booklet” or a post-sorting questionnaire can also be used here (Watts & Stenner 2005:
78). As van Exel and de Graaf  (2005: 10) note, “sometimes a single quotation says it
all”. In order to better understand respondents’ viewpoints; especially how respondents
interpreted the items they gave highest and lowest rankings in their Q sorts, I also sent
them a response booklet (cf. Watts & Stenner 2005: 78). This was carried out by asking
the respondents, after having sorted the arguments into a matrix, to specify their reasons
for giving certain arguments scores of  5 and -5. This actually encouraged them to explain
their opinions fairly explicitly.
After the respondents had sorted the arguments into a Q methodology matrix, the
data was analysed statistically using the PQMethod Software, which is freely available
Most unlike my view                      Most like my view
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
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on the Internet (PQMethod Software 2008). This programme provides a simpli  ed ap-
proach to data input and factors analysis (Eden et al. 2005: 418). The program can per-
form correlation and principal component analyses on data from a Q methodology pro-
cedure. Firstly, the data was entered into the program in numerical form.
Van Exel and de Graaf  (2005: 8–9) de  ned the steps in the Q analysis which I have
utilised in the empirical analysis. Firstly, the correlation matrix of  all Q sorts was calcu-
lated representing the level of  agreement or disagreement between each Q sort. Sec-
ondly, this correlation matrix was subject to a factor analysis (principal component analy-
sis) with the objective of  grouping Q sorts with similar or dissimilar results with other
groupings. In other words, people with similar viewpoints share the same factor. A factor
loading was determined to each Q sort. This factor loading presents the extent which
each Q sort is connected with each factor. The number of  factors depends on the vari-
ability of  Q sorts. Then the selected factors were rotated with Varimax rotation, which
shifts the perspective from where the Q sorts are studied (van Exel & de Graaf  2005:
8–9). However, there is a signi  cant proportion of  the degree of  researcher’s judgment
involved in retaining factors and their rotations (Eden et al. 2005: 418). That is to say that
the subjectivity of  a researcher cannot be avoided in a Q methodology procedure. Factor
scores point out the statements that require further attention in the factor interpretation.
Factor scores also point out the characteristic statements which is to say those statements
that are ranked at both extremes of  the composite sort of  a factor (van Exel & de Graaf
2005: 10).
After this quantitative analysis, a qualitative approach was adopted, which involved
interpretation of  the factors identi  ed. My objective was to conceptualise how the chang-
ing statehood is manifested in the discussions of  state spatiality in the Finnish context,
especially in the discussion of  the Helsinki metropolitan region. My interest was particu-
larly related to examining the discursive space in order to describe the ongoing debate,
instead of  studying single respondents’ personal opinions (cf. Aalto 2001: 110). It be-
came evident that the analysis of  Q sortings represented the regional actors’ views on
the changing statehood in Finland. It re  ected the options for state spatial strategies and
elicited the regional actors’ ways of  reasoning with regard to these strategies. The results
strongly supported the notion of  a polarisation in the respondents’ ways of  thinking in
matters of  regional policy, regional development measures and the different forms of
urbanisation in Finland. It also revealed the political con  ict between different forms of
urbanisation. The Q methodology turned out to be highly suitable in this kind of  inves-
tigation.
5.2. The regional actors’ views on the changing statehood in Finland
In the analysis, I identi  ed two factors which I have referred to later as discourses (Table
4). The extent to which participants are associated with a factor is expressed by a factor
loading. Twenty-one participants received signi  cant loadings in one of  these two factors
which is to say that there were 9–13 participants in each factor. A loading of  1.0 means
that the participant placed the items in totally identical ways with the factor in question
and a loading of  -1.0 means that the participant placed the items in the sorting grid in
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Table 4. A factor matrix of  the Q methodological study. This factor matrix represents par-
ticipants and the loadings of  their Q sortings on both factors (X indicates a de  ning sort). In







1. Chief  regional administrator 0.7601X 0.2585
2. Representative of  a subregion 0.6949X 0.3036
3. Representative of  a subregion 0.5619X 0.1915
4. Chief  regional administrator 0.8342X 0.2306
5. Representative of  a subregion 0.6529X 0.1356
6. Chief  regional administrator 0.8632X 0.1042
7. Chief  regional administrator 0.4645X 0.5690X
8. Chief  regional administrator -0.0876 0.7417X
9. Representative of  a subregion 0.6277X 0.2509
10. Chief  regional administrator 0.3286 0.5206X
11. Chief  regional administrator 0.0750 0.6539X
12. Chief  regional administrator 0.2648 0.6746X
13. Chief  regional administrator 0.8006X 0.2440
14. Chief  regional administrator -0.6173X 0.5359X
15. Chief  regional administrator 0.0412 0.7675X
16. Chief  regional administrator 0.1746 0.7596X
17. Representative of  a subregion 0.6959X -0.0144
18. Representative of  a subregion 0.3944 -0.0693
19. Chief  regional administrator 0.7369X 0.3274
20. Representative of  a subregion 0.1550 0.5743X
21. Representative of  a subregion 0.6099X 0.6733X
22. Representative of  a subregion 0.5875X 0.2917
23. Chief  regional administrator 0.5100X -0.0699
24. Chief  regional administrator 0.0661 0.7521X
totally con  icting ways when compared to the factor in question. A loading of  0 signi  es
that there is no interconnection between the participant and the factor. In my study one
respondent (18) did not receive a signi  cant loading to either of  the factors found. Two
respondents (7 and 21) had signi  cant loadings to both of  the factors. These sorts were
not therefore attributed signi  cance in the interpretation of  factors. I interpret that these
respondents have not yet formed their opinions on the changing statehood.
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In this case study, the participant’s factor loading must be in excess of  ± 0.430086
to be signi  cant. I calculated this by using the following formula (cf. Brown 1980: 222):
(1 36) * ±2.58(Ser) = ±0.430086. Factor loadings of  ±0.430086 exceed the signi  cant
level in using the Q methodological sample of  36 arguments. The factors found partly
overlap which becomes evident in reviewing the correlations between factors (Table 5).
The idealised Q sorts which are formed from factor scores provide a way of  under-
standing and interpreting the factors found (appendix II). The idealised Q sorts sum-
marise the characteristics of  each discourse.
Factor 1 Factor 2
Factor 1 1.00 0.4184
Factor 2 0.4184 1.00
Table 5. Correlations between factors.
Discourse I: “The welfare state ideology is still a valid method for responding to the current political
problem”
This discourse echoes strong support for the Nordic welfare state structures in various
ways. In particular, the ideology of  a spatially decentralised, balanced spatial structure
and social equality are looked on as core values. The fact that spatial and social equal-
ity in every aspect of  society is central to this discourse manifests that it emphasises
the welfare state ideology and methodology as valid measures not only for the future
societal development of  Finland but also its national competitiveness. For example, the
respondents highlight a territorially extensive higher educational network, a balanced
pattern of  settlement throughout the country, a workable transport network covering
the whole state territory (despite low transport volumes) and the spatial decentralisa-
tion of  public governance outside the Helsinki metropolitan region as valid measures
for promoting competitiveness and regional development in Finland. In addition, the
importance of  knowledge and a regionally balanced higher educational network also al-
lude to the manifestation of  a knowledge-based society. In general, these measures are
supported as preconditions for the smooth functioning regional business operations
and regional development.
Respondents paid particular attention to the meaning of  a higher educational net-
work in supporting the local development (Table 6). In particular, the respondents
agreed on the importance of  universities in developing regional innovations and inter-
nationally top-level knowledge but also local research and development activity. They
also agreed on the role of  universities in increasing the local “human capital” but also
placed signi  cance on higher education branches for the local consumption and busi-
ness life. Therefore respondents saw placing a focus on a few universities in Finland as a
threat for regional development. As one respondent put it: “A reduction in the national
higher educational network would decrease innovation activity and competition. Finland
is geographically-wide and consists of  diverging regions where several universities may
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succeed in international competition”. As another respondent states: “Only regionally-
equal higher education can keep the state on the path of  equally-balanced develop-
ment”. As it is shown, the use of  knowledge and education are seen central factors
leading to international competitiveness, particularly utilising the knowledge potential
of  the whole state space with a regionally extensive higher educational system.
This discourse explicitly echoes the interpretation of  the state as a developer and
supporter of  regional development throughout the state. In other words, the state is
seen to be responsible for development measures. In the present context, discourse I
con  rms concerns about the erosion of  national regional policy measures as a conse-
quence of  the prevailing shortage of  national regional development funding. It also
af  rms that respondents have perceived the gradual acceptance of  territorial inequality
and possible the polarisation of  successful and regressive regions that has partly oc-
curred in Finland. As one respondent puts it: “The most in  uential concern or threat is
the polarisation of  Finland. Although it is mentioned in discussions, it is not taken seri-
ously and nothing effective is done.” Likewise, another respondent notes that: “Spatial
differences in welfare and in the accessibility of  public or other services will expand:
differences will increase sharply in the future.” Respondents see the polarisation of  the
nation as a threat and having already taken place in part when considering the regional
differences in welfare services in particular. This becomes visible in one respondent’s
comment on the argument “The welfare differences between regions are minor, the ac-
cessibility of  services is assured and basic public services are operated well throughout
the state territory, even in the sparsely populated rural areas”, with the respondent’s
comment: “This is not true. The accessibility of  services is not assured throughout the
state territory, particularly in peripheral regions” and another respondent: “The argu-
ment is not from this world”. Although other respondents reacted more moderately
to this statement, they did however, see a great risk in the widening of  differences in
welfare services and eroding basic services in peripheral regions.
The responses indicate that the balanced and equal development of  the Finnish so-
ciety is seen as an intrinsic value itself. It is also manifested as a guarantor for stable
and balanced societal development. One respondent describes this as follows: “Both
the spatially centralising development and the decreasing population in peripheral re-
gions are seen to increase social problems. In practise, people should have the possi-
bility to select their residential environment. This forms a base to both creativity and
productivity”. Inequality is also seen as a possible factor in the erosion of  aforemen-
tioned national success factors and limiting opportunities to make full use of  the re-
sources of  the whole state territory. As a respondent puts it: “Stable societal conditions
have secured the best preconditions for sustainable economic growth which is the only
guarantee of  suf  cient resources for the whole state.” The welfare state itself  is high-
lighted as a competitive advantage in global competition, particularly through its ability
to ensure stable social conditions and an egalitarian society, but also because of  the
high level of  knowledge and human capital that it implies.
When considering the spatial aspect of  statehood, metropolis policy, policy for
large urban regions and spatial centralisation of  state resources are often represented
in public discussions as valid measures for responding to new political problems. In
discourse I, the “metropolitan region” is clearly perceived as a new “scale” of  activity
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and considered a threat to regional development. A certain resistance to such a spatial
transformation becomes visible, however, in the respondents’ opposition to these po-
tential new spatial measures intended to promote spatial centralisation. Discourse I,
for example, represents the ongoing spatial centralisation tendencies as an undesirable
trajectory and a threat to societal equality. This indicates that constructing a metropoli-
tan state is seen as a threat to the polycentric urban model and to territorial equality. In
fact, respondents see the utilisation of  the whole state space and state resources as the
core value in constructing national competitiveness. In this sense, respondents see the
politics concentrating on large cities or metropolises as a failure. As one respondent
describes the large urban regions: “The large cities do not generate anything new or re-
markable” and another respondent: “In Finland, growth is presently generated in small
or middle-sized municipalities, small or medium-sized enterprises or in subregions. As
far as growth is concerned, the large cities are “the last ones” to be considered”. This
indicates a clear promotion of  a polycentric urban model. Indeed, development of  the
Helsinki metropolitan region in general was not seen as a necessity for the favourable
development of  the whole country. Investments in the development of  large urban
regions, the spatial decentralisation of  government of  ces only within the Helsinki
metropolitan region, the channelling of  transport infrastructure to the most densely
operated routes, or the reduction of  the higher educational network, for example, were
frowned upon. In particular, the metropolisation of  the capital region was considered
liable to increase disharmony between the regions. It seems evident that the Discourse
I displays a nationally-oriented way of  understanding the changing statehood in which
the national scale is perceived as the primary scale of  action. This indicates that the
national scale is clearly seen as the most important point of  reference instead of  the
international scale for example. Therefore, the understanding of  the ongoing rescaling
of  statehood is clearly perceived in an inward-looking way in Discourse I.
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Discourse II: “Spatial centralisation as a response to the present political problem”
Discourse II is a distinctly growth and competition-oriented discourse (Table 7), giv-
ing clear signs about tendencies to spatially centralise state functions and economic
resources into the growth regions of  Finland. As these growth regions, particularly the
large urban regions and metropolitan region are seen as “growth generators”. By this
I mean that the discourse clearly supports a growth-oriented and spatially centralised
way to consider changing statehood.
My material indicates that measures for responding to the new political problems
of  the present time will in part be parallel to those adopted previously. That is to
say that knowledge (in the form of  the higher educational network), telecommuni-
cations, transport connections and the allocation of  resources will be at the core of
the strategies proposed. As one respondent describes the signi  cance of  higher edu-
cation branches for regions: “The students in universities and polytechnics integrate
themselves into corporations and public communities located in the region in question.
Table 6. Statements prompting the most agreement (positive values) and disagreement (negative
values) of  the arguments of  advocates in Discourse I.
Statement Value
Stable social circumstances, an egalitarian society, knowledge and human
capital are success factors in the global economy. A regionally unequal
society may lead to the erosion of  these success factors and the erosion
of  competitiveness based on them.
5
The concern over regional inequality and a division of  the nation into
privileged and less privileged is justi  able.
4
The maintaining of  settlement practically throughout the country
remains a viable aim for Finnish social policy, and a compensatory
regional policy is a good instrument for achieving this.
4
The welfare differences between regions are minor, the accessibility
of  services is assured and basic public services are operated well
throughout the state territory, even in the sparsely populated rural areas.
-4
Financial resources are adequately provided for regional development. -4
It is possible in Finland to maintain only three top-rank universities ca-
pable of  reaching international standards. We should concentrate on the
development of  those three universities.
-5
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This will therefore increase the regional competitiveness”. However, support for the
spatial centralisation of  state resources is re  ected in the respondents’ support for the
concentration of  transport infrastructure improvements in the most densely operated
transport routes. Also the building and maintenance of  transport network receives crit-
icism: “The Finnish road network has in part been constructed too much with regional
political arguments in mind. Roads are in a good condition in northern Finland when
compared to traf  c volumes.” Likewise respondents’ view on the higher educational
network is that it is too wide and fragmented and needs improvements. These argu-
ments show that the essential difference between the two discourses, however, lies in
their spatial focus. In other words, spatial centralisation is regarded in discourse II as a
method of  generating welfare and national success in global competition by enhancing
competitiveness and economic growth, i.e. the state spatiality has become re-concep-
tualised. In this discussion, a metropolitan region is clearly perceived as a new “scale”
of  activity, competing with the polycentric urban model. The respondents represent
their attitudes towards spatial centralisation in many ways, especially in relation to the
objectives of  economic growth and competitiveness. It is evident that the respondents’
reasoning with regard to the state spatiality re  ects a gradual acceptance of  spatial dif-
ferentiation in Finland. One sees it as unavoidable: “Unfortunately success cannot be
spread over the whole state territory. Development measures should be concentrated
in those regions that have the best growth potential.”
The best response to the newly emerging political problem of  growing international
competition is seen as being national spatial centralisation, that is to say enhancing
large urban regions and a metropolitan region instead of  regional centres. In other
words, the spatial concentration of  resources in the most “competitive” and “produc-
tive” regions of  Finland is seen to rest at the core of  the strategies that are valid for
responding to the current political problems. This discourse echoes to some extent
the locational policy discussion in Germany (Brenner 2000: 320), as the Helsinki met-
ropolitan region is understood as a key region, a “space” or “place” of  high competi-
tiveness, the speci  c economic advantages of  which are to be promoted, with other
European metropolitan regions as its reference points. This approach highlights scale-
speci  c state policies that are established in order to strengthen localised competitive
advantages in relation to competitive pressures (cf. Brenner 2000: 321). This indicates
that the spatial concentration of  functions in large urban regions is not considered an
expensive means of  generating af  uence in Finland, nor are societal investments in the
Helsinki metropolitan region regarded as contrary to the spirit of  competition. On the
contrary, the promotion of  the Helsinki metropolitan region is considered to enhance
the success of  the whole state territory and as a measure of  generating growth that is
seen as a precondition to maintaining a suf  cient level of  welfare in the whole state
space. As one respondent puts it: “Finland needs an attractive, internationally work-
able metropolitan region, the success of  which will re  ect outwards to other medium-
sized growth centres (the city-regions of  Oulu, Tampere, Jyväskylä and Turku)”, while
another respondent adds that: “At present and in the future, metropolitan regions will
compete for highly quali  ed workers and pro  table investments. It is especially im-
portant for Finland that Helsinki should succeed in this competition, along with other
metropolises in the Baltic Sea region. Through this network of  metropolises, the whole
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state territory will gain bene  ts, especially concerning knowledge and  nancial mat-
ters.” This indicates that the metropolisation of  Finland is looked on as a new measure
for the spatial production of  welfare, differing from the measures previously proposed
under the heading of  “one nation politics” (cf. Moisio & Leppänen 2007). This also
manifests that the adopted state strategies are increasingly outward-oriented in order to
enhance the international competitiveness which also indicates that the perceived refer-
ence point is becoming increasingly international instead of  national. In other words,
the rescaling of  the state is increasingly realised in relation to the ability of  being able
to succeed in international competition. In general, the importance of  large urban re-
gions and regions generating growth is expected to increase in the future.
The respondents nevertheless clearly re  ect their support for welfare values in Dis-
course II also. For example, Discourse II also recognises a stable and egalitarian state
as a competitiveness factor and inequality as a risk factor with respect to stable social
conditions and the accumulation of  know-how and human capital. This clearly indi-
cates that the resistance is not directed towards welfare itself  but rather towards the
methods of  producing it as well as directing state resources spatially. This indicates
that the welfare state is de  nitely not disappearing or eroding but rather transforming.
However, a distinct need for trimming the “old welfare state” towards a “new trimmed
welfare state” is perceived among respondents. This is indicated in the adoption of  a
growth centre approach whereby the growth centres are seen producing growth and
thereby generating welfare.
Discourse II clearly contains the assumption that the polarisation of  the state and
society is not a serious threat at all. That is to say that the spatial centralisation of
state resources to those regions which are perceived as potentially the most likely to
produce economic growth is not seen to produce social inequality. In addition, the
differences in spatial scope that may emerge in welfare services are not recognised as
forcibly in this discourse as in Discourse I. The spatial withdrawal of  state activities
to southern Finland was certainly noted, but the respondents seemed to be unwill-
ing to do anything to reverse it. On the contrary, they believed that the peripheral re-
gions of  northern and eastern Finland had been at least adequately taken into account
in regional policies. As one respondent puts it: “In the era of  international funding
programmes, national regional development has been left to be totally dependent on
those programmes. Nowadays funding is available for eastern and northern Finland for
almost any purpose – but actors in southern and western Finland, especially in the “de-
veloped” regions, have to manage with private investments.” This kind of  statement
re  ects the respondents’ concern over the present situation in which the societal struc-
tures created earlier are facing new challenges. They nevertheless clearly manifest that
insuf  cient national funding has been directed to overall regional development work.
In the present context this is tantamount to saying that they are clearly dissatis  ed with
the resources directed to southern Finland’s growth regions.
In Discourse II, the changing statehood and rescaling the state into a competition
and growth-oriented state forms are seen as an inevitable continuum. As a respondent
aptly puts it: “In general, the large cities are the most important “places” where innova-
tions originate. Furthermore, the spatially-concentrated development is a consequence
of  many inevitably occurring factors. The slowing down of  this development would
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not be sensible or even realistic”. That is to say that although welfare as a value itself
has not become discarded, the new spatial forms of  statehood have clearly been ac-
cepted as new ways of  producing growth and therefore contribute in generating wel-
fare. Re-entry of  a polycentric urban model is not perceived as an option in this cur-
rent competition situation.
Table 7. Statements prompting the most agreement (positive values) or disagreement (negative
values) in Discourse II.
Statement Value
Fast and reasonably priced telecommunications and transport connections
are of  central importance for the competitiveness of  regions.
5
Those places where growth is generated will increase in importance
in future regional policies.
4
Both polytechnics and universities are important generators of
regional development.
4
It is true that Lapland has lost all of  its political weight in Finland. -4
It is possible to decentralise the government within the Helsinki
metropolitan region.
-4
Special rights and an autonomous status (as in Åland) should also be
granted to Lapland.
-5
5.3. Polarisation of  views on spatial development
Tea Remahl (2008) has studied the change in regional political thinking from the 1990s
to the beginning of  the 2000s, particularly the social signi  cance of  the Finnish re-
gional politics and the change of  regional policy discourse in the  rst part of  the 2000.
She suggests that the change was a dramatic one as a transition in policy from the
compensating of  weaknesses to the development of  strengths emerged. She claimed
that in regional policy discussion in the early 2000s the political struggle of  the direc-
tion of  regional policy was largely un  nished. As a result of  her Q methodological
study, she (2008: 102–111) presents three discourses of  regional politics concerning
the beginning of  the 2000s. The  rst discourse named traditional, supports the welfare
state ideology and the principles of  universalism and spatial and regional equality as
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its core values. It sees the state territory as an important resource, also for economic
reasons. A spatially equal welfare state is supported mainly because of  social and cul-
tural reasons. Rural regions are seen as an integral part of  Finnish society as well. In
the second discourse, a discourse on competitiveness, the regional policy supporting
regional strengths  nancially is charged with the expanding of  the competitiveness of
the whole state. The spatial centralisation of  state is seen as producing bene  ts for
economic growth. The role of  the state is intended to be kept minor. It is clear that
surviving in international competition is considered more important than the regional
balance in this discourse. Remahl names the third discourse a consensus discourse, in
which a welfare state ideology is supported but with more moderate arguments. It is
acknowledged that a development of  growth centres produces bene  ts for other re-
gions too and therefore supporters are not willing to stop the centralisation of  state
space entirely. It is thought that with the help of  regional politics all state resources
are to be utilised (Remahl 2008: 102–111). The results of  Remahl (2008) prove that
in the early 2000s, opinions on the regional policy measures were con  icting. In other
words, this could be interpreted that a consensus about state spatiality had not yet been
attained. I argue that this represents the political struggle between the old and new
regional policy measures with diverse in  uences on state spatiality ready to begin. Al-
though the research questions presented by Remahl are quite different from this study,
it is possible to make some comparisons. When compared to the results of  this study,
conducted in the autumn of  the 2008, a distinct feature is the sharpening of  regional
policy discourses which indicate the polarisation of  thinking on the spatial form of
statehood.
A change in the current political problems has caused pressures to rework the state’s
spatial strategies in order to be valid in responding to those problems, and this has also
had consequences for state spatiality. The competing state spatial strategies are clearly
seen as methods of  responding to the current political problems, of  surviving in global
competitiveness. Discourse I makes reference to support for a spatially decentralised
statehood and equal spatial development, aspects in which a resistance to change can
be detected. Here well-balanced regional development and the socio-economic equality
within the Finnish society are seen as valid methods for responding to the new politi-
cal problems as well. On the other hand, Discourse II refers to support for a growth
policy and spatial centralisation within growth regions or regions which are seen to be
the most competitive on a global scale. This points out that the spatial allocation of
state resources is looked on in essentially different ways. As indicated here, the ways of
reasoning with regard to the tension in state spatiality becomes visible in the discur-
sive space. There also seemed to be a particular causality between the location of  the
provinces that the respondents represent and their reasoning with regard to the spatial
future of  the state. By this I mean that the regional examination of  the supporters of
the found discourses did not come as a revelation; the support for both discourses
was distributed fairly carefully according to the location of  a respondent. In the major
growth regions of  Finland and the regions near these major growth regions, support
for discourse II was apparent. By the same token, the representatives of  those regions
which do not belong to the largest growth regions in Finland, and are mainly located
in Eastern, Northern and Western parts of  Finland, quite clearly gave their support for
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discourse I. My purpose was not particularly to enquire into such causalities, however,
but instead to demonstrate the inherently con  ictual nature of  state spatial restructura-
tion in the Finnish context.
Despite the con  ictual nature of  state spatial restructuration in Finland, the re-
spondents clearly agreed about what measures would be effective for promoting re-
gional development and Finland’s regional competitiveness. In general, three distinct
groups of  such measures were found. Firstly, both discourses support the higher edu-
cation network, both polytechnics and universities, as signi  cant instruments in region-
al development. The regional scope of  the educational system has been characteristic
of  the spatially decentralised welfare state in Finland. As one respondent put it, “a
region without these institutions cannot be a growing one”. Secondly, transport is sup-
ported as a policy  eld that has direct effects on the competitiveness of  a region, as
fast and reasonably priced transport communications, and also telecommunications,
are considered to be crucial competitiveness factors. This indicates that the signi  cance
of  transport connections has altered from connecting the geographical peripheries un-
der the direct in  uence of  the central government towards constructing competitive-
ness, availability and attainability of  regions. As one respondent sees the importance
of  transport communications, “the speed, reliability and level of  transport connections
are the most in  uential factors in regional development”. Thirdly, both discourses sup-
port the spatial decentralisation of  public administration outside the Helsinki metro-
politan region as a valid regional policy measure. In addition, both discourses clearly
indicate that insuf  cient  nancial resources are currently available for national regional
development work.
The empirical investigation into how certain central regional actors both de  ne and
value contemporary regional policies presents that no consensus has been reached in
Finnish public discussions and rhetoric regarding the future direction of  the country’s
spatial development, i.e. between spatial centralisation and decentralisation. Although
despite the lack of  unanimity, development seems to be heading towards a spatial
form of  “competition state” which is to say the development of  centralising state spa-
tiality. The trajectory from a balanced Keynesian spatiality towards a growth-oriented
spatiality has become visible in the changing statehood, especially in that the large
city-regions are increasingly being seen as generators of  economic growth in the state
space. This points to an ongoing urbanisation in Finland and a discarding of  policies
that concentrate on rural centres and balanced regional development for the genera-
tion of  growth. In spite of  this, the perceived need for change was distinct in order
to be able to face the new political problems, the future forms of  statehood are com-
peting and spatially contradicting. In other words, a clear consensus exists in Finnish
socio-political discussion about the need to rework Finnish society to better respond
to the “global” socio-political challenges although the measures for this are sharply
polarised in spatial terms. This is particularly interesting due to the strong engagement
of  the Finnish state with the balanced, equal Keynesian welfare state. Indeed, the situ-
ation seems to be somewhat blurred, as equal, balanced regional development is often
defended in public discussions despite the willingness to undertake actual development
measures which are inclined to direct Finland towards a spatially centralising “competi-
tion state”.
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In fact, I found clear polarisations between the two discourses and in the respond-
ents’ ways to reason the future spatial development of  the state. This polarisation clear-
ly echoes the competing spatial forms of  statehood, the “polycentric urban model”
and the “metropolitan state”. These competing forms of  urbanisation create diverging
visions of  statehood. There is a constant discussion as to the spatial and governmen-
tal forms of  the “metropolis region” and what meaning the rest of  the state space
will take on. In other words, although neoliberal urbanisation is visible in Finland, its
various forms are being contested politically. The recently adopted scale-speci  c spatial
policies are evidently being concentrated especially on promoting the development of
the Helsinki metropolitan region. That is to say that by investing in growth regions, the
government is placing the large urban regions and the metropolitan region at the core
of  the strategies that will eventually create a new spatial structure in Finland. Much re-
sistance to the spatial centralisation of  the state has nevertheless become visible in the
discursive space. The polarisation referred to above is primarily political in character, in
that it re  ects a tension arising from political decisions. On the other hand, the spatial
transformation of  statehood can also be expected to have material consequences for
the state’s spatiality, since one discourse supports balanced regional development and
the other somewhat clear spatial centralisation. This goes to suggest that the aforemen-
tioned tension will materialise itself  as territorial structures of  the polycentric urban
model or as a metropolitan state consisting of  a still unde  ned number of  large cities
mainly in southern Finland. The direction of  this transformation depends on the cho-
sen state spatial strategy. It was interesting to notice that despite the ongoing discus-
sion on innovations, the ability to innovate and the meaning of  innovation activity on
growth generation, and innovation centres were not mentioned in the material. This
indicates that the discussion on innovation centres has begun in earnest in the very late
2000s.
Although my purpose was not to discuss on the content of  welfare itself, it became
clear that the signi  cance of  the welfare state in general, welfare as a value itself  and
the measures that are valid for constructing the preconditions for welfare production
in Finland clearly elicited the consensus of  respondents. This indicates that although
the objective of  producing welfare was an evident feature, the methods of  producing
it differed. In particular, the spatial allocation of  state resources in order to create the
preconditions for growth generation and business life is not discussed in a consensual
manner. This also manifests that the core question in the discussion is the transforma-
tion of  the welfare state, not the end or erosion of  the welfare state. The question is
also the regional actors’ way of  understanding their primary scale of  action, and to
target their strategies in an inward-looking way mainly towards the national scale or in
outward-looking way towards the international scale.
It is important to note that the economic depression in the latter half  of  the 2000s
in Finland is exerting new pressures on the ongoing spatial transformation of  state-
hood. When considering the economic depression in the 1990s, the ef  ciency and le-
gitimacy of  the Finnish welfare state was exposed for reconsideration. This indicates
that an economic depression, a crisis, clearly questioned the prevailing state strategies
and opened up the political space to new initiatives, which initially become visible in
a discursive space and subsequently take on material manifestations. In this context,
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currently one new political initiative proposed by the Prime Minister, Matti Vanhanen,
early in 2009 should particularly be taken into consideration: the state spatial strategy
to combat the current yet constantly changing political problems. Vanhanen’s “growth
initiative 2020” re  ects a blurred combination of  one-nation politics and growth-ori-
ented politics. In spatial terms, it is in  uenced by the balanced territorial structure as-
pect of  the Keynesian ideology, as may be seen from Vanhanen’s statement “We aim to
maintain living standards and services over the whole state territory. [… ] Our objective
is a socially and regionally equal Finland”. (Finnish Government 2009.) On the other
hand, Vanhanen highlights the growth-oriented approach by mentioning the objective
of  improving the preconditions for business and internationalisation as well. In other
words, this represents a new, intermediate way forward that lies in between the options
for the state spatial strategy studied here.
It is clear, however, that the current political problems affecting the country are
characteristically in a state of  constant change, so that its spatial strategies have to
evolve in order to be able to respond to the new challenges. In view of  the political
character of  these problems, political struggles are constantly going on in order to  nd
valid measures and state spatial strategies that will constitute better responses to the
problems. The economic depression has opened up space in the political  eld for new
political initiatives with regard to the state’s spatial strategy, as exempli  ed by Matti
Vanhanen’s initiative. The key challenge here is to consider the spatial consequences of
the options that are put forward, since it is these that will be potentially implemented
in the future to create a new spatial structure for Finland.
It seems evident that neoliberal political projects have enormously in  uenced the capi-
talist restructuring in supranational, national, and subnational scales during the last two
decades (Brenner & Theodore 2002: 13) as the power and authority of  the national
scale have been exposed to the modern-day politico-economic development. In these
discussions, the international scale has substantially raised its notability when consider-
ing direct contact with subnational actors, political decision-making and lawmaking.
Claims have been made about regional actors increasingly participating in multi-level
politico-economic relations. This phenomenon has occurred in the era of  deepening
European integration and economic globalization; economic trends, international trade
agreements and the rescaling of  the regional, national and international political levels
have changed the operational environment of  subregional actors. Even an idea of  “the
foreign policy of  regions” has been presented (Williams 1996: 250) concerning cit-
ies and regions implementing a foreign policy of  their own. However, seeing national
or international not as “scales” but rather as dimensions of  political economic prac-
tice provides an alternative approach which I have utilised particularly in this empirical
chapter (cf. Mans  eld 2005: 458).
In the era of  spatial Keynesianism, Finnish regional actors mainly operated within a
national context and although the operational environment has fundamentally changed
over the past twenty years, very little empirical research has been conducted on how
Finnish regional actors perceive and understand the new policy environment and how
they operate in the current regional setting. This chapter seeks to extend the discussion
on the spatial transformation of  state power in Finland by examining those evolving
regional practices in Southwest Finland (Table 8) that are currently aimed at locating
the region on the politico-economic world map above and beyond the state with the
purpose of  securing the local interests of  regional actors.
6. The persistence of  national spaces of
engagement – The case of  Southwest Finland
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This chapter  rst discusses the theorisations presented on regions and regional ac-
tors in a multi-level politico-economic space. This issue has been studied in political
sciences particularly under conceptualisations of  paradiplomacy and multi-level gov-
ernance. In many theorisations on relations between national, subnational and suprana-
tional actors in a multi-level politico-economic space, the central institutional locus of
the political is the state (cf. Cox 1998: 1). In this chapter, my purpose is however to ap-
proach the case study on a Finnish region, Southwest Finland, through the conceptu-
alisations developed by Kevin R. Cox (1998): the spaces of  dependence and spaces of
engagement. Firstly I will present the drivers to secure the local interest of  Southwest
Finland. The chapter then proceeds to examine the evolving strategies of  regional ac-
tors to locate their region in relation to different spatial scales, in other words, I study
the territorial positioning of  Southwest Finland in the context of  evolving and inte-
grating European space. Thirdly, I will introduce the constructed strategies and targets
of  regional actors when securing their local interests.
6.1. Regional actors in a multi-level politico-economic space
In the European context, theories of  multi-level governance are based on the assump-
tion of  “European policy space” as a process that involves signi  cant shifts in power
relations across levels of  government. In multi-level governance, state actors are not
seen as exclusively dominating decision-making, interdependencies or access to infor-
mation and communication channels (Gualini 2004: 37). The expanding state foreign
policy arena and the lowering of  the distinction between domestic and foreign policies,
a phenomenon referred to as “localising foreign policy” (Hocking 1993), is claimed to
Table 8. Characteristics of  the region of  Southwest Finland in 2008 (source: Regional Council




• 5 subregions (Loimaa, Salo, Turunmaa, Turku and Vakka-Suomi)
• Population 461,177
• Area total 20,600 km2
• GDP €14 billion
• Branches of  companies 34,500
• Net revenue €31 billion
• Export of  goods €7.1. billion
• Investments €1.2 billion
• R&D expenditure €0.7 billion
• Education
• 3 universities
• 4 universities of  applied sciences
• 16 providers of  vocational elementary education
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have lowered regions’ thresholds for pursuing their own interests on national and in-
ternational scales. The notion of  foreign policy environment as an overlapping process
of  internationalisation and localisation emphasises the demand of  decision-makers to
operate on various political levels and through various channels simultaneously (Hock-
ing 1993: 11).
In this context, Hocking (1993: 2–98) has introduced the term “multilayered diplo-
macy”, in which both governments and non-state actors are constrained to engage.
When considering regional actors this indicates that regions supervise their own inter-
ests in the European Union and within the nation-state in order to achieve politico-
economic bene  ts for themselves. The phenomenon of  regions supervising their own
interests is linked to the concept of  paradiplomacy, the broadening of  internation-
al affairs to allow regional actors to operate alongside organisations,  rms and other
non-state actors in their multi-level relations (cf. Keating 1999: 6). This alludes to the
idea that regional actors are increasingly becoming obliged to participate in multi-level
politico-economic relations and adopt strategies and policies of  their own in order to
bene  t from national and international funding sources. The objective of  regional ac-
tors is particularly to maximise the bene  ts to be gained from the European Union’s
programme-based regional politics and structural funding interventions in order to se-
cure their local interests and “survive” in a situation of  interregional competition. Pres-
sures to represent the interests of  regional actors on both national and interregional
politico-economic spaces have emerged as the regions have increased their importance
as both political and economic actors in the state space. This indicates that regional ac-
tors have begun to regard themselves as actors in the decision-making process, at the
same time as regions are seen as dynamic constructions, social systems linked function-
ally to other scales (Keating 1998: 10–78).
The concept of  “the foreign policy of  regions” is based on the observation by Wil-
liams (1996: 250) of  local and meso-level actors – cities and regions – implementing a
foreign policy of  their own in the context of  European integration. The present use
of  the concept of  “the foreign policy of  a region” is in particular a reference to the
strategies that regions develop in order to pursue their interests in a multi-level politi-
co-economic environment and achieve competitive advantages, gain access to  nancial
resources and reap co-operative bene  ts. It may be suggested, however, that, in addi-
tion to the supranationally-oriented understanding of  the foreign policy of  regions, re-
cent politico-economic challenges have emphasised the multi-level approach in subna-
tional actors’ relationships, interactions and possibilities to in  uence decision-making
on both international and national politico-economic spaces. However, the concept
of  “the foreign policy of  a region” should not be confused with the foreign policy of
a sovereign state, which commonly refers to a set of  goals regarding interaction with
other countries and non-state actors.
Williams (1996: 97) has proposed that the base for the objectives set by regional
actors and for the strategies that they select is constituted on the spatial positioning
of  a region, which refers to skills of  the regional actors to conceptualise the region’s
relative location within the spatial structure of  Europe. Inspired by Williams’ concept
of  “spatial positioning”, Sykes and Shaw (2008: 55–61) have developed the discus-
sion further by introducing the term “territorial positioning” by which they emphasise
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the particular context of  the EU and the integration process. Territorial positioning
refers to regional actors developing an awareness of  their territory’s spatial position in
relation to the changing geography of  the EU and a strategic appreciation of, and re-
sponse to, the changing European policy context. In this context, Sykes and Shaw have
further represented that “regions are embedded in a system of  vertical and horizontal
relations with the national and supranational levels and other regions, meaning that
they increasingly seek to promote their development and interests through external
interactions”. They have suggested that the EU enlargement process has modi  ed the
relative position of  regions within EU space. Sykes and Shaw also argue that chang-
es in regional policy models and the structure of  territorial governance have placed
an increased emphasis on the response of  sub-state territorial levels to the changing
context for their development, to be competitive rather than being merely reactive in
responding to the territorial consequences of  external economic decisions (Sykes &
Shaw 2008: 55–61). Through this positioning it is possible to identify opportunities,
comparative advantages and possibilities for the region; these strengths are the basis on
which new relationships and networks could be developed and strategic policies are to
be formulated (Williams 1996: 97).
Gualini (2004: 36) reminds us that despite the increased importance of  subnational
actors in multi-level operations, devolution of  state responsibilities to subnational ac-
tors or rescaling of  state, the subnational governmental levels are recognised but not as
substitutive for national states. The signi  cance of  subnational governance refers rath-
er to new forms of  local partnerships which aim to promote and guide the develop-
ment of  local resources (Jessop 2002a: 200). In Jessop’s (2002a: 201–204; 2004: 49–74;
2008: 210) terms a shift from government to governance on various territorial scales
has occurred, rather than a mere rescaling of  the sovereign state. He proposes that this
transformation has occurred in response to the predominant trends of  state restructur-
ing: the denationalisation of  the state, destatisation of  politics and internationalisation
of  policy regimes. Rather the role of  the state is seen as having altered from being
the guardian of  state-initiated economic and social projects and political hegemony
towards a provider of  partnership, a co-operative unit mediating between actors on
different spatial scales and a regime originator for networks and partnerships. This de-
velopment indicates the increased importance of  governance on all spatial scales and
emphasises the role of  the state as a “metagovernor” (Jessop 2002a: 201–204; Jessop
2004: 49–74; Jessop 2008: 210).
6.2. Towards new spaces of  engagement?
The politics of  local economic development, particularly the competition among lo-
calities and the muted levels of  con  ict within them has been scrutinised by Kevin R.
Cox together with Andrew Mair (1988). In so doing, they have examined the concept
of  local dependence; that is the dependence of  certain regional actors on the repro-
duction of  certain social relations within a particular territory.
If  local dependence cannot be escaped, it must be confronted. Cox and Mair (1988:
309–311) imply that this is done by locally dependent  rms in co-operation with local
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authorities and by people in constructing local business coalitions or public-private
partnerships. These actors aim to promote regional growth, regional tax revenues and
encourage local infrastructural and redevelopment projects by state institutions to at-
tract investment in their local economy. Local business coalitions or public-private
partnerships may pursue the development of  “accumulation strategies” (see Jessop
1990) in order to promote local economic growth. In doing so, locally dependent  rms
often attempt to harness the state in their efforts because the powers of  state and
state’s  nancial resources are valuable instruments in the competition among business
coalitions in different localities, e.g. in infrastructural and redevelopment projects by
state institutions in order to make localities more attractive to investors. However, the
construction of  local business coalitions and developing a coherent regional strategy to
promote local economic development is anything but simple; it may generate potential
con  ict between regional actors. (Cox & Mair 1988: 309–311.)
Kevin R. Cox (1998) has developed the idea of  local dependence further. Although
he considers the state as the central institutional locus of  the political framework, he
has criticised the conceptualisation of  activity in areal terms in his studies on the social
construction of  the politics of  scale. He has also criticised the areal approach in the
spatiality of  scale in particular and proposed the network as a more appropriate meta-
phor as areal boundaries tend to be porous and networks signify unevenness in the
penetration of  areal forms (Cox 1998: 1–3).
Cox (1998: 2–5) has studied local interests particularly which he has named spaces
of  dependence and their relation to broader  elds of  events and forces in construct-
ing the spaces of  engagement, “the space in which the politics of  securing a space
of  dependence unfolds”. As spaces of  dependence, he refers to “those more-or-less
localised social relations upon which we depend for the realisation of  essential interests
and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they de  ne place-speci  c conditions
for our material well-being and our sense of  signi  cance.” However, the boundaries of
the spaces of  dependence are somewhat blurred and spaces of  dependence occur at
diverse scales and for some agents there may be more than one space of  dependence
(Cox 1998: 2–5).
The existing spaces of  dependence are constantly challenged by global networks
of  relationships and interrelationships. These are the same global networks of  rela-
tionships and interrelationships where the spaces of  dependence are actually located.
Therefore the spaces of  dependence are constantly sought to be secured through key
regional actors, e.g. people,  rms and state agencies. However, these actors are par-
ticipants in a much more spatially extensive set of  exchange relations than those con-
tained within the bounds of  a particular place. (Cox 1998: 2–7.)
The ability to exercise territorial power signi  es a control over a geographical area.
Cox (1998: 2–7) argues that the ability to exercise territorial power contributes to the
ability to realise the local interests. In this context, the most obvious candidates to
exercise territorial power are the various agencies of  the state and as territorial powers
are not exclusive to the state, also other agents are involved. This makes in  uencing
state agencies important. In  uencing state agencies clearly demands either direct or
indirect measures; it can be done incorporating state agencies directly or indirectly
though the construction of  a network of  associations or in co-operation with those
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who can exercise some indirect in  uence on state agencies. In so doing, the key re-
gional actors are involved in more extensive networks of  social power (Cox 1998: 2–7).
6.3. Drivers for securing the local interests of  the Southwest Finland
region
The chosen case study region, the region of  Southwest Finland, is particularly suitable
as an indicator of  politico-economic global development due to the strong export-ori-
ented nature of  its industrial production, which connects it with the global economy.
It is possible in the light of  the interviews and policy documents evaluated here to dis-
tinguish a particular local interest of  key regional actors in the province of  Southwest
Finland. The local interests of  the regional actors was formed in securing and enhanc-
ing the competitiveness of  the region of  Southwest Finland in national and global
competition between regions. The ways of  key regional actors to understand and value
different “scales” provides an insightful view on the analysis.
The following observations are based on interviews with key regional actors, who
act in public organisations or public-private organisations. The interviewees were pro-
fessionals in promoting the regional interests and advantages in both national and in-
ternational contexts. The persons interviewed were regional development profession-
als, directors of  public-private organisations, developers of  regional business life, rep-
resentatives of  regional development centres, persons involved in regional and inter-
national development, experts in international relations and the Deputy Mayor of  the
City of  Turku with responsibility for Competence and Business Development. All the
actors were committed to the development of  Southwest Finland and it also made the
aspect of  general regional development highly visible.
Drivers for securing the local interests were found in the current politico-economic
development of  state and beyond. Firstly, the purpose of  regional actors was to en-
hance the competitiveness of  the region in question in order to gain success in inter-
regional competition. The key regional actors of  the Southwest Finland often stated
that they aim to secure their spaces of  dependence in interregional competition to
attract footloose international capital, national and international subsidies and highly-
skilled labour. Therefore providing prerequisites for private business life has become
the core of  those strategies to success in interregional competition and the main aim
of  regional actors in securing their local interests. Regional actors put forward that this
is carried out by developing a region’s operational environment and educational oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, it is typical for Southwest Finland’s regional actors to promote
companies’ internationalisation and create export possibilities by arranging meetings
and contact opportunities between private companies and foreign authorities.
Secondly, the interviews indicated that regional actors are “forced” to respond to
the challenges of  the Finnish state devolving its obligations and particularly welfare-
related responsibilities to the subnational actors. The respondents interviewed were
anxious to emphasise that the process of  devolution, the wider transfer of  respon-
sibilities, power and governance in general, is only in its initial stages in Finland (cf.
McGregor & Swales 2005: 478). Southwest Finland’s regional actors are expecting
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some governance restructuration, particularly concerning the regional administra-
tion, to occur in response to the increased economic and strategic responsibilities
given to subnational actors. They are also expecting economic and political decision-
making power to be transferred increasingly to subnational actors. This is also stated
in Southwest Finland’s Regional Programme (Regional Council of  Southwest Finland
2005: 50):
“Regional development work should be based on the region’s own
resources and strengths. It should include the setting of  objecti-
ves, decisions on the measures to be taken and the allocation of
resources. [… ] When strengthening the provincial administration,
it is important to strengthen democratic decision-making and the
regional budgetary authority. The strategies of  intermediate aut-
horities should be more closely connected to the regional strategy
and the province should be given a “provincial budget” in which
the Regional Council decides on the distribution of  development
funding in Southwest Finland over sectoral and administrative
boundaries.”
Another respondent replicates the same intention:
“A change should occur in the allocation of  funding, which is to
suggest that an increased amount of  funding should be allocated
directly to the region in question to be independently decided on
how to use it. At the moment this decision-making is much too
centrally planned and decided.”
The aforementioned statement indicates that regional actors have assimilated a
view of  development as being regional in origin, in contrast to being merely reactive
in responding to the territorial consequences of  external economic decisions (see
Sykes & Shaw 2008: 61). However, it seems that in the Finnish case the question is
more about the state encouraging regions to endogenous development and endog-
enous growth rather that transferring the actual economic decision-making powers
and economic governance to regions. As one respondent puts it:
“So the key to the exercise of  power lies in independent regio-
nal taxation which the region doesn’t have and nobody has even
proposed it. Now it seems that the interest has been on gathering
more tasks and responsibilities for regional actors. So, of  course,
it is a problematic [matter].”
Thirdly, the regional actors raised repeatedly the question of  adequate resourc-
es which are the core question concerning the transfer of  tasks and responsibilities
away from the state authorities. The respondents stated that a decreasing resource
base was available for managing the basic tasks of  the organisation, in parallel with
the neoliberal doctrines of  effectiveness, which call for cost savings, volume bene  ts
and the elimination of  overlapping in the services produced by regional public au-
thorities, and that this formed the background to internal regional co-operation in
securing the local interest in national and international networks and scales.
The respondents’ replies re  ected a shortage, or even a reduction, in the resources
allocated to regional actors by the national administration to allow them to manage
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their increased responsibilities and tasks, which meant that they were forced to seek
additional sources of   nance. As national compensatory regional policies have been
replaced with competition and growth policies, emphasising regional responsibilities
in the pursuit of  economic success, regional actors argued as they were forced to
compete on an interregional basis for scarce national and international  nancial re-
sources and markets. Also both direct and indirect rhetorical and economic guidance
pushes the regions into committing themselves to apply  nancial resources from in-
ternational sources, meaning especially EU funding. In this context, the European
Union is being seen as an agent compensating for the shortage of   nancial resources
received from the national administration. The European Union’s programme-based
regional policy funding challenged the state-run order in the  eld of  regional de-
velopment, as elsewhere, by creating new  nancial and administrative regimes. One
respondent interviewed in autumn 2007 explicitly stated that:
“Since the state doesn’t direct enough resources to us any longer,
we will apply to the EU.”
However, one respondent raised the often prevalent illusion about EU  nancing,
particularly about the in  uence on various actors concerning  nancial issues:
“It is often forgotten that in fact, a very large amount of  the
so-called EU  nance is indeed distributed in Finland, in the mi-
nistries, in the TE Centres or in the regional councils although
Finland’s actual share is decided in Brussels. But then the fact
that how the funding is distributed here between Finnish regions
and cities is a national question so in order to have an effect, one
should act in Helsinki and not in Brussels.”
This indicates that the  nancial issues and funding are central in regional actors’
actions in the international politico-economic space. The respondents also expressed
their willingness to operate directly on international networks without interference
from the national government. However, it should be noted that the state has a cru-
cial role in allocating regional development funding and in providing the national
contribution to projects partly  nanced by the EU. Furthermore, the national ad-
ministration also safeguards the interests of  subnational projects in the European
Union decision-making process. In this context, it is obvious that the nation-state
will preserve its authority in the key questions of  the European Union, especially
concerning funding (cf. Greenwood 1997: 240). All this contributes to the need for
interaction between national and subnational actors and the need for subnational ac-
tors to in  uence decision-makers on state governance.
Although it is obvious that regional actors have been looking after their interests
on a national politico-economic space for decades, the process of  internationalisa-
tion has obliged them to divert their attention increasingly to international politico-
economic networks and particularly to the available funding sources. EU member-
ship from 1995 onwards and the decline in trade with Russia challenged Finland’s
politico-economic relations in Europe. It is clear that internationality is now deeply
rooted in regional actors’ operations. Respondents particularly emphasised their activ-
ity on co-operation and networking in national and international politico-economic
space. Although some respondents considered the international “scale” to represent
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their main operational environment, the less focused character of  international co-
operation and networking was clearly brought out. As one regional actor stated:
“Co-operation in international networks is clearly looser in nature.
And also less focused. So there is much to develop in the co-ope-
ration of  regional actors in international networks.”
Respondents clearly put forward that the supply for networking possibilities is cur-
rently over  owing and the objective of  economic ef  ciency has obliged regional actors
to select the most productive co-operation opportunities in order to achieve concrete
bene  ts from international co-operation and networking.
However, the regional actors interestingly mentioned their shortage of  knowledge
and skills in making use of  EU project funding in particular. They were clearly aware
of  their lack of  knowledge, particularly with regard to  nancial applications. Regional
actors were also informed of  their further possibilities for EU funding and interna-
tional co-operation in constructing and strengthening regional competitive advantages.
Nevertheless, they emphasised the bureaucratic nature of  EU-  nanced projects in par-
ticular, which complicated their international or interregional co-operation and net-
working, and they saw a need for internal co-operation in order to overcome organi-
sational barriers and co-operate internationally in order to achieve the required knowl-
edge and  nance possibilities. It is also crucial to note that the respondents emphasised
the danger of  the Commission actually seeking to undermine spatial cohesion by set-
ting regional authorities to compete against each other for national and international
funding sources (see Williams 1996: 251).
The results indicate that the challenges of  politico-economic development, i.e. in-
ternationalisation, the devolution of  state power, inadequate resources, a shortage of
knowledge and interregional competition, have forced regional actors to secure their
local interests by managing their existing spaces of  engagement mainly with the state
governance but also to construct new spaces of  engagament mainly with international
actors particularly concerning  nancial issues. On the other hand, the implicit approval
of  the requirement for competitiveness has tempted regional actors to commit them-
selves voluntarily in multi-level operations to secure their local interests. Regional ac-
tors clearly expressed their willingness for further devolution of  state power and  nan-
cial resources. At the same time, they emphasised the importance of  strengthening the
identity and coherence of  their region. Despite the powerful role of  the state which
continues to exist, these tendencies indicate the willingness of  Finnish regional actors
to construct their regions as stronger territorial units in the future, in other words they
point to a further institutionalisation of  regions in the scalar restructuration of  the
Finnish state.
6.4. The two-level territorial positioning of  the Southwest Finland region
Regional actors in Southwest Finland have developed various strategies and develop-
ment visions regarding the region’s future position in Europe and beyond in order to
construct a tempting environment for business life and to be better able to direct their
development strategies. This indicates that the regional actors of  Southwest Finland
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have deeply internalised the practice of  territorial positioning in their actions. The ac-
tors of  Southwest Finland emphasised the importance of  regional coherence, shared
objectives and regional identity in constructing their development vision and strategy.
As regional strengths, the marine branch, the region’s knowledge-intensive character
and its logistics advantages were repeatedly mentioned in regional policy documents.
The main focus in policy documents was in the marine industry, ICT, biotechnology,
tourism and culture, also mentioned was the ability to co-operate on regional, national
and especially in international networks (cf. City of  Turku 2005, Regional Council of
Southwest Finland 2005, TAD Centre 2005).
The material shows that the practices of  territorial positioning are carried out in
both the national and international politico-economic spaces or networks. Firstly, on
a national level the regional actors saw close connections with the Helsinki metro-
politan region as the most attractive regional development strategy and a way of  po-
sitioning Southwest Finland on a national and international politico-economic space.
However, a link between Southwest Finland and the Helsinki metropolitan region ap-
peared to be a double-edged issue for the interviewees  as they were clearly concerned
about the public  nancial investments  owing into the metropolitan region, although
they also emphasised the advantage of  the short geographical distance between the
two regions in developing the competitiveness of  Southwest Finland. They were nev-
ertheless well aware of  the size difference between the two regions and conscious of
the impossibility of  competing with the Helsinki metropolitan region. Instead, they
were willing to enter into close interregional co-operation in order to bene  t from the
growth there. This indicates the dif  culties experienced by smaller regional entities in
achieving visibility and marketing their region on a European level. In this context, an
alliance with the Helsinki metropolitan region in order to construct a larger territorial
entity would seem to be highly relevant. Some respondents also proposed closer co-
operation between the cities of  Turku and Salo, and the subsequent construction of
a development corridor from the twin-city of  Turku-Salo to the metropolitan region.
It should be noted that the city of  Salo is especially highlighted in the respondents’
rhetoric on account of  its competitive advantages in the form of  a dynamic electron-
ics industry and growth-oriented international business life. This indicates that the
current reworking of  the Finnish state may affect the spatial structure by developing
new regional alliances and development corridors in which emphasis is placed espe-
cially on infrastructure development.
Secondly, internationally the Baltic Sea connections and the position of  Southwest
Finland as a bridgehead between Scandinavia and Asia were especially emphasised
(Figure 12). The respondents argued that the enlargement of  the European Union
and the region’s resulting new territorial position formed a threat particularly to the
less-developed subregions in Southwest Finland, on account of  the assumed decrease
in and redirection of  European Union structural funding in the coming years. This
will pose an economic challenge to some subregions and oblige them to  nd com-
pensatory  nance. The respondents’ arguments re  ected the relative revision of  the
region’s territorial position within the political space of  the EU (see Sykes & Shaw
2008: 60–61).
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6.5. Securing the spaces of  dependence
Strategies of regional actors
As the regional actors have de  ned the territorial position of  Southwest Finland in
Finland as well as Europe and beyond in order to identify the region’s possibilities
and competitive advantages in a spatial context, they have begun to develop strategies
to respond better to the challenges of  ongoing politico-economic development. In
other words, they have begun to secure their local interests, manage the existing spaces
of  engagement and also construct new spaces of  engagement. As far as the regional
actors of  Southwest Finland are concerned, their strategies to secure their spaces of
dependence are fourfold.
Firstly, respondents saw the most important strategy to be the constructing and
maintaining of  suitable conditions for business life, as the provision of  prerequisites
for business life was seen to construct a base for regional competitiveness. One re-
spondent in autumn 2007 emphasised the role of  the public sector as a provider of  the
operational environment for business life as follows:
“We see the role of  the public sector as a provider of  the ope-
rational environment. Private companies are totally responsible
for their competitiveness, but the public administration can as-
sist by creating a favourable operational environment. In earlier
times the most important offerings in terms of  the development
of  the operational environment were coal and steel, but nowadays
Figure 12. An example of  the visualisation of  the territorial positioning of  Turku, capital city
of  Southwest Finland, in the Baltic Sea region (source: Pilot Turku Ltd 2008).
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it is knowledge. This is decisive for the competitiveness of  private
companies, but it also matters more and more in the operation of
public administration.”
This strategy is conducted in order to attract international footloose capital, knowl-
edge-related resources and a skilled labour force. More precisely, the constructing and
maintaining of  suitable conditions for business life was to be carried out by promot-
ing private companies’ networking and business contacts, by applying for funding and
carrying out regional development projects and by ensuring the availability of  regional
business services. Regional actors have established public-private organisations in order
to construct an appropriate operational environment for business life and to promote
the region’s competitive advantages. For instance, Promoting Intermodal Logistics
Operations Turku Ltd (Pilot Turku Ltd) was established in 2003 to promote logis-
tics services and the relocation of  companies in Southwest Finland, while Turku Sci-
ence Park Ltd aims to promote knowledge-based activities in the region and facilitate
the internationalisation of  private companies. This echoes the competition logic and
entrepreneurial strategies which indicate that nowadays regional actors in Finland are
increasingly operating within a competition-oriented territorial regime. This may blur
the state space further and cause interregional tensions as regions  nd themselves in
competitive positions in relation to each other.
As the second strategy, the respondents brought up the development of  region’s
knowledge-related resources and human capital by improving the availability of  edu-
cation possibilities and entrepreneurial knowledge in the region. In this context the
higher education branches were especially emphasised. When considering the knowl-
edge-related resources of  regional actors, they particularly emphasised the importance
of  learning from each other in matters such as applying for  nancial resources for
research and educational projects. Richard Florida’s notion of  “learning regions” which
collect, preserve and facilitate the  ow of  knowledge, ideas and learning by means of
the relevant infrastructure also seems applicable in the context of  Southwest Finland
(see Florida 1995: 528).
The third strategy is linked to the image of  the region in question. It is also closely
connected with the distribution of  information about the region, marketing in par-
ticular. The strategy consists of  marketing the region, interchanging information and
networking both nationally and internationally. The promotion of  regional actors’ in-
terests by means of  lobbying and personal in  uence are core practices in the region’s
information dissemination and marketing strategy. These measures are conducted in
order to bene  t from  nancial resources or to attract international investment and
skilled labour to the region.
The fourth strategy consists of  strengthening regional co-operation in service pro-
duction. This is done in order to enhance the regional identity and coherence. Regional
co-operation is also a prerequisite for  nding the shared strengths and development
strategies in securing the local interests. The construction and sharing of  a regional de-
velopment vision and strategy appeared to be a demanding task for the regional actors,
who emphasised the importance of  disseminating “tacit knowledge” through meetings,
events, projects and routine collaboration. The signi  cance of  internal communication
between regional actors cannot be overemphasised. In some cases, the lack of  internal
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communication between regional actors was considered a hindrance in regional co-op-
eration and in the pursuit of  regional interests. The interviewees therefore proclaimed
their continued willingness to strengthen regional coherence and to lower the organisa-
tional barriers in Southwest Finland.
Constructing new spaces of engagement
In light of  the interviews and policy documents evaluated here it is possible to dis-
tinguish that the base for securing local interests is formed by internal co-operation
between regional actors. The respondents stated that a decreasing resource base was
available for managing the basic tasks of  the organisation, in parallel with the neoliber-
al doctrines of  effectiveness, which call for cost savings, volume bene  ts and the elimi-
nation of  overlapping in the services produced by regional public authorities, and that
this formed the background to internal regional co-operation. The interviewees espe-
cially emphasised the importance of  regional co-operation in the form of  knowledge
sharing. Furthermore, the objectives of  creating, developing and ensuring adequate
preconditions for business life by developing the operational environment and regional
knowledge had the effect of  pushing regional actors into co-operation. Broadly speak-
ing, the region’s internal co-operation consists of  adopting various rules, regimes and
practices. These activities are conducted in order to prepare regional actors to compete
nationally and internationally for  nancial and knowledge-related resources.
Sykes and Shaw (2008: 66) have noted that it is essential for regional actors to ensure
that their region’s interests are heard and represented in national policy. In Finland,
education, particularly knowledge-related issues, and infrastructure were emphasised
as central to the creation of  preconditions for business life. In both of  these policy
sectors concerning infrastructure and education, state governance has a central role
in decision-making which makes the state government a main space of  engagement
for regional actors. The respondents in Southwest Finland clearly expressed their will-
ingness to contribute to the determination of  national government priorities and the
need to obtain  nancial resources in order to stimulate endogenous growth and ensure
regional service production. Despite the coexistently emergent willingness of  regional
actors to develop regionally and locally more autonomous operations, in  uencing in
the central operational preconditions of  regional development (particularly concerning
transport infrastructure and higher education) has remained central for regional actors.
This is so also in a historical context, which indicates that state power has remained
quite centralised in Finland during decades; the de  nite decision-making power has
remained on the state scale when considering these preconditions for regional develop-
ment. The minor allocation or transfer of  state power into local or regional actors has
led to the constant interaction between the state actors, the regional actors and the lo-
cal actors in the interest supervision. Therefore the Finnish peculiarity seems to be that
the state actors, especially the state government, remains as the main space of  engage-
ment in securing the local interests, the space of  dependence.
The local interests of  Southwest Finland with respect to the state actors were enact-
ed through two strategies: the distribution of  information by marketing the area in the
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media and arranging events such as seminars and conferences, and the promotion of
regional interests by lobbying directly or indirectly through various organisations. Per-
sonal relationships, co-operation with members of  parliament, meetings and negotia-
tions formed the basis for pursuing the interests of  Southwest Finland nationally. It is
evident that the state has a crucial role in allocating regional development funding and
in providing the national contribution to projects partly  nancedby the EU. Further-
more, the national administration also safeguards the interests of  subnational projects
in the European Union decision-making process. In this context, it is obvious that the
nation-state will preserve its authority in the key questions of  the European Union, es-
pecially concerning funding and other  nancial issues (Greenwood 1997: 240). All this
contributes to the need for interaction between national and subnational actors and the
need for subnational actors to in  uence decision-makers on a national level.
As Hocking (1997: 98) has presented internationally, the local interests can be ex-
pressed through national governments, through regional agencies or through national
governments via regional agencies. In  uence on external policy can be also expressed
directly in the international system without any intermediaries (Hocking 1997: 98). It
is evident that regional actors can pursue their interests within the EU via regional po-
litical, social and economic networks or clusters (Greenwood 1997: 232). Regional co-
operation may emerge in the form of  either cross-border co-operation (with a shared
frontier) or transregional co-operation (co-operation independent of  frontiers) (Sodupe
1999: 62). In practice, a regional actor’s interests are implemented through networking,
lobbying and active participation in organisations and co-operative relationships, and is
based on the strategic objectives of  actors, the accomplishment of  which may require
the establishment of  particular alliances, agreements and joint projects in the regional
operational environment and interregional co-operation (Williams 1996: 250). Despite
the ongoing state restructuring and spatial transformation of  state power, the impor-
tance of  state actors should not be underestimated in the present politico-economic
development.
The persistence of  the national space of  engagement was in my case study a dis-
tinct feature. The administration of  the European Union and various international
networks, together with co-operative regional administrations had gradually gained a
place alongside the state actors but had not however replaced them. This indicates that
the European Union has gained particular signi  gance as a supplementary source of
 nance but it has not superseded the state actors and the importance of  national politi-
cal space as a “point of  reference” for regional actors (see Rometsch & Wessels 1996:
346).
It is typical for Southwest Finland’s regional actors to promote companies’ interna-
tionalisation and create export possibilities by arranging meetings and contact oppor-
tunities between private companies and foreign authorities. The interchange of  infor-
mation with international actors is considered highly important for this, and therefore
new actors and of  ces have been established to pursue the interests of  regions in Eu-
rope (see Greenwood 1997: 229–230; Kettunen & Kull 2009: 118). The Turku-South-
west Finland European Of  ce, for example, has been established to represent regional
interests in the decision-making processes of  the European Union and to support
interregional co-operation in Europe. In addition, it has the aim of  in  uencing EU
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programmes and subsidy policies. It is the gathering and dissemination of  informa-
tion, however, that lies at the core of  the of  ce’s activities. Even so, international co-
operation and the pursuit of  regional interests are not as well organised internationally
as they are nationally, and therefore shortcomings emerge in strategic co-ordination
practices.
Regional actors aim to secure their local interests. This is done by targeting private
businesses and a skilled labour force in order to attract the relocation of  investments,
companies and individuals. Co-operation between regional actors in the production of
services for private business lies at the core of  their strategies and the Turku Regional
Business Agency known as Potkuri, for instance, was established in 2004 to facilitate
private companies’ access to public business services in Southwest Finland. In addition,
marketing the region in order to gain visibility, distribute information and enhance the
region’s image was emphasised among the regional actors’ core strategies in targeting
private businesses and a skilled labour force.
7.1. Theoretical offerings
The inter- or postdisciplinary research on the changing statehood has provided an in-
formative framework for my study in the speci  c context of  Finland as a Nordic wel-
fare state. The empirical analysis has been motivated on particular theories and concep-
tualisations. Firstly, when considering the vigorous debate on scale and state rescaling
in recent years, it became clear that scale is arguably one of  the most in  uential spatial
concepts. It rather soon became evident, however, that scale cannot be seen as a “geo-
graphical level” or “hierarchy” but rather as one dimension of  socio-political activity,
socially constructed or as a dimension of  socio-political agency. The scale is produced
in political struggles and the rescaling of  statehood also has material consequences.
The material consequences of  state rescaling manifest the intertwining character of
the conceptualisations of  territory and scale; the material consequences of  state rescal-
ing may emerge in state territory, for example as the new territorial divisions of  state
space. Particularly the contributions of  Kevin R. Cox (1998; 2009), Becky Mans  eld
(2005), Neil Brenner (2009), Andrew E. G. Jonas (2011) and the TPSN framework
introduced by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) arrested my attention to the spatial
conceptualisations: adopting the most suitable and accurate theoretical framework and
avoiding one-dimensionalism.
Secondly, when considering the changing statehood, I have studied the discursive
constitution of  economic and political relations (cf. Jessop 2002a: 4–5), in other words
the discursive space in which the political struggles are articulated. When consider-
ing the production of  the changing statehood, particularly Bob Jessop’s (1990, 2002a)
theorisation on the strategic-relational approach provided an insightful framework. It
helped me to understand the reworking, restructuring and rescaling of  statehood in a
speci  c spatio-temporal context. Furthermore, Neil Brenner’s spatialised version of
Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach provided a good framework for discuss-
ing the spatial aspects of  changing statehood. It assisted me in understanding the state
scalar selectivity as an expression, a medium and an outcome of  political strategies
(cf. Brenner 2004a). The approach provided me with a way of  discussing the chang-
ing statehood as a political process. It also assisted in combining the production of
this transformation with its perceived spatial consequences. In the empirical chapters, I
have concentrated on the interaction between the state and its territory mainly on two
political spaces that of  “national” and “regional”; the changing relationship between
space and power on the changing statehood and the regional actors’ ways of  under-
standing and responding to this change.
7. Discussion
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7.2. Four eras of  state strategies – temporal-contentual characterisation
of  the state’s key dimensions
I have studied the interaction between state apparatus and state space from the mid-
1960s up to the present time. I have suggested that alongside the of  cial regional poli-
cy, also other policy  elds fundamentally impact on the changing statehood. Therefore,
when considering the study of  changing statehood, other policy  elds such as educa-
tion policy and transport policy should also be taken into account. By studying the
state budgets I found out that particularly the contemporary education, investment
and regional policies were manifested as the central policy sectors which enforced the
changing statehood.
In general, in the analysis of  state budgets from 1965 to 2011 I argued that Finland
is gradually sliding from a “one nation” regime of  accumulation towards a regime em-
blematic of  competition states as the principles emblematic of  a competition-oriented
state have been adopted. However, the transformation of  statehood should not be
seen as a linear continuum. Rather the Finnish peculiarity seems to be that the willing-
ness to give up the objective of  the balanced regional development has not taken place
uniformly and strong opposition has emerged towards the change, particularly towards
the spatial aspects of  change. This points out that the question is not about eroding
or ending of  the welfare state but rather “trimming” it in the face of  changing politi-
cal problems. This also indicates that the regimes of  the competition state and welfare
state should not be set as opposite regimes to each other or considered as an inevitable
continuum from the past up to the present but rather to focus on their path-depend-
ent, and intertwined characteristics in a speci  c geographical context.
On a general level, the  ndings emphasise that the interaction between the Finnish
state and its territory has fundamentally changed over the past  fty years. I have un-
derstood state strategies as responses to the “central political problem of  the govern-
ment” at a given time. The change in the perceived political problems and ways of  re-
sponding to those problems have in  uenced the changing statehood. As a result of  my
examination on state strategies, I identi  ed four eras of  changing state strategies (Table
9). Furthermore, I have characterised the general temporal-contentual key dimensions
of  the state (Table 10).
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Table 9. The changing strategies of  the Finnish state, 1965–2011.
Epoch
The changing strategies of  the state
Know-how Investments Regional policies
1960–1970









• Extension of  the higher
education network to the
“development regions”.
• Direction of  student
places into the develop-
ment regions.




and state activities in the
“development regions”.
• Major public investments
in the production infra-
structure.
• Financial assistance for
state-owned companies.






• State actions are seen









• Development of  the sys-
tem of  higher education.






• The incorporation of
state-owned companies
begins.
• The rhetoric of  “develop-
ment regions” decreases.
• The concept of  competi-
tiveness is present in the
budget rhetoric.
• The ideology of  welfare
state equality is begin-
ning to alter towards the





• R&D activity and higher
education are both highly
valued.
• The role of  innovations
is emphasised in budget
argumentation.
• Effectiveness is imple-
mented in the  eld of
education.
• Non-material invest-
ments become central to
budgets.
• The role of  the state
is understood as that








• Urban and rural politics













• Knowledge and innova-
tions are at the core of
state’s survival strategies
in global competition.





reform and creation of
larger high education
branches.
• R&D investments 4% of
GDP.
• The state as a remover of
market obstacles.
• In rhetoric, regional
equality has (at least part-
ly) become replaced with
the reduction of  regional
disparities in the develop-
ment prerequisites.
• Regional innovation
policy has emerged along-
side the regional policy.
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The  rst era of  changing state strategies was the era of  inward-looking state strate-
gies with the objective of  territorial equalisation in the 1960s and 1970s in which the
accumulation regime of  Atlantic Fordism was discursively, institutionally and practical-
ly materialised as the Keynesian welfare state aimed at full employment, the provision
of  infrastructure and welfare services and spatially equal and balanced development
(cf. Jessop 2002a: 55). At the beginning of  the era, the mode of  production was mainly
agricultural, but industrialising. The political strategies that developed in Finland from
the 1960s onwards highlighted  rstly national integrity, social cohesion, societal order
as well as the national economic growth which has remained a central objective of
state governance throughout the decades although methods of  producing the growth
have changed. These issues were closely connected to the security policy concerns of
the state and the state space acquired a security-political meaning. That to say the state
apparatus focused on guaranteeing societal order and preventing the radical resistance
movements in state space by enhancing the national social and territorial integrity and
equality. The state space was also seen as a strategic asset of  the state, a kind of  spatial
capital. The strategies of  enhancing national survival and success had a tendency to
be inward-looking, with indicators of  “welfare” and “national competitiveness”. This
is also manifested in the way national government understanding the “primary space
of  action” as distinctly national. The regional policy was the characteristic policy sec-
tor in the construction of  the politics of  “one nation” with a highly materialistic role
in development. In particular, the construction of  the politics of  one nation was en-
forced through providing equal education opportunities, constructing basic infrastruc-
ture such as transport connections and state-owned production infrastructure across
the state space, maintaining full employment and promoting even distribution of  set-
tlement across the state space in order to generate social and territorial integrity and
cohesion. This indicates the expansion of  state infrastructural power across state space
through public investments, state planning, transfer payments and subsidies which ho-
mogenised the state space. In parallel, the planning system was centralised and hier-
archical, and regions implemented the nationally set objectives. The politics of  “one
nation” became visible in state space as a spatial structure of  spatially decentralised
welfare state.
Secondly, the principles of  competition and spatial differentiation gradually emerged
in state strategies from the late 1970s onwards as the security-political meaning of  state
space decreased and markets were opened. The state strategies began to change being
both inwards and outwards-looking during the 1980s. The restructuring of  the Finnish
welfare state and a change in state strategies were both evident by the early 1980s. De-
spite the gradual change in the focus of  state strategies, the politics of  one nation was,
however, still present in state budget rhetoric throughout the 1980s. The logic of  the
competition state began to be realised in earnest from the late 1980s onwards as a new
regime of  accumulation. New emphasis emerged alongside the principles of  social and
territorial equality in the 1990s as the valuation of  education, immaterial investments
and knowledge increased.
Thirdly, in the 1990s the state was characterised as an outward-looking state with the
emergent competition strategies. Regional policy gained symbolic-discursive aspects
alongside its materialistic characteristics. The characteristic policy sectors were urban
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policy and programme-based regional policy: principles of  regional endogenicity, en-
dogenous growth of  regions and regional competitiveness emerged particularly in rela-
tion to the international space of  action. In general, the role of  state altered towards
the provider of  economic preconditions for endogenous regions. After the relatively
slow opening up of  Finland to the world economy and fairly late adoption of  neolib-
eral principles, the doctrines of  neoliberalism have nevertheless been increasingly in  u-
ential – particularly since the economic depression of  the 1990s which caused policy
actors to reconsider the ideological bases for the spatially decentralised welfare state.
Therefore the intertwined logic of  competition and “one nation politics” emerged as
a spatial structure of  a decentralised competition state and as a polycentric urban net-
work.
Fourthly, innovations, knowledge and education further raised their importance
throughout the 2000s in the face of  a new phase of  globalization as the Finnish society
was heading towards the innovation intensive knowledge-based society. This indicates
that the transformation of  statehood has further continued during the 2000s. The po-
litical problem of  state governance has attained a neoliberal, competition-oriented tone
as the present political problem of  the state – securing and developing competitiveness
in global competition – has brought the ability to compete to the core of  state strate-
gies. The objectives of  attraction of  transnational footloose capital and constructing
the preconditions for private businesses have raised immaterial investments, that is to
say investments in education, innovations and technology central for “the surviving
strategies”. It seems that economic matters, pro  tability, productivity, effectiveness and
economic growth have clearly superseded the security-political concerns of  the state
and the valuation of  state space has changed; territory of  state is no longer seen as
a spatial capital. From the mid-2000s onwards the characteristic policy sectors were
the metropolitan policy and innovation policy: the statehood was spatially centralis-
ing and also perceived as polarised by key regional actors. Presently, the role of  the
state is particularly central in promoting the metropolitan region and in “opening up”
and internationalising the state space further. The role of  regional policy was becom-
ing increasingly symbolic and discursive. However, the role of  regional policy remains
central in de  ning particular territorial divisions between the peripheral regions and
the growth regions. When considering the changing statehood, the polycentric urban
model has become challenged by the presented visions of  state spatiality: metropolitan
state, regional innovation centres and the model of  network metropolitan region.
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Table 10. Temporal-contentual characterisation of  state’s key dimensions.














































of  state space,
infrastructural power of  state,
one nation politics
endogenous growth of  regions,
competitiveness of  regions,
polycentricity
polarisation and centralisation
of  state space
The role of
state actors
the meaning of  the state as a
generator of  social cohesion
and societal order
the role of  the state as a




the role of  state in promoting a
metropolitan region,
the role of  state in “opening







state space as strategic asset
opening of  markets,
decrease in security-political
meaning of  state space,
emerge of  the competition
state regime














regions realise nationally set




relation to international scale
regions de  ne their territorial
position in relation to metro-
politan region (favouritism)
127Discussion
I suggest that the understanding and reasoning of  competitiveness of  the state has
changed remarkably from the 1970s up to the present time. The concept of  competi-
tiveness referred to a need to develop national competitiveness in international trade
through active labour and education policies and state investments in the early 1970s
as the term competitiveness referred mainly to the price competitiveness of  the state
owned industries. The balanced economic and regional development, stable societal
development, stable and full employment were seen to construct national welfare in
general and also enhance national competitiveness, in other words the national com-
petitiveness was seen as spatial in nature.  However, the meaning of  the term com-
petitiveness has gained new emphasis with emergence of  competition-oriented growth
policy. It was now the international competitiveness of  the state which became empha-
sised and not the price competitiveness typical of  the 1970s and 1980s. The rhetoric
of  balanced national development as a precondition for national competitiveness and
welfare has been replaced with measures to concentrate particularly on those regions
producing growth and having “competitive advantages”: the concentration of  state re-
sources to the most productive regions has be seen to increase the ability of  the Finn-
ish state to compete in international politico-economic space.
Alongside the conceptualisation on competitiveness, the content of  regional devel-
opment has become re-conceptualised. Enhancing the “ability to develop competitive-
ness” and “competitive advantages” rather than actually “developing competitiveness”
has emerged as an objective alongside the principle of  endogenous regional develop-
ment. That is to say that the responsibility of  regional competitiveness and regional
development is seen as transferred to regional actors themselves. In this transforma-
tion the role of  the state has altered from a “government” sharing state subsidies in a
top-down manner towards a “governor” securing adequate resources for the endog-
enous development of  regions. Although the role of  the state is changing, the state
itself  is not disappearing or hollowing out. As the notable political-economic decisions
concerning the statehood are still made in the context of  the state, this makes the state
the crucial institutional site and discursive framework in which the political struggles
of  changing statehood are engaged (cf. Jessop 2002a: 212). In this context, the exist-
ing, everyday struggles and con  icts in politics and the role of, for instance, electoral
politics in the shaping of  subnational state geographies and state territories would sup-
plement the examination on the changing statehood (e.g. Ward & Jonas 2004). This is
a research subject which has not been at the core of  my examination but which would
merit more academic attention.
7.3. Contested forms of  urbanisation
The transformation of  statehood has led to a spatial restructuring of  state and to a
re-conceptualisation of  the state space, i.e. the spatial manifestation of  state power.
Competing state spatial strategies have emerged aiming to enhance the competitiveness
and “survival” of  Finland in various global politico-economic arenas. A transforma-
tion in state spatial projects and strategies can be expected to have a profound impact
on spatiality. I have argued that the spatial policy in the early 2000s differs from the
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spatial policy of  the 2010s. Although a consensus had not been reached in Finnish
public discussions and rhetoric regarding the future direction of  the country’s spatial
development in the early 2000s, development seems to be heading towards a spatially
centralising statehood. In the early 2000s, the large city-regions were increasingly being
seen as generators of  economic growth in the state space in Finland. This points to an
ongoing neoliberal urbanisation in Finland and a process of  discarding of  policies that
concentrate on rural centres for the generation of  growth.
After the economic recession of  the 2008, a need for a further change emerged in
order to enhance Finland’s competitiveness in tightening global markets. Metropolitan
and innovation policies have become established measures to respond to the emerging
politico-economic challenges. The recently adopted scale-speci  c spatial policies are
evidently being concentrated especially on promoting the development of  the Helsinki
metropolitan region; the metropolitan region is clearly perceived as a new “scale” or
“space of  action”. A strong metropolitan region has been seen as a growth engine for
the national economy and as a prerequisite for the state success in global competition,
the state spatial strategy for “surviving”. This indicates that a consensus on the neces-
sity of  constructing a competitive metropolitan region has been reached although its
concrete spatial structure remains unclear; visions of  metropolitan state, regional inno-
vation centres and network metropolitan region have been presented.
The arguments which allude to the idea of  a concentration of  resources in the Hel-
sinki metropolitan region represent to some extent the opposite approach to that of
balanced development that previously dominated discourses on state spatiality. The
change has already taken place in societal values; territorial differentiation and spatial
selectivity within the state have become gradually accepted. The meaning of  state space
as spatial capital has further decreased and state spatiality has become valued in a dif-
ferentiated way. The future direction for state investment priorities between the most
competitive growth regions and the principle of  spatially equal distribution remains
somewhat unclear, the situation may lead to con  icting viewpoints among regional ac-
tors in Finland. However, it actually seems that presently the competing state territorial
forms were those of  spatially decentralised competition state and metropolitan state;
the two competing forms of  urbanisation in Finland. In other words, although neolib-
eral urbanisation is visible in Finland, its various forms are being contested politically.
The centralising spatiality of  the Finnish state has not been approved without ob-
jections. The values and views of  regional actors and citizens have become central to
this because in the end the operation of  the political system depends on the legitimacy
accorded to it by the people. Already before the economic recession of  2008 the re-
entry of  a strong state was elicited in public discussions (Ryynänen 2009: 18). There is
a need for further research to ascertain whether the present development is a phase in
the long development, or if  a pendulum is heading back towards the territorially equal
spatiality of  the Keynesian welfare state in the long run.
Inequalities are expressed spatially through the polarisation of  development among
different territories, regions, places and scales and this may also generate regulatory
problems (Brenner 2004a: 12–14). I propose that the spatial polarisation of  Finland
clearly merits more research as the meaning and importance of  remote and rural re-
gions in Finland will eventually become questioned. The polarisation, however, may not
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be only a Finnish peculiarity but may well be an integral aspect of  the recent neoliberal
trimming of  state space in various contexts. Although some individual capitals may
 nd the bene  ts of  scale economies and other externalities of  the differentiation or
even the polarisation of  regional development between urban and peripheral regions,
this development may, however, destabilise the space-economy and generate dysfunc-
tional political-economic effects (Brenner 2004a: 14). In the Finnish case it would be
important to establish what kind of  importance will be attributed to the peripheral,
scarcely populated regions in the transformation of  state spatiality and how this would
interfere with political movements in Finland e.g. would it promote radical resistance
movements particularly in territorial peripheries.
7.4. The persistence of  the national space of  engagement
Regional actors’ have responded to the ongoing transformation of  statehood and de-
veloped new ways of  securing the local interests, their spaces of  dependence (see Cox
1998). In my empirical examination, however, it became clear that merely focusing on
the questions of  scale did not provide an adequate perspective on the issue. Despite
the fact that scale is arguably one of  the basic dimensions of  social practise and cannot
therefore be ignored, alone it was not enough in discussing the multi-level, overlap-
ping and similarly occurring activity of  the key regional actors in securing their spaces
of  dependence. Therefore the enquiry into regional actors ways to secure their spaces
of  dependence and constructing new spaces of  engagement provided an insightful
approach to discuss both the rescaling of  the state and also to consider national or
international not as scales but rather as dimensions of  politico-economic practices (cf.
Mans  eld 2005: 458).
I have demonstrated that the persistence of  national space is evident as the most
important space of  engagement for regional actors despite of  the intensifying Europe-
an integration and the attempts to foster the European regional system. My argument
therefore is that the national space has persisted as the primary space of  engagement
in securing the interests of  local or regional actors which the international scale, ac-
tors or networks have not superseded but rather gained importance in offering mainly
 nancial supplements. I noticed that among respondents the secondary spaces of  en-
gagements (European etc.) are understood as supplements to the national operational
environment of  regional policy rather than “spaces of  competition” themselves.
When considering the territorial positioning of  the case study region, Southwest
Finland, in a multi-level operational environment, the symbolic-discursive understand-
ing of  the conceptualisation of  a regional scale becomes signi  cant. This is so be-
cause the reworking, restructuring and re-conceptualisation of  the regional scale in a
multi-level operational environment constructs both discursive but also material conse-
quences on state spatiality and state territoriality, like the concrete rescaling of  the pub-
lic administration; the fundamental reforming of  the state’s regional administration in
where the decision-making power and  nancing are greatly transferred into subnational
administrative levels. The core question is about the political process of  enhancing the
material, symbolic and discursive aspects of  the regional scale; in other words to secure
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the spaces of  dependence in multi-level actor networks. When discussing the spatial
transformation of  state power into the regions, the regional actors clearly expressed
their willingness for further devolution of  state power and  nancial resources, at the
same time emphasising the importance of  strengthening the identity and coherence of
their region. These tendencies may indicate that Finnish regions are likely to become
constituted as stronger territorial units in the future, in other words they point to a
further institutionalisation of  regions in the scalar restructuration of  the Finnish state.
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OHJEET TAULUKON TÄYTTÄMISEKSI
1. Kaikki 36 korttia sisältävät väittämän tai mielipiteen. Korteissa olevat numerot ovat satunnaisessa
järjestyksessä. Järjestä väitteet mielipiteitäsi vastaaviksi. Lue ensin väitteet läpi ja jaa ne kol-
meen ryhmään:
a. väitteisiin, jotka vastaavat mielipidettäsi
b. väitteisiin, jotka eivät vastaa mielipidettäsi sekä
c. väitteisiin, joista sinulla ei ole mielipidettä tai joita et koe merkityksellisiksi.
2. Aseta väittämät taulukkoon. Taulukon vasemman puolen negatiiviset luvut kuvastavat sitä, ettei
väite ole näkökulmasi mukainen (-5 on vähiten näkökulmasi mukainen). Taulukon keskellä sijaitseva
0 kuvastaa neutraalia mielipidettä ja taulukon oikealla puolella sijaitsevat positiiviset luvut väittämän
ja mielipiteesi samankaltaisuutta (5 on eniten näkökulmasi mukainen). Aseta väittämät taulukkoon
siten, että ne väittämät, joiden kanssa olet samaa mieltä, tulevat taulukon positiiviselle puolelle (ei
ole merkitystä, mikä väittämistä on ylin, ja mikä alin). Ne väittämät, jotka ovat vähiten näkökulmasi
mukaisia, asetetaan taulukkoon negatiiviselle puolelle siten, että -5 osoittaa mielipiteesi ja väittämän
välistä suurinta eroa. Huomioi, että jokaiseen ruutuun voidaan asettaa vain yksi väite.
3. Kun olet asettanut väittämät mieleiseesi järjestykseen, kirjoita väittämän numero taulukkoon
sille kohdalle, johon se mielestäsi kuuluu.
4. Tämän jälkeen vastaa lyhyesti seuraaviin kysymyksiin.
a) Vastaajan nimi:____________________________________________
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Ideal scores in factors I and II.
Statement I II
1. Fast and reasonably priced telecommunications and transport connections are of
central importance for the competitiveness of  regions. 3 5
2. It is possible in Finland to maintain only three top-rank universities capable of  reach-
ing international standards. We should concentrate on the development of  those three
universities.
-5 -1
3. If  society invests heavily on developing the Helsinki region, the competitiveness of
our economy will decline signi  cantly because of  increasing costs. 0 -2
4. Those places where growth is generated will increase in importance in future regional
policies. 1 4
5. The concern over regional inequality and a division of  the nation into privileged and
less privileged is justi  able. 4 0
6. Finland will inevitably be divided into two parts; one of  progress and one of  regres-
sion. 0 -2
7. From the 1960s to the 1990s the state was the main driving force behind the success
of  Lapland. Now it is assuming the role of  a bystander and even creating new problems. 0 -1
8. The regional policy approach seems to have disappeared and has been replaced by a
quiet acceptance of  the fact that different parts of  the country are developing differ-
ently.
1 0
9. The Helsinki region is not large enough to constitute a metropolis. It is better to
create something small and special. The whole of  Finland as an item of  export is more
impressive than the Helsinki region alone.
0 0
10. Special rights and an autonomous status (as in Åland) should also be granted to
Lapland. -1 -5
11. The idea of  decentralisation is outdated. -2 -1
12. The welfare differences between regions are minor, the accessibility of  services is
assured and basic public services are operated well throughout the state territory, even
in the sparsely populated rural areas.
-4 0
13. In terms of  Finland’s competitiveness it is sensible to invest in small and medium-
sized cities, which usually are the most cost-ef  cient. 0 1
14. The state has recently been taking smaller and larger steps in retreating towards the
capital city. Now it is time for it to return, not only to some regional centres but to all
corners of  the country.
1 -1
15. The network of  higher education institutions in its current form is wide and frag-
mented, with plenty of  room for improvement. -3 2
16. Highway investments must be targeted at areas with traf  c and people. -2 3
17. It is not fair that the limited funding of  road maintenance is directed ever increas-
ingly to densely populated Southern Finland. 1 -3
18. Both polytechnics and universities are important generators of  regional develop-
ment. 3 4
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19. Large metropolitan regions are becoming more and more important to the success,
welfare and economics of  the whole country as a lot innovations, new information and
expertise is produced in those areas.
-1 2
20. The state is giving up its wide responsibility of  regional development and focusing
the most innovative economic development measures to major cities. 1 0
21. Financial resources are adequately provided for regional development. -4 -3
22. The state has been “retreating” to the south in the last decades, focusing its opera-
tions on the Helsinki area even though regionalisation has been emphasized in public
discussion.
2 1
23. There is no returning to a decentralised welfare state. -2 -2
24. The metropolisation of  Helsinki would also lessen the con  ict between Helsinki and
the rest of  Finland. -2 1
25. Setting the focus on metropolises is costly to society. 0 -2
26. The Nordic welfare state model provides a competitive advantage for Finland even
today. 2 3
27. It is true that Lapland has lost all of  its political weight in Finland. -1 -4
28. Decentralisation of  the central administration represents sensible regional policy. It
is important for the provinces that the decentralization trend continue. 2 2
29. The maintaining of  settlement practically throughout the country remains a viable
aim for Finnish social policy, and a compensatory regional policy is a good instrument
for achieving this.
4 1
30. It is more pro  table to invest in the development of  major cities than in that of
other areas. -3 0
31. We must stop talking about university merges or decreasing the higher education
institution network in conjunction with regional policy. 2 -1
32. The powerful metropolitan region that is developing around Helsinki is a necessary
factor for Finland’s future success. -1 1
33. Stable social circumstances, an egalitarian society, knowledge and human capital are
success factors in the global economy. A regionally unequal society may lead to the ero-
sion of  these success factors and the erosion of  competitiveness based on them.
5 3
34. It is possible to decentralise the government within the Helsinki metropolitan
region. -3 -4
35. Somehow it seems that the decision-makers have been focusing more and more on
Southern Finland while forgetting the eastern and northern parts of  the country. -1 -3
36. The state has to begin taking responsibility once again for the regional
impacts of  its own actions. 3 2


